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STUDENT PROJECT
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS TEN YEARS AFTER BIVENS
The poorest man may, in his .cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; but the King of
England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
Sir William Pitt, quoted in
I T. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LMi-

TATIONS 611 (8th ed. 1927)

If there be a country in the world where the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people can be fairly appreciated ... that country
is assuredlyAmerica.
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55

(rev. ed. 1899)
A few plain and practical rules will do for a wandering horde of
savages, but they must and will be much more extensively ramified when civilization has polished, and commerce and arts and
agriculture enriched, a nation.
Judge Turley, Jacob v.
State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.)
Rep. 493, 515 (1842)
For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing.
Mr. Justice Harlan (concurring in the judgment), Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971)
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INTRODUCTION

The American experience has been uniquely institutional. For
more than two-hundred years, great social change has found acceptance, even if at times overdue, in one of the fora of government. If "[t]he idea of perfectibility is . . .as old as the world,"'
the framers of the Constitution were prescient in providing a system capable not only of withstanding change but also of integrating
the ideals of new and different eras. Thus our idiosyncratic mix of
freedom and equality, constantly changing, gaining content, and
seeking coexistence, has been well served in the most pluralistic of
societies. Our institutions have avoided the indelible "stamp of the
2
age in which they were first hammered out."
The judiciary has played an increasingly important role in this
evolution. Because "the Constitution proceeds by briefly indicating
certain fundamental principles whose specific implications for each
age must be determined in contemporary context," 3 the impact of
the judicial role has been particularly strong in the last several de1. 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 34 (rev. ed. 1899).
2.
3.

G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 5 (1977).
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:943

cades. While one is tempted to trace the start of this era to the
Brown decision 4 in 1954, it is more properly viewed as beginning
just after the executive and legislative branches of the federal government started to assert themselves during the Roosevelt years.
The massive increase in the scope and reach of the national government demanded, in its wake, an active (if not an activist) federal
judiciary. 5 Thus the increased power of the executive was questioned; 6 the power of Congress condemned but quickly given new
life;7 the right of all people to share in the success of new-found
prosperity8 affirmed and reaffirmed. 9
The tripartite institutional structure proved as malleable as the
laws it produced. A fourth branch of government, exhibiting characteristics of each of its progenitors, emerged in the form of an
administrative bureaucracy. 10 One hundred years before the New
Deal, Tocqueville wrote: "Public officers in the United States are
commingled with the crowd of citizens; they have neither palaces, nor guards, nor ceremonial costumes."" A century later, "a
host of zealous lawyers and academics descended upon the nation's
capital with a strong belief in the inevitability and viability of centralized economic planning."' 12 The arrival of the bureaucrats presented an age-old dichotomy: As the new servants of government
sought an egalitarian economics, they threatened the privacy and
welfare of their intended beneficiaries. 18 Just as Icarus had ignored
the warnings of Daedalus and soared too high with the Daedalian
wings, the administrative state seemed to have forgotten the warnings of the Constitution's framers:
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
5.

Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.

REV. 1669, 1671-81 (1975); see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 567-95

(1973).
6. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
7. Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) and A.L.A. Schechter

Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
8. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 575-76.

9. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
10. Stewart, supra note 5, at 1671-88.
11.

1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 209.
S. BREYER & R. STEVART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAV AND REGULATORY POLICY 27 (1979).
13. Compare Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) with B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 100-01 (1976) (criticizing Wyman rule allowing termination of
12.

welfare benefits on refusal of periodic home inspection).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss3/5
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[T]here is in the nature of sovereign power an impatience of
controul, that disposes those who are invested with the exercise
of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens that in
every political association . . . there will be found a kind of excentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off
from the common center.14

When Webster Bivens ified his complaint pro se in federal
district court in 1967,15 he was no doubt primarily concerned that

he be afforded relief for injury suffered at the hands of federal
agents. Bivens' case, however, represented much more than a variation on the theme of common law torts. Decades of centralization

had left some with the view that the sanctity of the federal
functionary-or of the federal government-was somehow as worthy of protection as the constitutional rights of the individual citizen. 1 ' "'The will of the nation,' " however, "is one of those expressions which have been most profusely abused by the wily and
the despotic of every age. . . . [S]ome have even discovered it in
the silence of a people, on the supposition that the fact of submission established the right of command.- 17 Webster Bivens' pro se
action thus served to remind us that "[e]lected magistrates do not

make the American democracy flourish; it flourishes because the
8
magistrates are elective.'

It is now ten years since the Supreme Court held that Webster Bivens was entitled to damages for the violation of his fourth
amendment rights. 19 The decision stands as a microcosm of Ameri-

can constitutional law. Questions of federalism, separation of pow-

14. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 96-97 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see 5
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269 (G. Hunt ed. 1904): "[T]he invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the
sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents."
15. Complaint at 2, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp 12 (1967), affd on other grounds, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir.
1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
16. E.g., Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 756-71 (1964).
17. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 55.
18. 2 id. at 112.
19. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). The apparent contradiction in the case name occurred because
the United States attorney supplied the names of the federal agents involved after
Bivens had filed suit. Brief for Respondents at 2 n.1.
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ers, and constitutional interpretation were all raised in the argument of the case. As with most groundbreaking decisions, 20 Bivens
raised more questions than it answered; the past ten years have
seen an attempt by the federal courts to deal with those questions.
This Project will attempt to define the legitimate contours of a
federal cause of action for the monetary redress of constitutional violations by establishing a normative theory for the judiciary's role.
Section II will provide historical justifications based largely on the
relationship between the judiciary and other branches of government on one hand and between the individual and government on
the other. Section III will trace the development of the cause of
action in light of the perspectives offered in the previous section.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections will examine possible limitations on the action: Section IV will deal with procedural obstacles
to the institution of the cause of action; section V will consider the
defenses and immunities available to those properly brought into
court; section VI will propose an organic theory of damages intended to satisfy the plaintiff's compensatory needs, the citizenry's
concern with deterrence, and the system's goal of constitutional
perpetuation. In conclusion, the Project will suggest that the vitalof,
ity of the Bivens cause of action is consistent with, supportive
21
and compelled by "['t]he very essence of civil liberty."
II.

HisTORicAL PERSPECTIVES

A. Federalismand the Creation of the Supreme Court
The development of a federally enforced remedy for the vindication of federal constitutional rights would seem at first blush not
to implicate questions concerning the proper allocation of powers
between the several state governments and the federal government.' In considering the history of constitutional jurisprudence,
however, it becomes clear that the relatively late recognition of an
implied damage remedy parallels, at least in part, changing notions
of federalism. In the beginning, the framers of the Constitution
20. E.g., compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) with
Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) and Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430 (1968) and Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1).
21. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).

1. But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-3, at 17 (1978)
(arguing that issues which apparently touch on only separation-of-powers concerns
often also implicate federalism concerns).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss3/5
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were acutely aware of the colonial experience with the King of
England and sought to avoid the creation of a domineering central
authority for the new nation. 2 The Constitution came to be viewed
by many as "the only guarantee against centralization." 3 Thus any
assertion that the federal courts were the proper forum for the re-

by a federal official could logically
dress of rights allegedly violated
4

have been viewed as ironic.

The framers attempted to deal with the enforcement concern
by providing for the concurrent exercise of executive, judicial, and

legislative powers by the federal government and the state governments. This design was intended to foster state control of purely
state matters and national control of federal matters. 5 Providing

definition to this distribution, however, has proven to be an exceedingly difficult task. James Madison, in addressing opposition to

constitutional ratification, emphasized that those powers granted
the federal government were to be exercised primarily in external

affairs, while state power would extend to all those objects which
in the course of ordinary affairs concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people. 6 At the same time, it has been recognized

that the "Madisonian clockwork would enable the forces and counterforces of government to mesh as needed . . . to shield the individual and community from governmental oppression and discrimination." 7 Thus, even if the power to protect individual rights was
2. During the course of the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1,
17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979)), a leading opponent
of increased federal power construed the Constitution as a "document, which fulminated anathemas against George III as a tyrant unfit to rule a free people." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 351 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Beck); see G. GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 22-25 (1977).
3. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Swann).
4. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1538-40 (1972); Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory
Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 207-09 (1969); White, The Path of American Jurisprudence, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1212, 1223 (1976). Lord Acton wrote that "the distribution of power among several States is the best check on democracy.... It is the protectorate of minorities and the consecration of self-government." J. ACTON, The
History of Freedom in Antiquity, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 49, 49 (1948).
Indeed, the government referred to the irony of the plaintiff's assertion in Bivens.
Brief for Respondent at 12, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The various Bivens opinions will hereinafter be cited
as Bivens.
5. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 41-46 (J. Madison); Commager, The Constitution:
Was it an Economic Document?, in I AMERICAN HISTORY (A. Eisenstadt ed. 1962).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. Madison).
7. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 2-1, at 15 (emphasis added). Indeed, one authority
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seen at the time of the revolution 8 to properly rest in state government, it could have been equally well argued that the pendulum of

authority was to swing as suggested by the course of a history yet
to unfold. 9
The endorsement of a cause of action in federal court for the
redress of a constitutional violation can be seen as an outgrowth of

the development of the federal judicial system. The founders'
agreement that a national judiciary should be established 0 masked
their differences as to the form and jurisdiction of that tribunal.
The provision in the plans of the convention for a Supreme Court
met little resistance, a fact left without illumination in the rec-

ords of the Convention. The proposal for inferior federal courts,
however, met strong opposition, apparently founded on a fear that

their establishment would lead to federal judicial usurpation of
state court power. 12

has found that Madison himself believed at different times both "that the general
government was the only logical agency of interpretation, and that the states had to
be the final judges of the meaning of the Constitution." Ketcham, James Madison
andJudicialReview, 8 SYR. L. REv. 158, 160 (1957).
8. Professor Crosskey was one of a very few scholars to suggest that the framers
intended the federal judiciary to have jurisdiction over questions of substantive law.
See 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE

UNITED STATES 711-19 (1953). His thesis met particularly strong criticism, which
was evaluated in Gilmore, The Age of Antiquarius on Legal History in a Time of
Troubles, 39 U. CH. L. REV. 475, 485-87 (1972).
9. "'Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE." THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 553 (A. Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961).
10. "That there should be a national judiciary was readily accepted by all." M.
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 79 (1913).

11. All plans considered included establishment of a Supreme Court. See 1
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21-22, 244, 292 (rev. ed,
M. Farrand ed. 1937); 2 id. at 432; 3 id. at 600. Professors Hart and Wechsler discuss
the agreement to a federal judiciary by the participants of the Constitutional Convention as being arrived at without discussion. The idea of a federal tribunal had some
precedent in colonial times but the proposal at the Convention was an innovation in
that it established a national tribunal with judicial power to be joined with executive
and legislative branches as part of a national government. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 4-6 (2d ed. 1973); see THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton).
12. "The most serious question was that of the inferior courts. The difficulty
lay in the fact that they were regarded as an encroachment upon the rights of the individual states. It was claimed that the state courts were perfectly competent for the
work required, and that it would be quite sufficient to grant an appeal from them to
the national supreme court." M. FARRAND, supra note 10, at 79-80; accord, THE
FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss3/5
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The Convention eventually agreed to leave that issue to the

dictates of Congress. 13 While the vote accepting the "no plan"

compromise was unanimous, 14 it cannot obscure the fact that the

framers clearly foresaw a preeminent role for Supreme Court review of state court decisions (and by implication all decisions) affecting constitutional interests. In predicting their relationship,

Alexander Hamilton argued that
the national and State systems are to be regarded as ONE
WHOLE. The courts of the latter will of course be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the union, and an appeal
from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal which is destined
to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice and the
rules of national decisions. 15
While Hamilton's view was largely descriptive, Thomas Jefferson
offered a normative justification for judicial enforcement of the Bill
of Rights, conceiving of the federal judiciary as "a body, which if
rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own department
merits great confidence for their learning and integrity."' 16
Thus, although in the interests of federalism the framers
avoided the institution of lower federal courts, they nonetheless
struck a balance between state and federal authority by providing
for Supreme Court review of constitutional questions. 17 That

power, however, was never explicitly defined in terms of interpre13.

"The decision that was reached was characteristic of much of the later

work; at this early stage of the proceedings, it might be regarded as prophetic of the
ultimate outcome of the convention's labors. In other words, the matter was compromised: inferior courts were not required, but the national legislature was permitted
to establish them." M. FARIAND, supra note 10, at 80 (emphasis in original). The
plans submitted to the Convention ranged from mandatory establishment of inferior
federal tribunals to the states'-rights position of allowing state tribunals the power of
decision in the first instance. P. BATOR, P. MISHIciN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
supra note 11, at 11.
14.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at

45-46.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 556 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
16. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (March 15, 1789), reprinted
in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659, 659 (J. Boyd ed. 1958). Jefferson's

observations concerning the quality of the federal judiciary merit particular attention
since state court judges frequently had little or no legal training. D. BOORSTIN, THE
AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 199-200 (1958); G. GILMORE, supra note 2,
at 21-22; W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw 32-33 (1975); Fisher,
The Administration of Equity Through Common Law, I LAw Q. REV. 455, 456

(1885).
17. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1: "The judicial power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution .... "
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tive, injunctive, or remedial authority.18 Moreover, with only one
federal court extant, the opportunities for the national judiciary to

inform the construction and application of constitutional law were
necessarily limited.
B.

The Role of Inferior Courts in a Federal System

Given the limits imposed on the Supreme Court, the early de-

velopment of constitutional interpretation, at least as to individual
rights, was left largely to the state courts. 19 The Judiciary Act of
1789,20 which was the twentieth enactment of the First Congress,
established inferior federal courts. The original jurisdictional grant

to these courts, however, did not include power to hear cases
arising under the Constitution. Until 1875, when Congress removed this barrier, 21 remedies for constitutional violations rested
within the authority of state tribunals, though subject to review by

the Supreme Court. The state courts developed a political admixture of American and British precedent. 22 While it was not considered binding on American courts, "the common law was from the

first looked upon by the colonists as a system of positive and subsidiary law, applying where not replaced by colonial enactments or

by special custom suited to new conditions." 23 The common law
analogue applied with equal force to constitutional as well as statutory interpretation. As the Supreme Court recognized in 1887,
"[t]he interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is
necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in

the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the
24
light of its history."

18. See text accompanying notes 100-118 infra.
19. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE LAW N AMERICA 31-37 (1974).
20. Ch. 20, §§ 2-5, 1 Stat. 73 (italic in original) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
41, 43, 81-132 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)):
§ 2. And be it further enacted, That the United States shall be, and they
hereby are divided into thirteen districts ....
§ 3. And be it further enacted, That there be a court called a District
Court in each of the afore mentioned districts ....
§ 4. And be it further enacted, That the before mentioned districts ...
shall be divided into three circuits ... and that there shall be held annually
in each district of said circuits, two courts, which shall be called Circuit

§§

Courts ....

21. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
1331(a) (1976), as amended by Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369).
22. G. GILMOE, supra note 2, at 19-23.
23. P. REINSON, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 6

§

(1970).
24.

Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1887).
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Two English cases in particular provided state courts with authority for the implication of a damage remedy from the fourth
amendment. Wilkes v. Wood,2 5 decided in 1763, presented a question which Chief Justice Pratt found to be "of the greatest consequence he had ever met with in his whole practice."2 6 John
Wilkes, a member of Parliament, had published anonymously a
series of papers called the North Briton.27 The forty-fifth of that
series, like many of the others, was highly critical of the King and
the government. In response, the secretary of state, Lord Halifax,
issued a warrant ordering the King's messengers "'to make strict
and diligent search for the authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper, entitled, The North Briton, No. 45,
•. * *and them, or any of them, having found, to apprehend and
seize, together with their papers.' "28 Upon arrival at Wilkes'
home, the messengers broke into his files and removed all of his
29
papers without regard to content.
Chief Justice Pratt instructed the jury that absent "proof positive" 30 as to the people and papers to be searched, "a discretionary
power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions
may chance to fall,"31 should be found illegal as "contrary to the
fundamental principles of the constitution." 32 The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff of one-thousand pounds against the state of33
ficial who had supervised the procedures.
The Wilkes case is significant for several reasons. First, it established authority for the substance of the fourth amendment later
to come. Indeed, John Wilkes carried on correspondence with
noted American revolutionaries including John and Samuel Adams
and John Hancock. 3 4 In England, the decision led to a long and
successful career for Pratt, later to become Lord Camden, 3 5 and
spawned similar actions. Wilkes, in fact, later brought suit against
Lord Halifax, the secretary of state who issued the warrant, and re-

25.
26.

98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
Id. at 498.

27. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43 (1937).

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting unidentified warrant).
98 Eng. Rep. at 491.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 499.

33. Id.
34. N. LASSON, supra note 27, at 46 n.114.
35. Id. at 47.
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covered a judgment of four-thousand pounds. 36 Most important,
the Wilkes case specifically established precedent for the grant of
both compensatory and exemplary damages to serve the purposes
of compensation and deterrence. As Chief Justice Pratt found,
"[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from
any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detesta37
tion of the jury to the action itself."
The general warrant issued by Lord Halifax led to the arrest of
forty-nine people 38 and to several suits beside the Wilkes case resulting in a verdict for plaintiffs. 39 Prior to that activity, a warrant
specific as to the person but general as to papers was issued for the
arrest of John Entick. 40 Upon hearing of Mr. Wilkes' success,
Entick brought suit and recovered a judgment of three-hundred
pounds.41 Although Entick v. Carrington42 was decided after
Wilkes, it takes on a separate significance. In Parliament, the combined force of the Entick and Wilkes cases led to the adoption of
legislation making the issuance of general warrants in cases of libel
illegal. 43 Its greatest precedential value, however, lies in the
United States Supreme Court's 1886 decision of Boyd v. United
States.44 In Boyd, the Court was faced with the question whether
federal legislation requiring the party opposing the government to
produce in court certain private papers without a specific warrant
was violative of the fourth and fifth amendments. 45 Historical analysis weighed heavily in the Court's decision.
Justice Bradley, after reviewing the relevant statutes, 46 noted
that the practice complained of had its roots in prerevolutionary
history. 47 He summarized the Wilkes case, specifically noting the
awards of damages recovered. 48 Justice Bradley then reviewed the
36.
37.
38.
39.
relevant
40.
41.

See id. at 45.
98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99.
N. LASSON, supra note 27, at 43.
E.g., Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). For discussion of the
cases, see N. LASSON, supra note 27, at 43-48.
Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 808 (K.B. 1765).
N. LASSON, supra note 27, at 47.

42.

95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).

43.

N. LASSON, supra note 27, at 49.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Id. at 617-23.
Id.
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 626.
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Entick case, stressing that it "was welcomed and applauded by the
lovers of liberty in the colonies as well as in the mother country." 49
Of particular importance, he believed that since
every American statesmen [sic], during our revolutionary and
formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this
monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true and
ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently
asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who

framed the Fourth Amendment.

. . .5

Finally, quoting from Lord Camden's (formerly Chief Justice Pratt)
opinion in the Entick appeal, Justice Bradley argued that "'where
private papers are removed and carried away the secret nature of
those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand

more considerable damages in that respect.' "51
It has been long recognized that the roots of the fourth
amendment lie in the eighteenth-century British determination
that warrants authorizing a "roving commission" 52 are repugnant to
a free society. Given the concomitant British practice of awarding
damages for this invasion, it makes little sense to argue that violations of the same right, now accorded written constitutional status,
were intended to receive a lesser degree of remedial protection.
While the redress of constitutional violations was within the original jurisdiction of state courts only, the framers did not intend that
such courts would be without the authority, indeed the responsibility, to go beyond state law in deciding constitutional cases. Hamilton recognized that the supremacy of the document was applicable
in state adjudication as well as federal. 5 3 The rather circuitous
practice of seeking relief in state court for the violation of a federally created right, particularly given the role intended by the framers for the national judiciary, 5 4 is a direct outgrowth of the federal
system. However, particularly in light of British common law precedent, it would be fallacious to then suppose that state law was intended to delimit the substantive incidents of a federal action.
Thus, whether state court decisions actually contributed to the de49. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 628 (emphasis added) (quoting unreported opinion).
N. LASSON, supra note 27, at 43.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 543 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
See text accompanying notes 1-18 supra.
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velopment of the Constitution as a "sword" 55 is a question properly
viewed as environmental rather than genetic.
C.

The Interplay of the Constitution and the
American Experience
The discovery of common law precedent for the implication of
a damage remedy, even when coupled with the Supreme Court's
recognition of that precedent, does not fully explain the validity of
the implication. For once it is recognized that the common law was
intended to be molded as necessary to meet the very different environmental and sociological realities of the American experience, 56
it must then be asked whether the remedial power under reference
was consistent with the morphogenesis of the American judicial
function. Two lines of reasoning-one dealing with the institutionalization of the judiciary's interpretive function, the other with
the content of the interpretation-support the conclusion that the
damage remedy is consistent with what Professor White has called
57
"an indigenous American jurisprudence."
The institutional argument begins with the recognition that
American judicial review was derived from the British model.58
While the British version was largely an exceptional check, placed
in the authority of the House of Lords, on objectionable judicial
decisions, 59 the American version was a necessary corollary to the
principle of constitutional government. As the framers sought a
government of limited powers, "[j]udicial review was the inarticulate major premise upon which the movement to draft constitutions
and bills of rights was ultimately based."60
The federal structure itself demanded the provision of a body
capable of accommodating the decisions of thirteen state tribunals.
The states, in recognition of their individual sovereignties, were accorded the power to pass on the interpretation of laws in the first
55. Dellinger, supra note 4 (title). Indeed, the government argued in Bivens
that the lack of lower federal court original jurisdiction regarding constitutional questions, see text accompanying notes 10-14 supra, indicated that the framers contemplated only state common law providing a basis for actions seeking to enforce rights
otherwise arising under the Constitution. Brief for Respondents at 10, Bivens, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
56.

57.
58.
gins, 72
59.
60.

See W. NELSON, supra note 16, at 30; White, supra note 4, at 1213-17.

White, supra note 4, at 1224.
Jaffe & Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical OriLAWvQ. REv. 345 (1956); see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 81, 82 (A. Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 33.
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instance. However, recognizing the need for uniformity, the Supreme Court was provided with the power of appellate review in
federal matters. 6 1 The desire for a uniform system of law regarding
national matters, moreover, was based on more than the need for a
final arbiter. For hypothetically, at least, any particular state court
could have been invested with the power of ultimate review. As
Hamilton wrote,
the frame of the government is so compounded, that the laws of
the whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws of the
parts. In this case if the particular tribunals are invested with a
right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be much to fear
from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local regulations. As often as such an interference was
to happen, there would be reason to apprehend, that the provisions of the particular laws might be preferred to those of the
general laws .... 62
Thus the power of judicial review was placed in a national tribu63
nal.
Such a placement was also justified on grounds of expertise.
The colonial practice of appointing nonlawyer judges continued
after independence, even at high state court levels. 64 In establishing a national judiciary, the framers were likely influenced by
the "professionalization" of the British bench and bar. 6 5 Both
Hamilton 66 and Jefferson6 7 cited the development of a highly quail61. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
63. Some have argued that judicial review was merely a product of Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). E.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS

BRANCH 1-14 (1962). However, as Lawrence Friedman has argued, Marbury,
whether or not compelled by the Constitution, followed a period which saw an
increasing antipathy toward supreme legislative power. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 107 (1973); see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 31-34. This trend,
combined with the institutional needs of a federal system and the framers' rejection
of congressional interpretive supremacy, see THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144-46 (A.
Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), strongly supports the position that Chief Justice
Marshall was correct, as a matter of interpretation, in Marbury. Moreover, the framers did provide for a number of checks on the judicial power which, although difficult to effectuate, are viable in combination with other, largely nonlegal, checks on
the courts. See Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic
Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810, 848-58 (1974).
64. See authorities cited note 16 supra.
65. See White, supra note 4, at 1213.
66. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 22, 80 (A. Hamilton).

67. See text accompanying note 16 supra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 9:943

fled federal judiciary, particularly as to national issues, in support
of a centralized judicial authority. The institution, then, takes on a
particular character, not only as the final constitutional arbiter, but
also as one which, though not infallible, was intended to consist of
68
men particularly well-suited for its task.
The second line of reasoning relevant in discussing the implication of a constitutional damage remedy concerns the interpretive
context of the judicial function. From the time independence was
declared, the state constitutions were infused with a clear concern
for the protection of individual rights from governmental oppression. 69 The national Constitution, noteworthy for its generality as
to the structure of government, was considerably more specific regarding the individual rights that were to be protected.70 Indeed,
the original document "could not have been ratified, without the
promise of a bill of rights." 71 The judiciary's role as final arbiter of
the Constitution would thus be most valid, if accepted at all, in the
protection of individual rights.7 2 As Madison argued when
introducing the Bill of Rights, "independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive ....
Moreover, the descriptive claim for the remedial defense of
constitutional liberties rests in an inveterate eighteenth-century advocacy of natural rights. 74 On certain issues, for example the rights
later identified in the fourth amendment, the European experience
was transferred to the American revolutionaries. 7 5 Controversies
surrounding the Stamp Act, the Sugar Act, and the Boston Port
Act, on the other hand, gave the colonists first-hand experience
leading to a belief that "[i]n all government lay the seeds of tyr-

68. But see McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 Hous. L. REV. 354, 360-61 (1966), arguing that, at least on normative grounds,
the expertise argument is unjustified.
69. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, at 102-03.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 102.
72. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS pas-

sim (1980). Professor Choper argues that "given the existence of any authority in our
counter-majoritarian judiciary to review the constitutionality of political action, it
should apply to claimed violations of individual rights." Id. at 65.
73. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (remarks of James
Madison).
74. See White, supra note 4, at 1219.
75. See text accompanying notes 23-46 supra.
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army ....

"76 In response, the framers concluded that only a written constitution would provide the people with an unmistakable
77
bulwark against the violation of individual rights.
The remedial power endorsed in Bivens, some 200 years after
its roots were set, is consistent with both the letter and the spirit
of constitutional jurisprudence. British case law, recognized and
relied upon by the Supreme Court, provides unambiguous precedent. 78 Moreover, the damage remedy is an outgrowth of an era in
which the paramount importance of natural rights provided a spark
for revolution. The specific institution of a supreme federal tribunal, without institutional precedent in the common law, is itself an
indication that constitutional transgressions were to receive the
most serious consideration. When the role of the institution, informed by the circumstances of its enactment, is considered, an inevitable conclusion is reached: The judiciary power extends 79to the
provision of damages for the violation of constitutional rights.

D. Damages as the Least Intrusive Remedy
The historical, institutional, jurisprudential, and precedential
foundations offered thus far in support of implying a damage remedy do not address the fiscal ramifications of that remedy. While
one might logically argue that fiscal considerations should play no
role in the determination of an issue controlled by the Constitution, the damage remedy in cases involving units of government or
government officials has had a singular capacity to arouse the ire of
defendants. Where state governments or officials are brought into
federal court, claims of judicial impingement on federalism are frequently heard.8 0 Where federal officials are the defendants, the judiciary is often portrayed as seeking to assert itself as the "most
equal" of the three branches of the national government. 8 1 In recent years, however, there has been a dawning recognition that the
federal judiciary might perform its function in the least intrusive

76.

White, supra note 4, at 1219.

77. Id. at 1219-20.
78. See text accompanying notes 23-46 supra.
79. While the arguments offered here concerning the role of the courts in the
American system support the implication of a damage remedy from amendments
other than the fourth, specific case precedent has been limited to the fourth amendment. For discussion of the propriety of extending the implication beyond that
amendment, see pp. 986-1013 infra.
80. E.g., Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53-54 (1944).
81. See Dellinger, supra note 4, at 1545.
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manner by avoiding8 2often large-scale injunctive orders in favor of
the damage remedy.

The contemporary notion that injunctive relief is a permissible
federal remedy for the violation of constitutional rights, while damages are not, can be traced to the Supreme Court's 1908 decision
in Ex parte Young. 83 The Court there created the fiction that a
state official seeking to enforce an unconstitutional statute was acting outside of his authority and therefore could not claim the protection of the eleventh amendment. 4 The Court thus approved of
an injunction although it clearly impacted upon the state.85 While
the case did not involve a claim for damages, the decision has since
consistently been interpreted as excluding all types of relief not
sanctioned therein; thus damages have been considered an
unconstitutional form of relief when the state is the real-party de86
fendant.
The Ex parte Young fiction has been recognized as controlling
cases involving federal officials. 87 Indeed, its purported holding as
82. See id. at 1543.
83. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
84. Id. at 159-60.
85. Id. at 161-68.
86. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-49 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974). The relief granted in Ex parte Young has been characterized as "prospective" in nature. Id. at 664. Since Ex parte Young, decisions
requiring the expenditure of public funds in the course of conforming to an
injunctive or declaratory order have been upheld "as ancillary to the prospective
relief" ordered, 440 U.S. at 349, and therefore have not encountered the hostility
that awards of damages, even when wholly restitutionary, have encountered. E.g.,
415 U.S. at 664-69, 673-78.
87. The Court stated in Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912), that
"[tihe principle has frequently been applied with respect to state officers seeking to
enforce unconstitutional enactments .... And it is equally applicable to a Federal officer acting in excess of his authority or under an authority not validly conferred." Id.
at 620 (citations omitted). The fiction has since been extended to cover actions
seeking damages. In bringing a Bivens action, the plaintiff must coudh his complaint
in terms of the defendant's "individual capacity." "That designation satisfies the fiction which was first adopted in Ex Parte Young ... in order to overcome the impediment of sovereign immunity." Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 396 (D.R.I. 1977) (citation omitted), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 577 F.2d 147, rev'd sub nom. Colby v.
Driver, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (decided together with Stafford v. Briggs). Thus, in order to prevent judicial interference with fiscal functions, the courts have been content to characterize an official act, completed in the course of employment, as a fictional individual act. See id. Immunities have been developed in partial alleviation
of the injustice that results from the concomitant fiction, i.e., that damage awards
granted against the government are somehow more intrusive than are other types of
relief. For a discussion of various types of immunities and defenses, see pp.
1056-1094 infra. See Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1139
(1969):
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to the damage issue has permeated constitutional tort litigation and
engendered an hostility toward damages as a remedy that is
equally applicable whether the defendant is a state or federal official. Of Ex parte Young's progeny, Edelman v. Jordan 8 is notable

for its portrayal of the damage remedy as a particularly egregious
incident of judicial interference with executive and legislative functions.
Edelman involved a class suit seeking, inter alia, retroactive

payment of benefits wrongfully withheld by the State of Illinois
pursuant to the federal-state program of Aid to the Aged, Blind,
and Disabled. 9 Because payment of these claims did not involve
expenses ancillary to the prospective relief also sought in the action, questions concerning federal judicial interference with the

state treasury were raised. 90 The Court's holding-against plaintiffs'
claim for restitution-was justified primarily on eleventh amend-

ment grounds, 91 though most persuasively on statutory grounds. 92

However, in explaining its reluctance to extend the Ex parte
Young fiction to monetary relief, the Court stated: " "[W]hen we
are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial interference
in the vital field of financial administration a clear declaration of

the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts
than those of its own creation must be found.' "93
In response to the Court's statement, it might legitimately be
asked whether the judicial action sought in Edelman was in reality

Equity gives the remedy, in the sense that a court lacks the capacity to give
the remedy unless endowed with equitable powers; but in a case like Ex
parte Young, involving an injunction against unconstitutional regulation, it is
ultimately the Constitution that gives the right to the remedy. Putting it another way, the Constitution is an integral aspect of the substantive law administered on the equity side, just as it is an integral part of the substantive
law administered on the law side.
88. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
89. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 987-89 (7th Cir. 1973), reu'd and remanded
sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The unreported judgment of the
district court is reprinted in relevant part in 415 U.S. at 656-58 n.5.
90. 415 U.S. at 664-69, 673.
91. Id. at 660-69. The eleventh amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
92. Id. at 674 ("[The Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled] provision by its
terms did not authorize suit against anyone ....").

93. Id. at 673 (brackets in original) (quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U.S. 47, 54 (1944) (footnote omitted)).
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any less meddlesome than that consequent to injunctive or declaratory relief. In Milliken v. Bradley,94 for example, the Court "approved an injunction ordering a State to pay almost $6 million to
help defray the costs" 95 of a desegregation order. 96 The Milliken
Court recognized that the Ex parte Young line of cases "permits
federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to
requirements of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury." 97 Moreover, prior to granting
the order that carried with it the six-million-dollar expense, the
Court had disallowed a proposed injunctive remedy at least in part
because it was "obvious from the scope of the interdistrict remedy
itself that . . . the District Court [would have] become first, a de
facto 'legislative authority' to resolve . . . complex questions, and
then the 'school superintendent' for the entire area."98 Clearly,
then, there is little basis for hostility to the damage remedy relative to other types of relief, particularly in the wake of an era that
has seen increasing judicial control of activities formerly within the
sole province of executive branches of government.99
E. The Damage Remedy:
A Hostage of the Tensions of Federalism
Given the potentially greater impact of the injunctive remedy,
the late development of legal powers in the redress of constitutional violations seems unjustified on policy grounds. The explanation, however, lies not in policy but in the maturation of the federal system. At the inception of the Republic, the states had
mature common law systems. 100 In an action for the violation of
rights similar to those secured by the fourth amendment, the state
action would lie in trespass. 1 1 Given the availability of established
methods of dealing with analogous violations, the need for seeking
an alternative method of redress was lacking. 102
94.
95.
(Powell,
96.
97.
98.

433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 n.15 (1977) (citing 433 U.S. at 293
J., concurring in the judgment)).
433 U.S. at 288-91. See generally id. at 277-79.
Id. at 289 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 667).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974) (Milliken I).

99. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:The Forms of Justice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
100. See Fisher, supra note 16; Woodruff, Chancery in Massachusetts, 5 LAW
Q. REV. 370 (1889).

101. See Dellinger, supra note 4, at 1537-40.
102. See Hill, supra note 4, at 208-09.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss3/5

20

Callahan et al.: Constitutional Torts Ten Years after Bivens

1981]

PROJECT-CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

Moreover, there had been little more than a hint' 03 of constitutional compulsion requiring the states to disregard established
procedures in favor of federal standards, at least until the passage
of the fourteenth amendment in 1868. The post-amendment process leading to the application to the states of "many of the rights
guaranteed by the first eight Amendments"'10 4 has been long and
arduous, encompassing seventy-two years thus far.105 It is less than
surprising, therefore, that the initiation of a damage remedy for the
violation of rights originally considered solely federal in application
did not come in state courts.
The late development of the same remedy in federal courts is
a product of several related circumstances. First, it was not until
1875 that the inferior federal courts were granted original jurisdiction in private civil litigation arising under the Constitution. 10 6
Second, although the states had mature common law systems at
the time the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed, their equitable powers remained largely underdeveloped. 10 7 The first Congress sought
to fill the remedial gap by vesting equitable powers in the federal
judiciary.' 08 For nearly two-hundred years thereafter it was commonly assumed that equitable remedies were "to be freely given,
seemingly as a matter of constitutional right' 0 9 by the federal
courts. However, it was likewise assumed that suits at law, even
103. But see text accompanying notes 52-55, 61-63 supra.
104. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). For a list of those provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been "selectively" incorporated, see L. TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 11-2, at 567-68 & nn.7-24.
105. The first Supreme Court case utilizing the fourteenth amendment to inval-

idate state legislation, in this instance on due process and commerce grounds, was
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 8-1, at 434. The
process of selective incorporation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights began later
that term with Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (fifth amendment right to compensation), and has most recently been extended in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment right against double jeopardy).
106. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976), as amended by Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369).
107. See Fisher, supra note 16 (explaining circuitous development of equity
powers in Pennsylvania); Woodruff, supra note 100 (explaining circuitous development of equity powers in Massachusetts).
108. The extent of congressional concern with equity powers is evidenced by
the enactment in 1792 of another statute, Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275,
which, although it did not increase the federal equity power ordained by the Judiciary Act of 1789, reemphasized congressional concern that the common law powers
existing in the British chancery courts were to be utilized in American federal courts.
See Fisher, supra note 16; Woodruff, supra note 100.
109. Hill, supra note 87, at 1111.
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where the defendants were federal officials, were governed by state
law.110 Thus, even after the grant of original jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts in 1875, the development of legal remedies in
federal court for the violation of constitutional rights succumbed to
heavy historical baggage. And as already discussed,' the weight
grew even heavier with the addition in 1908 of Ex parte Young's
implied dictum.
The damage remedy, then, can be seen as a hostage of the
federal structure that was left unrescued until the Bivens decision
in 1971. Interestingly, Bivens was decided 100 years after section
one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the present section 1983) had
authorized damage actions against state and local officials for violation of federal constitutional rights.'1 2 Just as the Civil Rights Act
was a response to pre- and post-Civil War era abuses, the Bivens
action is properly viewed as a response to the pre- and postRevolution recognition that government held the power to violate
individual rights. That this recognition was not allowed a remedy
for two-hundred years is clearly a product of the tensions of federalism, tensions intended to produce a workable distribution of
power in a dual judiciary system. In this case, however, the state
systems failed because they relied on analogous-but most often
insufficient-common law remedies." 3 The failure of the national
judiciary was in the difficulty of reconciling its perhaps contradictory roles in two areas of constitutional law. The Constitution of
1789 called for a central government of limited powers. The Bill of
Rights, enacted two years later, demanded an institution capable of
vigorous enforcement.114 Marbury"15 signaled the Supreme Court's
ascendancy on intergovernmental issues. The Court was also active
in its early years where questions of uniquely federal concern, particularly commerce disputes,"16 had arisen. However, in the area
of individual rights, which lacked the special federal focus presented by commerce questions, the Court lay dormant."17 It took
110.
at 1110.
111.
112.
1979)).
113.

E.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963); Hill, supra note 87,
See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III

See Hill, supra note 87, at 1120-24, 1127.
J. CHOPER, supra note 72, passim.
115. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
116. E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
117. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 1-2, at 2-3.
114.
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one-hundred years,' 18 a war, and a fresh set of amendments, before the Court was able to develop a jurisprudence capable of fulfilling the promise of 1791 without rekindling the fears of 1789.
The danger of an omnipotent central authority had become ingrained on a system's consciousness.
F. Implying Remedies From Statutes
The proposition that the late development of a constitutional
damage remedy is a result of the tensions of federalism, and not of
a perceived inherent limitation on the judiciary's remedial power,
is strengthened in light of the well-settled judicial practice of implying remedies from statutes. Anglo-American precedent Was established in Couch v. Steel,"19 where a seaman was awarded daiages from the owner of a ship upon which he had sailed. The
owner had failed to keep adequate medical supplies on bbard in
breach of a statutory duty. Violation of the statute was punishable
by fine; however, the fine was recoverable by only a comm6r informer, not by the aggrieved party.12 0 The plaintiff, whd had takri
ill on board, brought private suit on statutory grounds. 1 2i The
court relied upon the general rule that "'whee a man has a temporal loss, or damage by the wrong of another, he may have an action upon the case, to be repaired in damages.' "122 Chief Justice

Campbell, however, went on to state that where a statute is enacted for the protection of a class of persons, and through violation
of the statute a member of the protected class is injured, that individual shall have a remedy. 12 3 Although this principle has been
largely abandoned by British courts,' 2 4 the precedent established
has become an important principle of American remedial law, 125

first given the Supreme Court's approval in 1916.126
118. E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (upholding federal invalidation
of state legislation on due process grounds).
119. 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854).
120. Id. at 1198.
121. Id. at 1196.
122. Id. (quoting 1 COmYN, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND tit. Action
Upon Statute (F)).
123. Id. at 1196-97.
124. Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MoD. L.
REv. 233, 245 (1960).
125. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statuties, 77
HARV. L. REV. 285, 285-87 (1963).

126. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916): "[D]isregard of the
command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of
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Since 1916 the Court has consistently affirmed its power to
imply a private cause of action in order to effectuate the underlying
purposes of federal legislation. 12 7 In Cort v. Ash, 12 8 where the
Burger Court unanimously declined to exercise this power, four
factors governing the relevant inquiry were set forth:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted," . . .that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? .. .Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff? ...And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
29
cause of action based solely on federal law?'
Application of the Cort standards would seem to benefit constitutional tort plaintiffs. As to the first requirement, the Cort majority
itself cited Bivens as an example of "a clearly articulated federal
right in the plaintiff ...."130 The second standard allows courts to
defer to the intent of the enacting body. One would be hard
pressed to find any intent of the framers-either implicit or
explicit-to deny a private cause of action. Conversely, the Court
in Boyd v. United States recognized that the precedent of the
Wilkes and Entick cases13 1 was "in the minds of those who framed
the Fourth Amendment.
... 32While the damage remedy was
not explicitly provided for, examination of the history and purpose
of the Bill of Rights fairly leads to the conclusion that the damage
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the
damages from the party in default is implied ....
"
127. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steel v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The lower federal courts have exercised a similar power. E.g., Reimeister v. Reimeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Wills v. Trans
World Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
128. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
129. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
130. Id. at 82; see Katz, The Jurisprudenceof Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 41 (1968): "Remedial
implementation is universally meaningful because the class of persons who are the
holders of these interests is coextensive with the political society."
131. The cases are discussed at text accompanying notes 25-51 supra.
132. 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1885).
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remedy was implicitly sanctioned. 133 On the third count, the damage remedy is consistent with the deterrence goals of the Bill of
Rights and, if one accepts that common law precedent influenced
the drafting of the original amendments, the remedy furthers the
implicit compensatory purpose as well.
The fourth standard addresses federalism concerns. As previously discussed, 1' the provision for original jurisdiction in state
courts only cannot be assumed to have been a limitation on the
substantive incidents of federal rights. Thus, constitutional tort actions are not of the type "traditionally relegated to state law."' 3 5
Moreover, an examination of whether individual rights is "an area
basically the concern of the states,"' 136 must yield a conclusion in
the negative. Even if one were to suggest that such rights were initially local in character, the fourteenth amendment forever altered
137
the inquiry.
Given the ease of applying the Cort standards to constitutional
torts, "[t]he argument that the Constitution, as law in courts, ought
to be treated as any other body of legal rules should not prove disconcerting."' 13 8 Indeed, those who would argue that the judiciary
should be most vigilant in protecting individual constitutional
rights' 3 9 might well suggest that the judicial power should be less
restricted when the remedy sought to be implied is derived from
the Constitution. The Court came to this conclusion in Davis v.
Passman,140 rejecting the application of the Cort standards to constitutional remedies.141 That decision is the most definite indication
from the Court that it perceives its role in the protection of constitutional rights as instrinsically justified. The presence of federal
legislative policy or state policy notwithstanding, Davis and its
progeny 142 make it clear that only principles of comity and convenience of process appropriately influence the exercise of judicial discretion. Where questions of constitutional rights are involved, "the

133.
134.
135.
136.

See
See
422
422

text accompanying notes 25-79 supra.
text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
U.S. at 78; text accompanying note 129 supra.
U.S. at 78; text accompanying note 129 supra.

137. See, e.g., L.

TRIBE,

supra note 1, § 1-3.

138. Katz, supra note 130, at 39.
139. E.g., J. Choper, supra note 72 passim.
140. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
141. Id. at 240-44. The case is discussed at pp. 987-994 infra.
142. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-25 (1980); id. at 25-30 (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment, joined by Stewart, J.); pp. 994-1004 infra.
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judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary means through which
14 3
these rights may be enforced.'
G. The Value of a Normative Foundation:
Self-imposed Limits on the Cause of Action
In 1980, long after the Bivens action had become a popular avenue for federal court suit, 14 4 Justice Rehnquist wrote in Carlson
v. Green14 5 that "to dispose of this case as if Bivens were rightly
decided would in the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter be to start
with an 'unreality.' "146 Justice Rehnquist, notwithstanding the
passage of time and the creation of a substantial body of federal
law, would have overruled Bivens "as a result of its weak precedential and doctrinal foundation .... "147 In contrast, the Court itself has stated that prior decisions, particularly those dealing with
constitutional issues, should not be overturned without the presentation of new information proving the earlier opinion incorrect beyond peradventure.' 48 The view offered by Justice Rehnquist,
however, does present an important point: The Bivens opinion was
doctrinally weak, attempting to bootstrap a valid result into a line
of precedent that simply did not exist. 1 4 9 The Court went a significant distance to rectify this in Davis v. Passman,15 0 where it eschewed the descriptive arguments-that the judiciary had always
(at least implicitly) sanctioned similar actions-for normative arguments-that even if the cause of action had not previously been
sanctioned, it should have been and still should be. Indeed, the establishment of a normative role for the judiciary has attracted the
attention of the nation's most significant constitutional scholars in
5
recent years.' '
Few, if any, would suggest that the Court has no appropriate
interpretive role. Justice Rehnquist has recognized that the Court
is necessarily involved in " 'the living process of striking a wise bal143. 442 U.S. at 241.
144. See pp. 1004-1013 infra.
145. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
146. Id. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S.
77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
147. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

148. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
overruling in part, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
149. See pp. 976-986 infra.
150. 442 U.S. at 241-42, 245.
151. E.g., J. CHOPER, supra note 72; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1975).
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ance between liberty and order as new cases come here for adjudication.' "152 Terms such as "judicial legislation," therefore, more
appropriately describe the excesses of judicial action, not the fact of
the action. Accordingly, the advocate of an activist position must
provide normative foundations that not only define a basis for the
action sought but also reveal standards that intrinsically limit the
judiciary's role.
For the advocate of the Bivens cause of action, the starting
point must be the intent of the framers. In establishing a system of
government, the framers encountered a dilemma: How could the
rights of the people be protected without establishing a body that
held the power to violate, as well as protect, those rights? The institution of the Supreme Court was intended to answer that question. A supreme federal tribunal, separate and distinct from the
traditional legislative and executive branches of government, was to
check the authority of the policymaking bodies insofar as the Constitution indicated the substance of rights to be protected. The
qiestion of remedial authority cannot be in significant doubt, aside
from the vagaries of history, for to allow that the judiciary is beholden to the legislature for its remedial power in an otherwise
valid exercise of authority is to denigrate "the wise balance between liberty and order." If, as Madison suggested, the judiciary is
charged with the protection of the Bill of Rights "against every
assumption of power in the legislative or executive," 153 the prerequisite of legislative approval of traditional judicial activity must
be normatively unsound, regardless of its descriptive content.
The foundation offered in this section for the judicial role is
self-limiting. It does not justify the protection of rights not provided for by the framers and it does not allow for the creation of
remedies (e.g., criminal penalties) that have not been within a federal court's discretion since article III granted jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court over "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
154 The logical extension of its thesis-and
this Constitution .
the limit of its reach-is the provision of damages, where they
have traditionally been appropriate, for the violation of an individual's constitutional rights. Whether the courts have seen fit to exercise this power so defined is the subject of the next section.
"...

152.
153.

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Gales.& Seaton eds. 1789) (remarks of James

Madison).
154. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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SUBSTANTIVE DEVELOPMENT

This section will analyze both the creation and subsequent de-

velopment of a Bivens cause of action-a judicially created damage
remedy against federal officials who violate an individual's constitutional rights.1 The necessary prerequisite to the action itself, the
recognition that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction
in actions seeking damages for the violation of constitutional rights,
was not realized until the Supreme Court's 1946 decision in Bell v.
Hood.2 Twenty-five years later, the Court inferred the remedy directly from the Constitution in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.3 The decision further effec-

tuated the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure, advancing goals of compensation for plaintiffs
suffering injury to constitutionally protected rights and deterrence
4
of unconstitutional conduct of federal officials.

In the ten years since Bivens its reasoning has been extended
to other constitutional provisions. 5 The Supreme Court has provided the lower courts with an analytical framework to guide the
expansion of a Bivens cause of action to other constitutionally protected rights6 and has resolved related issues of choice of law and
exclusivity of remedy. 7 The relationship between the judicially created Bivens remedy and its statutory analogue, section 1983,8
1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). The various Bivens opinions will hereinafter be cited as Bivens.
2. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
4. See text accompanying notes 123-135 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 143-322 infra.
6. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 288 (1979).
7. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
8. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). Thus a § 1983 action will lie for violation of any
constitutionally protected right by anyone acting under color of state law. See generally Comment, Civil Actions for Damages under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes,
45 TEX. L. REv. 1015 (1967). For a list of cases brought under § 1983 see id. at 1021
nn.34-44.
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which authorizes damage actions against state officials who violate
constitutional rights, has played an important role in the development of Bivens in the federal courts. Since section 1983 and Bivens
serve similar goals, the merits of applying section 1983 precedent
to Bivens actions will be addressed in this section. The question of
the requisite mental state, yet to be addressed by the Supreme
Court, will be analyzed in light of the Bivens-section 1983 interplay. Finally, the original policy goals and the reasoning of Bivens
will be reexamined in light of subsequent case law in an effort to
determine the future of the cause of action.
A. The Right is Recognized: Bell v. Hood
In Bell v. Hood,9 the plaintiff brought suit in the District
Court for the Southern District of California, alleging a conspiracy
by officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to violate his
fourth and fifth amendment rights.' 0 Invoking the court's federal
12
question jurisdiction," the complaint presented the novel issue
whether damages were available consequent to a violation by federal officials of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure. 13 The district court, in an unpublished order,
dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.14 Bell appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court. 15 In the Court of Appeals' opinion, the
case did not "arise under the Constitution or laws of the United
States,"' 6 because there was neither a statutory basis nor an ex9. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
10. Complaint at 2, 6-7.
11. At the time of Bell, federal question jurisdiction was governed by Judicial
Code, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091 (1914), as amended by Act of May 14, 1934, ch.
283, § 1, 48 Stat. 775, as amended by Act of Aug. 21, 1937, ch. 726, § 1, 50 Stat. 738,
as amended by Judicial Code, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143 (1940) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976), as amended by Federal Question Jurisdiction Amendments
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369). It provided in pertinent part:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
12. 327 U.S. at 684.
13. Bell v. Hood, 150 F.2d 96, 98-99 (9th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
The fourth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. No. 2850-RJ Civil (S.D. Cal., Apr. 24, 1944) (order dismissing complaint);
see Bell v. Hood, 150 F.2d at 97.
15. 150 F.2d at 100.
16. Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
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press constitutional provision allowing recovery of damages from
federal officials for the violation of fourth amendment rights.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 17 and subsequently reversed the court of appeals. 18 In a 1946 opinion by Justice Black,
the Court reasoned that a complaint alleging the violation of a constitutional right by federal officials is the paradigm of an action
"arising under the Constitution of the United States," 19 for the
right to recovery will depend upon the construction of applicable
constitutional provisions. 20 Justice Black explained that the two
lower courts had confused the question of the presence of subject
matter jurisdiction with the analytically distinct inquiry of what
remedy would be available once jurisdiction was assumed. 21 Thus
the Supreme Court held that subject matter jurisdiction would always exist for such a claim, unless it was "made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction [or was] wholly insubstantial and frivolous." 22 The district court was directed to assume jurisdiction to
determine whether the plaintiff had stated a claim for which relief
23
could be granted.
On remand, the district court again dismissed, this time for
failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 24 The
court noted that the complaint sought relief against the officers as
individuals, claiming that they were not acting in a governmental
capacity at the time of the search. 25 However, the court reasoned
that the Constitution purports to limit only the actions of the federal government, and not individual action; 26 consequently, a claim
for monetary relief against individuals could not be based directly
on the Constitution. 27 In the absence of governmental authorization of the officials' actions or a federal statute conferring a right to
sue such officers for damages in their individual capacities, the
court was without a basis upon which relief could be granted.28

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

326 U.S. 706 (1945).
327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946).
Id. at 684.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 685.

24. 71 F. Supp. 813, 821 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
25. Id. at 815.

26. Id. at 817-18.
27. Id. at 818-19.
28. Id. at 820-21.
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Since the plaintiff asserted a federal question giving rise to
section 1331 jurisdiction, and no other provision of federal law allowed the requested relief, the district court was squarely confronted with the question the Supreme Court had not reached: Were
damages to be available in an action brought in the federal courts
against federal officials, implied directly from the Constitution? As
the court answered in the negative, Bell was left entirely without a
remedy in the federal courts.2 9 The Bell remand has often been
cited as precedent by other federal courts in dismissing similar
constitutional claims. 30 This restrictive reading of Bell, although
widely accepted, ignored the Supreme Court's earlier statement
that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."3' The Court's
jurisdictional statement became an empty promise for a plaintiff
seeking damages to redress the violation of a constitutional right by
federal officials. Access to the federal courts was pointless if no judicial remedy existed for the redress of a plaintiff's otherwise legitimate cause of action. 32 Given the existence of federal jurisdiction
recognized in Bell, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
of inferring a damage remedy directly from the Constitution if the
exercise of federal jurisdiction was to be meaningful. It was not until 1971 that the Court chose to answer the question. 33
29. Id. at 820. The court also dismissed Bell's state law claims. Id. At the time
Bell was remanded in 1947, the leading case on pendent jurisdiction was Hum v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). The Court in Hurn held that a federal court still retains
jurisdiction of a pendent state claim if it was brought before the court with a federal
question which constituted a distinct ground of recovery. Id. at 246. By allowing a
plaintiff whose suit involved both federal and state law, based on a single cause of
action, to be heard on both claims in federal court, the decision implicitly espoused
a philosophy of judicial economy, advanced litigant convenience, and avoided res
judicata problems. See Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent
Jurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1019 (1962). The district court in Bell limited the Hum doctrine to equity. 71 F. Supp. at 820.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 971 (1965); Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1957);
Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1963); Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 582, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd per curiam,
290 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 827 (1961).
31. 327 U.S. at 684 (footnote omitted).
32. The Court addressed the relation between a valid cause of action and available relief in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236-48 (1979).
33. Bivens has been the subject of extensive scholarly comment. See, e.g.,
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitutionas a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1532 (1972); Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a ConstitutionalCause
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B. The Right in Search of a Remedy: Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
1. Bivens in the lower federal courts.-In a fact situation remarkably similar to Bell, Webster Bivens alleged in his complaint
that he was arrested without warrant or probable cause 3 4 by agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The agents searched Bivens'
entire apartment, manacled him in front of his wife and children,
and then threatened to arrest them as well. Bivens claimed that he
was taken to a station house where he was booked, fingerprinted,
interrogated, and stripsearched;3 5 he was later released without
charges having been filed against him. 36 Bivens demanded damages from the agents in compensation for the violation of his fourth
amendment rights. The District Court for the Eastern District of
New York dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction3 7 and on
the alternative ground that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim
38
upon which relief could be granted.
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in a correct statement of the
law as it existed at that time, reversed the district court on the first
ground, citing Bell for the proposition that the federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. 39 However, the court
affirmed on the alternative ground that the complaint had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 40 The court of appeals rejected the argument that the fourth amendment-which
had always been used to shield individuals from government action--could now be used affirmatively, as a sword, by individuals
against federal officials. 41
The court's opinion conceded that it was desirable to read the
congressional grant of federal question jurisdiction broadly, so that
the courts would have the power to infer a damage remedy42 to
of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.

Q.

531 (1977); Note, "Damages or Nothing"-The Efficacy of a Bivens-type Remedy, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 667 (1979); Note, Remedies for Constitutional Torts: "Special
Factors Counselling Hesitation," 9 IND. L. REV. 441 (1976).

34. Complaint at 1 (filed pro se).
35. Id. at 2.
36. 276 F. Supp. 12, 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
37. Id. at 13, 16.
38. Id. at 16.
39. 409 F.2d 718, 720 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 724.
42. See id. at 722. The court of appeals noted that a constitutional damage remedy could be inferred in much the same way that damage actions are inferred from

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss3/5

32

Callahan et al.: Constitutional Torts Ten Years after Bivens
1981]

PROJECT-CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

prevent the fourth amendment guarantee from being reduced to a
"mere 'form of words.'-4 The court also noted that traditionally
available remedies might "not provide a totally effective enforcement scheme for Fourth Amendment rights"4 4 in the situation
presented. 45 Criminal prosecution of the officers was possible,46
but rarely practical.4 7 In the event that a civil suit was brought in
state court, exemplary damages or recovery for emotional injury
would be allowed under New York tort law only after actual injury,
such as physical damage to Bivens' apartment in the course of the
arrest and search, was proved.48 Yet the gravamen of Bivens' complaint was that his constitutionalright to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure had been violated. A state action sounding in
tort could not grant damages that would realistically compensate an
invasion of personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, as a
common law tort action is not designed to allow recovery for intangible injuries, such as those to personal liberty interests, which are
49
federally (and interstitially) guaranteed by the Constitution.
Despite the admitted inadequacy of this remedial scheme to
vindicate Bivens' rights, the circuit court viewed the panoply of
available remedies as sufficient in most cases to render the constitutional right of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure

statutes not expressly so providing. Id.; see pp. 965-968 supra. The focus of the statu-

tory inquiry is, generally, whether creation of the remedy furthers legislative intent.
See 409 F.2d at 722 (quoting Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178,
181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966)). However, the Court has held that
the focus changes when the implication for the remedy derives from the Constitution. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240-44 (1979). For a discussion of Davis,
see text accompanying notes 143-185 infra.
43. 409 F.2d at 723 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (quoting
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
44. Id. at 725.
45. Declaratory relief, a theoretical possibility, would be practically impossible
because Bivens could not reasonably anticipate the future violation of his constitutional rights. Injunctive relief would also be inappropriate as it was unlikely that
such a search would recur in a regular pattern. See generally Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 504-05 (1978); 409 F.2d at 723. The exclusionary rule was of course inapplicable since Bivens was never charged with a crime in connection with the search.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1976) (criminal prosecution of federal officials for
warrantless searches).
47. Newman, Suing the Lawbreaker: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 449-51 (1978).
48. Brief for Petitioners at 37-39. New York tort law suggests that the question
of compensation be left to the jury to weigh the policy considerations involved. Id.
49. See text accompanying notes 260-263 & sources cited note 261 infra.
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more than an illusory promise. 50 The court declined to act,
believing the standard for judicial creation of a new remedy di-

rectly from the Constitution to be one of necessity, at least in the
absence of congressional authorization. 5 1

2. The Supreme Court Opinion.-The Supreme Court granted
certiorari 52 and later reversed the decision of the court of appeals
on June 21, 1971. 53 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority (us-

tices Douglas, Stewart, White, and Marshall), held that a damage
remedy could be inferred directly from the Constitution against a
federal official for the violation of fourth amendment rights, even in
the absence of legislation specifically authorizing the courts to do
so. 54 Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment in a separate opinion; 55 Chief Justice Burger 56 and Justices Black 57 and Blackmun
58

dissented.
Both the majority and concurring opinions specifically rejected
the government's argument that Bivens' only proper avenue of re-

dress was suit in state court, 59 based on common law tort, removable by the defendants under statute to federal court.60 Bivens,
then, must have had a federally protected right, arising independently of state law, on which to base his suit in federal court. 6 The

source of this right was deduced by the majority in the following
manner:
[Wlust as state law may not authorize federal agents to violate the
Fourth Amendment . . . neither may state law undertake to
limit the extent to which federal authority can be exercised....
The inevitable consequence of this dual limitation on state power
is that the federal question becomes not merely a possible de50. 409 F.2d at 725.
51. Id. at 726. The necessity standard was explicitly overruled by the Supreme
Court. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
52. 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
53. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
54. Id. at 389.
55. Id. at 398 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
56. Id. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 427 (Black, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 390-97; id. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
60. Id. at 391. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1976) provides for removal to the federal system of suits that could not originally have been filed in a federal court. See generally
Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969). At the time of Bivens, the justice Department routinely took advantage of the removal provision. 403 U.S. at 391 n.4.
61. For a discussion of the early roots of this federal right in English and American common law, see pp. 952-956 supra.
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fense to the state law action, but an independent claim both
nec62
essary and sufficient to make out plaintiff's cause of action.
As to the availability of damages, the majority implicitly rejected the high standard espoused by the court of appeals: "The
question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his Fourth
Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal
courts. "

63

Justice Harlan's discussion in concurrence also deduced the
existence of a federal right without reference to state law.6 4 In
Justice Harlan's view, Bivens had a constitutionally protected interest in remaining free from unreasonable search and seizure. Justice
Harlan believed that since the federal courts had traditionally
granted equitable relief to vindicate fourth amendment rights without any congressional authorization more specific than the general
federal question jurisdiction contained in section 1331, vindication
65
of these interests was not exclusively in the hands of Congress.
As specific congressional authorization is not necessary to empower
the federal courts to grant equitable relief for violations of constitutional rights, then neither is it a prerequisite to a damage remedy.
The decision to grant or withhold damages is, he reasoned, within
66
the discretion of the Court.
The analyses of the majority and concurring opinions require
the identification of an appropriate standard to guide judicial action. Starting from the premise that the federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, the government had argued that the creation of
new remedies is a task best left to the legislature, the branch of
government charged with the responsibility of making the policy
judgments that inform the application of the law. 67 Thus, the government saw an extremely narrow role for the judiciary: In the absence of congressional authorization, relief should be granted only

62. 403 U.S. at 395 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
66. Id. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). But cf. Act of May 8,
1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275 (federal equitable relief authorized by Congress). Justice
Harlan felt that this authorization was superfluous. 403 U.S. at 404 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. Brief for Respondents at 20-21.
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where it is "indispensible for vindicating constitutional rights." 6 8
Pointing to alternative remedies then available in fourth amend-

ment cases, the government argued that a federal damage remedy
was unnecessary for the vindication of Bivens' rights. 6 9 The propri-

ety of the damage remedy was not itself relevant; rather, the government believed that the application of a more traditional remedy

would constitute less drastic, and therefore more appropriate, judicial activism.

Justice Harlan disagreed. Rejecting the proposed "essentiality
test,"70 he viewed the correct standard for implying a damage remedy in a constitutional case to be "whether compensatory relief is

"necessary' or 'appropriate' to the vindication of the interest asserted" 71 and recalled the judiciary's "particular responsibility to
assure the vindication of constitutional interests." 72 Justice Harlan
also disagreed with the government's contention that alternate
remedies were adequate, stating that "[flor people in Bivens'
73
shoes, it is damages or nothing."
Justice Harlan's approach is unsatisfactory in that his reliance

on an equitable-legal analogy is flawed. 74 While the federal courts
have traditionally granted equitable relief in constitutional cases,

they have statutory authority to do so as a result of an Act of Congress7 5 responding to the underdevelopment of equity in the state

court systems in the early days of the republic. 78 Congress has not
similarly empowered the federal courts to grant relief in damages
for constitutional violations. Although Congress granted the inferior
federal courts jurisdiction over federal questions in 1875, 77 that ac68. Id. at 24.
69. Id. at 25-32.
70. 403 U.S. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
71. Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). This
standard is derived from United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
There, the United States brought suit against the owner and driver of a truck who
had injured a soldier in the army. 60 F. Supp. 807, 808-09 (1945). The issue was the
power of the federal courts to create common law on exclusively federal matters after
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court held that where necessary
or appropriate, the courts retained their common law power to deal with federal
problems. 332 U.S. at 310-11 (distinguishing Erie).
72. 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
73. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
74. Id. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
75. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§§ 2-5, 1 Stat. 73; pp. 962-965 & n.108 supra.
76. See pp. 962-965 and authorities cited note 100 supra.
77. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
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tion alone created no new causes of action. Thus, for those who see
78
the proper role of the federal courts as extremely circumscribed,
Justice Harlan had not justified the Bivens result as a simple exercise of federal remedial discretion. Absent a justification of the judiciary's role apart from congressional action, 79 the Bivens result
would stand as an example of judicial legislation rather than judicial
effectuation of the framers' intent-an appropriate exercise of the
judicial function.
The majority's attempt at justifying the Court's action was
equally unconvincing. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, summarily rejected the essentiality standard, stating that "[t]he question is merely whether petitioner . . . is entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in
the federal courts."'s0 Justice Brennan attempted to explain the
Court's function by reference to precedent. First, he discussed the
tradition of awarding damages consequent to a deprivation of a personal liberty interest. However, his citation of four voting-rights
cases in evidence of the tradition was unavailing. 8 ' In none of the
cited cases did the Court authorize or sanction a damage award.
Wiley v. Sinkler82 was a damage action consequent to a denial of
the right to vote in a congressional election. The Supreme Court
held that such an action arose under the Constitution, in spite of
the fact that a voter's qualifications are determined by state law,
' 83
because the right to vote "has its foundation in the Constitution."
The Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, however, because the plaintiff had failed to allege that he was registered to
vote when his ballot was refused. In its only reference to the damage remedy, the Court asserted that the amount of damages sought
satisfied the then-requisite amount in controversy.84 Like Bell v.
Hood, Wiley addresses the right but not the remedy. Swafford v.
§ 1331(a) (1976), as amended by Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369).
78. See, e.g., Green v. Carlson, 446 U.S. 14, 31 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Green, see text accompanying notes 124-181 infra.
79. See pp. 948-969 supra.
80. 403 U.S. at 397.
81. Id. at 395-97 (citing Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v.
Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900)).
82. 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
83. Id. at 60.
84. Id. at 64-65.
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Templeton,85 presenting substantially the same jurisdictional issue,
was decided on the authority of Wiley. While both cases recognized the plaintiff's right to a federal forum, neither reached the
question of the propriety of the damage remedy sought.
In Nixon v. Herndon,86 a black man was denied the right to
vote on the basis of a state statute prohibiting blacks from voting in
a Democratic party primary election. Although the plaintiff sought
damages, the Court struck down the statute as violative of equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment. 87 In Nixon v.
Condon,8 8 the same plaintiff sought damages after Texas had repealed the statute declared unconstitutional in Herndon and replaced it with new legislation 89 enabling a "State Executive
Committee" of the Democratic party to exclude blacks from party
membership. As the Court noted, an identical result had thus been
achieved merely by substituting a different entity. Rejecting an argument that the new arrangement did not constitute state action,
the Court struck down the revision on equal protection grounds. 90
In neither case did the Court address the question of relief in damages. Thus, the four voting-rights cases do not support the proposition, put forward by Justice Brennan, that "[h]istorically, damages
have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." 9 '
Surprisingly, these cases, which merely recognized a right
redressable in a federal forum, substitute for a discussion of the
historical roots of the damage action itself in British and American
common law. Entick v. Carrington92 and Wilkes v. Wood,93 landmark British cases that recognized a damage action for violation of
privacy interests later to be protected by the fourth amendment,
received only indirect mention in the majority opinion. 9 4 Boyd v.
United States,9 5 an early recognition by the Supreme Court of the
85.

185 U.S. 487 (1902).

86.

273 U.S. 536 (1927).
Id. at 540-41.
286 U.S. 73 (1932).
TEX. REv. CIV. CODE art. 3107 (Vernon Supp. 1927) (repealed).
286 U.S. at 89.
403 U.S. at 395.
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
403 U.S. at 396 (citing N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION 43-50

(1937)

(discussing development of "fourth amendment" interests in British law prior to revolution)).
95. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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damage remedy for fourth amendment violations, although cited in
the brief for petitioner,98 was not mentioned at all by the Court.
Justice Brennan also cited Marbury v. Madison,97 for the
proposition that for every right there must be a remedy. While
Marbury does indeed state that "It]he very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury," 98 the statement standing by itself is misleading. In Marbury the question was
whether one who had received a federal commission should have
the right to force the executive, through the courts, to grant him
his position. 99 Marbury, of course, upheld the propriety of judicial
review in that instance; however, the opinion is silent on the scope
of available remedies in federal courts for violation of protected interests. Inasmuch as Bell v. Hood unquestionably established the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear a damage claim against a
federal official for a fourth amendment violation, 100 the quotation
from Marbury added nothing to the majority's discussion. The
Marbury citation, like that of the voting-rights cases, provides little
guidance to a court seeking to define the scope, as opposed to the
existence, of its remedial power. In sum, Justice Brennan's contention that a damage remedy is within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, while most likely correct,' 0 ' is essentially unsupported in
the opinion.
The true justification for Bivens lies instead in its effectuation
of the substantive rights intended by the framers to be part and
parcel of the fourth amendment. In Webster Bivens' case the only
avenue open to the Court, consistent with its normative role, was
the authorization of a traditional remedy to fill a gap in a federal
remedial scheme.' 0 2 The decision can be easily understood as the
96.

Brief for Petitioners at 9, Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see pp. 952-956 su-

pra.
97. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
98. Id. at 163 (quoted in 403 U.S. at 397).
99. Id. at 154.
100. 327 U.S. 678 (1946); see text accompanying notes 9-33 supra.
101. See pp. 948-969 supra.
102. The Supreme Court has filled such constitutional gaps on more than one
occasion. Perhaps the clearest example is the exclusionary rule, which prohibits at
criminal trials the introduction of evidence seized in violation of a suspect's fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The rule was made applicable to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In the context of fifth amendment rights, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), instituted the now-famous Miranda warnings, which,
by informing a criminal suspect at the time of arrest of the right to remain silent and
to have counsel, are designed to avoid unintentional waivers of these rights. In the
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Court's response to its constitutional duty to protect individual con10 3
stitutional rights.

The majority, finding "no special factors counselling hesitation
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress," 10 4 decided that a

damage remedy would properly vindicate Bivens' constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Justice
Harlan, believing that "courts of law are capable of making the
types of judgment . . . necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of Fourth Amendment rights,"'10 5 came to the
same conclusion.
Two policy objections were advanced against the Bivens result
in the dissenting opinions. 10 6 First, Justice Black presented the

view that a negative inference was to be drawn from the enactment
of section 1983.107 In the absence of a similar statute allowing dam-

age suits against federal officials in the federal courts, Justice Black
stated that "[a] strong inference can be drawn . . . that Congress

does not desire to permit such suits against federal officials. "108 Yet
in making this argument, equating congressional silence with congressional disapproval, Justice Black ignored the particular circumsixth amendment area, the Court has effectuated the right to counsel by holding that
counsel must be provided for those criminal defendants unable to afford it. Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). This right was made applicable to the states under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 327 U.S.
335 (1963).
In another context, the Court has inferred a negative implication from the commerce clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, by prohibiting state
regulation of commerce where there is federal power to do so. See Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
103. "[T]he courts ... are charged at all times with the support of the constitution and.., people of all conditions have a right to appeal for a maintenance of fundamental rights." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); see J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (protection of in-

dividual rights not only important Supreme Court function but also most clearly supportable exercise ofjudicial review).
104. 403 U.S. at 396.
105. Id. at 309 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
106. The dissenting opinions by Justice Black, id. at 427, and Justice
Blackmun, id. at 430, dealt with the propriety of the damage remedy itself. Chief
Justice Burger, also dissenting, id. at 411, perceived of the damage remedy as an effort by the Court to "fill one of the gaps of the suppression doctrine-at the price of
impinging on the legislative and policy functions that the Constitution vests in Congress." Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). His opinion was primarily an effort to
show the inadequacy of such judicial action by elaborate reference to the failure, in
his view, of the suppression doctrine.
107. Id. at 427-28 (Black, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
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stances surrounding the enactment of section 1983. Section one of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871,109 presently section 1983, was enacted
during an era in which the federal government was forced to provide a remedy for the repeated violation of constitutional rights by
state governments.' 1 0 Representative Bingham, author of section
one of the fourteenth amendment and a vigorous supporter of the
Act, asked, "Who dare say, now that the Constitution has been
amended, that the nation cannot by law provide against all such
abuses and denials of rights as these in States and by States
* . .?"1ii To impute an hostility to damage actions against federal
officials from congressional silence in 1871 is to search far for a legislative opinion on the subject. Moreover, it is at least as well argued that a congressional concern for the protection of individual
rights is equally applicable to federal or state officials. This would
be particularly true given the manifold increase in the power of the
federal government since 1871. Thus, while section 1983 certainly
does not provide for an action against federal officials, the policies
2
underlying its enactment exhibit no hostility to such an action."1
A second policy objection advanced by the Bivens dissenters
was a fear that the threat of liability for honest errors of judgment
would inhibit federal officials not only from committing improper
acts but also from committing praiseworthy acts."1 3 Necessarily
linked with this idea is the concern that those seeking careers in
federal service will be dissuaded by the threat of liability in damage actions. That concern, however, need not defeat the action entirely. The creation of a good faith defense, first extended to fed1 14
eral officials by the Second Circuit in the Bivens remand,
protects those who make bona-fide errors of judgment, or who act
when the state of the law is unclear, 115 and thus answers the fears
of Justices Black and Blackmun.
109.
1979)).

Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III

110. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAIv. L.
REV. 1133, 1137-75 (1977).
111. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 85 (1871).
112. Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978): "To create a system in
which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it

does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head."
113.
114.

403 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972). The defense was first given the Court's ap-

proval, as to Bivens actions, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
115. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See generally Friedman,
The Good Faith Defense in Constitutional Litigation, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501
(1977). For a discussion of the defense and its development, see pp. 1076-1083 infra.
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Justice Black's Bivens dissent, which is primarily concerned
with his distaste for judicial legislation, shows how far his position
had changed in the twenty-five years since he wrote the Court's
opinion in Bell." 6 Limitations inherent in the operation of the federal court system and in the role of the judiciary-limitations that
gained new-found recognition following a period of judicial activism
-permeate his Bivens opinion. Justice Black referred to the increasing number of cases on the dockets of the federal courts and
to time spent in conscientious efforts to cope with the heavier
workload."i 7 The Justice was also concerned with difficulties implicit in a decision to embark on a new course of constitutional law,
requiring the resolution of "competing policies, goals, and priorities in the use of resources.""" Indeed, he doubted that the Court
had constitutional power to perform what he regarded as a balancing test."19
Yet rather than usurping Congress' role, the Court merely
filled a gap in the remedial scheme for vindicating constitutional
rights. The key question in Bivens was whether the Court's action
was consistent with its intended role in the institutional protection
of such rights. Once it is accepted that the framers intended the
judiciary to enforce and vindicate constitutional rights against violation by other branches of government, the question was precisely
whether a damage remedy was necessary if the Court was to fulfill
its function. Both the majority and concurring opinions believed it
was. 120 The dissenting Justices believed that the creation of a remedy was within the exclusive power of Congress.12 1 The legislature,
however, did not create the right asserted by Webster Bivens; neither is it authorized to limit the substance of such rights. To the
extent that a remedy is necessary to give meaning to a constitutional right, the judiciary is responsible for granting the relief
called for. Thus, the Second Circuit's decision, expressing the belief that the damage remedy was only unnecessary-and not
116.
117.

327 U.S. 678 (1946).
403 U.S. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting). This concern was echoed in Justice

Blackmun's dissent. He predicted that the creation of a damage action "opens the
door for another avalanche of new federal cases." Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see id. at 391 n.4 (Court criticizes this point); id. at 410-11 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
118. Id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 397; id. at 402-03 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
121. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 427-30 (Black, J., dissenting);
id. at 411-12, 418, 422-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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prohibited122 --struck the appropriate theme. The Supreme Court
dissenters, in questioning the judiciary's power without examining
the distinct historical importance of constitutional rights and the judiciary's role in protecting them, treated constitutional analysis as
statutory analysis.
3. The Policy Goals.-The twin goals of Bivens---compensation and deterrence 12 3 -become clear when the decision is viewed
as a whole. As a threshold matter, plaintiffs are now guaranteed a
fiederal forum for compensatory claims against federal officials who
violate their constitutional rights. The majority devoted most of its
opinion to refuting the governmenfs claim that state law was
controlling, stating that "the Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether
the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citizen." 124 Implicit in the Court's holding was a recognition that uniform rules of law controlling both the plaintiff's constitutional
claims and the scope and substance of defendants' claims to official
immunity were desirable. Perhaps in light of its experience with
the troublesome development of the section 1983 cause of action,
the Court was unwilling to leave the development of the Bivens
cause of action to the state courts. 125 Moreover, the Court recognized that state and federal law protected differing, and sometimes
inconsistent, interests. 126 Justice Harlan, in concurrence, thought
it "entirely proper that these injuries be compensable according to
uniform rules of federal law, especially in light of the very large elein any event control the scope of
ment of federal law which must
12 7
official defenses to liability."'
Access to the federal system cannot be an end in itself,12 8 as
Bell demonstrated, but is instead the means employed to the end
129
of obtaining compensation for an injury to a constitutional right.
The majority opinion, in fact, was primarily concerned with the
compensation value. The damage remedy also advances the deter122.

Bivens, 409 F.2d 718, 725-26 (2d Cir. 1969).

123. 403 U.S. at 390-95.
124. Id. at 392.

125.
126.
127.
128.
goal).
129.

Id. at 393-94; see id. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
But see Lehmann, supra note 33, at 533-55 (access is Bivens' primary
See Note, supra note 33 (compensation is Bivens' primary goal).
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rence of wrongful conduct. 13 0 Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, con-

tended that the holding in Bivens "seeks to fill one of the gaps of
the suppression doctrine,"' 131 which in his view rested logically,

though ineffectively, on a deterrence rationale.'

32

The government

had also relied on deterrence as a necessary element of the rem-

edy, arguing against implication of a damage remedy because it believed that the suppression doctrine, already law, had a better deterrent effect than would a damage remedy, thus rendering the

latter unnecessary. 133 Justice Harlan cautioned, however, that deterrence is only a subordinate goal to compensation, and that a

plaintiff's right to recover damages should not depend on a showing that a monetary award against a federal official would deter fu34
ture lawless conduct. 1

The historical arguments already developed indicate that both

the compensation and deterrence goals comport with the preconstitutional experience with fourth amendment values. While the amendment was almost certainly written with the goal of deterring illegal
action by the new government, the framers' experience is consistent with the view that compensating injury was an equally valid

though logically secondary goal. 135 Thus, while deterrence is the
primary goal of the amendment, compensation is the primary-

though not exclusive-goal of the remedy.
C. Expansion of the Cause of Action in the Supreme Court

1. The Butz Dictum.-No case based on a Bivens theory
reached the Supreme Court unitl 1978, although several Justices
mentioned Bivens in dicta in the seven years following the decision. 136 In 1978 the Court decided Butz v. Economou, 13 7 an action
130. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).
131. 403 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 413-15 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
133. Brief for Respondents at 25-32.
134. 403 U.S. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. See pp. 952-956 supra.
136. See, e.g., Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 209-10 & n.14 (1976)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.) (Bivens was conceivably available to taxpayer whose fourth amendment rights had been violated by
IRS officials); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-14 (1973); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 433 (1973) (majority noted that Bivens might be available against police officer employed by District of Columbia although § 1983 was
not); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 14 n.7 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Douglas, J.) (Bivens should be available to plaintiff whose right to vote for delegate
in political party convention was allegedly interfered with). In City of Kenosha V.
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against the Department of Agriculture for conducting a malicious

prosecution, after the plaintiff allegedly criticized the department's
policies. Two of the plaintiff's causes of action, involving first and
fifth amendment claims, 13 8 were based on Bivens theories. The

Court granted certiorari solely to consider the issue of official immunity to suit,1 3 9 expressly left open in Bivens.14 0 However, the

majority seized the opportunity to reaffirm Bivens, characterizing it
as "establish[ing] that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a

constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general federalquestion jurisdiction of the federal courts to obtain an award of
monetary damages against the responsible federal official." 1 4 ' This

restatement is considerably broader in scope than the original decision, which was limited to fourth amendment claims. Given the re-

luctance or refusal of some of the lower federal courts to extend
Bivens logic to claims involving other constitutional rights,'

42

the

dictum may well have been a cue to suggest a more relaxed interpretation.
2. Davis v. Passman.-The Supreme Court addressed the propriety of extending Bivens to other constitutional rights in Davis v.

Bruno, the majority suggested that the district court might have been able to assume
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) in a suit seeking both legal and equitable relief against a municipality. Legal relief might then have been granted on a Bivens
theory in a claim under the fourteenth amendment. 412 U.S. at 511-14. Justices
Brennan and Marshall, in a concurring opinion, specifically noted Bivens' availability. Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
137. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
138. Id. at 481-83.
139. Id. at 480-81.
140. 403 U.S. at 397-98.
141. 438 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun, who had dissented in
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), joined the majority in Butz.
142. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 801 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(refusal to allow fifth amendment Bivens claim on due process theory), rev'd, 442
U.S. 228 (1979); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41-44 (1st Cir. 1977) (refusal to allow
fourteenth amendment Bivens claim against municipality); Greenya v. George
Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 562 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (question of any Bivens
extension expressly left open); Cardinale v. Washington Technical Inst., 500 F.2d
791, 796 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (question of any Bivens extension expressly left open),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975); WAHBA v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 103-04
(2d Cir. 1974) (question of any Bivens extension expressly left open), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 874 (1974); Moro v. Telemundo, 387 F. Supp. 922 (D.P.R. 1974) (refusal to
allow first and fifth amendment Bivens claims); Archuleta v. Callaway, 385 F. Supp.
384 (D.C. Colo. 1974) (refusal to allow fifth amendment due process Bivens claim);
Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D.C. Colo. 1974) (Bivens limited to
fourth amendment claims); Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922, 925 (E.D. Va. 1974)
(Bivens limited to its factual analogues).
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Pusman.143 Davis, a woman discharged from her position on U.S.

Representative Passman's staff, brought suit in the District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana, seeking restitutionary dam-

ages. She alleged a violation of her fifth amendment due process
right in that the Congressman fired her solely on the basis of gen-

der.144 The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a
claim, believing that the law provided Davis no private right of action. 145 The court reached this conclusion by applying standards
originally developed in Cort v. Ash 146 to determine whether a
cause of action could be inferred from a statute that did not so provide on its face. In the alternative, the district court held that no
violation of Davis' rights had been set out in the facts stated in her
4
complaint. 1 '
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially reversed the district
court, 1 48 concluding that a Bivens cause of action did arise under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, that if Davis' allegations were proved, her discharge violated her constitutional right,
and that, although Passman was entitled to a "qualified immu-

143. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
144. Complaint at 1-2.
145. No. 75-1691, slip op. (W.D. La. Jan. 21, 1975).
146. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). In Cort, a stockholder sought an injunction and
damages against Bethlehem Steel Corp. in a derivative suit, alleging that a corporate
contribution to a presidential campaign violated federal law. Complaint at 1-6. The
Court refused to imply a private cause of action from the criminal statute allegedly
violated by the corporation, enunciating the following criteria to govern implication
of a private cause of action from a statute not expressly so providing:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted" . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of

the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? ...Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is the cause of action one

traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?
422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)). Although the Supreme Court distinguished
Cort from Bivens in the Cort opinion itself, id. at 82, many commentators had suggested the application of the Cort standards in the Bivens context. See, e.g.,
Dellinger, supra note 33, at 1543-52; Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil
Rights: The Casefor a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378, 1380, 1388 n.57 (1978).
For a discussion of the propriety of the extension, see pp. 965-968 supra.
147. No. 75-1691, slip op. (W.D. La. Jan. 21, 1975).
148. 544 F.2d 865, 882 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 571
F.2d 793, 800 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), rev'd, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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nity'1 4 9 from suit because of his congressional status, his actions
were not shielded by the speech or debate clause of the Constitution. 150 Sitting en bane, the court of appeals then reversed the initial decision. It held that "no right of action may be implied from
the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment,"'15 because the
neither congressionally created nor
damage remedy sought was
1 52
compelled.
constitutionally
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 53 and reversed the en bane
decision, citing Bivens and Butz in support. 154 The Court held
that it was error to apply the Cort standards to a cause of action
implied directly from a constitutional provision because "the question of who may enforce a statutory light is fundamentally different
than the question of who may enforce a right that is protected by
56
the Constitution.' ' 5 5 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,'
reasoned that because statutes are enacted by Congress, it is
within congressional discretion to decide who possesses and who
can enforce rights inherent in a statutory scheme.157 The judiciary's role where individuals claim private rights of action under
statutes not expressly providing them is to discern the legislative
intent underlying the regulatory scheme.' 58 The Constitution, on
the other hand, was not enacted by Congress. "One of 'its important objects' . . . is the designation of rights. And in 'its great
outlines,' . . the judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary
means through which these rights may be enforced."' 59 Justice
Brennan quoted James Madison's admonition that the rights incorporated in the Bill of Rights were primarily to guard against legisla149. Id. at 881; see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
150. 544 F.2d at 877-81; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The speech or debate
clause was designed to insure the integrity of the legislative process by providing
Members of Congress with an immunity from suit for discussion in the congressional
chambers. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1973).
151. 571 F.2d 793, 801 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'd, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
152. The decision is curious in light of the Supreme Court's recognition of the
historical interrelation of the fourth and fifth amendments. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 646-50 (1961).
153. 439 U.S. 925 (1978).
154. 442 U.S. at 230, 234.
155. Id. at 241 (emphasis in original).
156. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens formed the majority. Id. at 231.
157. Id. at 241.
158. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964) (it is duty of courts
to provide remedies necessary to effectuate congressional purpose).
159. 442 U.S. at 241 (citations omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
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tive and executive "encroachment." 160 Moreover, the judiciary

-because it is countermajoritarian in nature-is the most appropriate branch to redress the violations feared by Madison: "[Tlhe
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from
acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but
from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the
major number of the constituents." 161 Because the members of the
Court are not elected, they are able to protect the rights of individuals without fear of majoritarian electoral backlash. In the limited discussion presented in the majority opinion in Davis, the
Court went further in establishing a normative institutional justification for its decision to imply a damage remedy than it had in
Bivens.

Once the Court's authority to exercise discretion in the protection of constitutional rights is acknowledged, it is next necessary to
determine standards that will guide future action. The Davis majority established a three-step inquiry, 16 2 setting a model for other
courts considering the expansion of Bivens. The first step involved
examination of whether a plaintiff asserted a constitutionally protected right; 163 the second, whether he or she stated a cause of action which asserted that right; 164 and the third, whether relief in
damages was an appropriate remedy to redress the violation alleged. 165 All three questions were answered in the affirmative in
Davis.

The first step of the Court's analysis examined the source of
Davis' right-the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 166
which has been interpreted to include an equal protection element. 167 Davis alleged that although she was an able and willing
worker, Congressman Passman had determined that he needed a
man in her position instead, and fired her. 168 The Court concluded
that the allegations presented by Mrs. Davis, if true, would consti160. Id. at 241-42 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789)
(remarks of James Madison)).
161. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269 (C. Hunt ed. 1904).

162.
163.
164.
165.

442 U.S. at 234.
Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 236-44.
Id. at 245-48.

166. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... "
167. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100-01 (1976); Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam).
168.

442 U.S. at 230 (quoting letter from Rep. Passman to Mrs. Davis).
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tute a fifth amendment violation unless the gender classification at
issue withstood the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.169

Pursuing the second stage of its inquiry, the Court noted that
the existence of a cause of action depends on whether the party asserting the constitutional right at issue is "an appropriate party to
invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction ' 170 of the federal
courts. The Fifth Circuit (en banc) had answered the question in
17 1
Justhe negative based on its application of the Cort standards.
tice Brennan rejected the framework offered by the court of appeals, without addressing the particulars of the analysis, and held
that
the class of litigants who allege that their own constitutional
rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights,
must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the172courts for
the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.
The Davis standard for constitutional remedies is essentially the

first prong of the Cort standard; that is, whether "the plaintiff [is]

,one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted'
....

'173 The

remaining three of the Cort standards, dealing with

separation-of-powers and federalism concerns, 174 were appropriately (though implicitly) read out of the analysis. Given the federal
judiciary's institutional function in the protection of constitutional
169. "'To withstand scrutiny under the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives."' " Id. at 234-35 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 316-17
(1977) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976))). The Court remanded to
the Fifth Circuit for consideration of this and other issues. Id. at 235 n.9, 248-49. The
result of the "scrutiny" does not, however, effect the existence of a cause of action.
See note 175 infra.
170. Id. at 244.
171. The Fifth Circuit (en banc) held that (1) the injury asserted by Davis less
clearly implicated fifth amendment concerns in comparison to Bivens' fourth amendment claims, 571 F.2d at 797; (2) Congress, which had legislated in the area of employment discrimination in the federal government, "avoided creating a cause of action for money damages for one in Davis' position," id. at 798; (3) "the breadth of
the concept of due process indicates that the damage remedy sought will not be judicially manageable," id. at 799; and (4) the creation of a due-process-based Bivens
claim created the possibility of "deluging federal courts," id. at 800.
172. 442 U.S. at 242.
173. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citation omitted) (quoting Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
174. See id.; pp. 965-968 supra.
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rights and the existence of a federal cause of action against a federal official, the latter Cort standards had no place in the Davis
175
analysis.
In the third step of its analysis, the Court stated that damages
were appropriate in this case because they were judicially manageable, 176 presenting "a focused remedial issue without difficult questions of valuation or causation."' 177 Since Passman was by this time
no longer in Congress, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement
was unavailable; damages were Davis' only remedy.
The Court went on to consider potential limitations on the
damage remedy. Although the majority concluded that Passman's
position as Congressman did give rise to "special concerns
counselling hesitation,"' 178 it believed that the speech or debate
clause afforded him all the protection to which his position entitled
him; no additional immunity was necessary. However, whether the
clause itself shielded him from liability in this case was not decided, as the en bane court of appeals had not considered the question. 1 79 The Court also stated that since Congress had not explicitly
declared that those in petitioner's position could not recover damages,180 the judiciary was free to award them. Whether the Court
175. Two separation-of-powers issues were presented in Davis. The first questioned the legitimacy of governmental action given traditional levels of constitutional
scrutiny. 442 U.S. at 234-35. The second concerned the speech or debate clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.1. 442 U.S. at 234, 239; id. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined
by Rehnquist, J.). Neither issue, however, concerns the existence of plaintiffs' cause
of action. The speech or debate clause, which "shields federal legislators with absolute immunity," id. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.), presents
an issue "regardless of the abstract existence of a cause of action ...." Id. (Stewart,
J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.). The constitutional scrutiny issue must be
raised and satisfied by the defendant; thus, absent defendants' success in withstanding the appropriate level of scrutiny, the inquiry will proceed past the first two
stages of the Davis analysis to the remedial concern. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 217 (1977); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9
(1974) (arguments not raised by petitioner-defendant not considered by Court).
176. Id. at 245; see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
177. 442 U.S. at 245 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 246 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted); cf. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396
(discussing areas where Court would hesitate to provide remedy).
179. The speech-or-debate clause issue drew at least one dissenting opinion in
Davis. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist believed the judgment should have been vacated and the case remanded to the court of appeals for judgment on the speech-ordebate issue. 442 U.S. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
180. Id. at 246-47. The court of appeals, however, had been persuaded otherwise. 571 F.2d at 798. Section 717 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 717, 86 Stat. 111 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
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could grant Bivens-type damages in the face of congressional legislation to the contrary was not considered by the majority.
Finally, the majority dismissed the court of appeals' concern
that recognizing a damage remedy for fifth amendment due process
violations would deluge the courts with new claims.1 8 1 The Court
considered the availability of other forms of relief and the substantive requirements of asserting a cause of action to be significant
limitations on the potential influx of similar cases. 18 2 The "most
fundamental answer" to the Fifth Circuit's concern, in the Court's
view, was provided by Justice Harlan in Bivens: "'[C]urrent limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from
budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted to stand in the
way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional princi-

ples.'

"183

The Davis decision is important in several respects. First, it
implicitly approved the continuing process of expansion of the
Bivens cause of action in the lower federal courts. Defendants
could not point to a Supreme Court opinion overturning a lower
court decision that had refused to apply Bivens logic to another
constitutional provision. Second, rejection of the Cort standards
emphasized that, while creation of express private rights of action
through statutory enactment was in Congress' hands, thus limiting
the role of the judiciary to ascertainment and effectuation of legislative intent, the role of the judiciary in effectuating constitutional
guarantees of individual rights was necessarily far more active.
Davis reaffirmed the duty of the federal courts to stand ready to assist those whose constitutional rights are violated and whose only
recourse, by the very nature of the constitutional system, is the
courts. Finally, the Davis opinion signaled that the primary goal of
judicial action in constitutional tort cases is compensation. Unlike
Bivens, the deterrence values presented in Davis were of limited
magnitude. Nonetheless, in order to give meaning to one plaintiff's
rights, regardless of the adequacy of available remedies to society
(1976)), had failed to include those in Davis' position, who are not in competitive
service. Brown v. General Servs. Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976), held that
§ 717 was an exclusive remedy for those in competitive service. By not providing a
remedy to those not in competitive service, the Davis court of appeals believed Congress deliberately, rather than accidentally, excluded them. 571 F.2d at 798.
181. 571 F.2d at 800-01.
182. 442 U.S. at 248.
183. Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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at large, the Court acted. 184 The logic of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens was given new life: "Damages as a traditional form
of compensation for invasion of a legally protected interest may be
entirely appropriate even if no substantial deterrent effects on future official lawlessness might be thought to result."185
3. Carlson v. Green.-The latest substantive development
from the Supreme Court in the Bivens line of cases came last
Term, in Carlson v. Green. 8 6 Mrs. Green brought suit in the district court for the Southern District of Indiana.' s 7 On behalf of her
son's estate, she alleged that injuries he had suffered at the hands
of federal prison officials, in violation of the eighth amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, caused his
death."' The district court believed the allegations made out a
cause of action for damages under Bivens, but held that the
Indiana survivorship and wrongful death laws limited recovery in
this case to less than $10,000.189 Since under such an interpretation the then-requisite amount was not in controversy, the district
90
court dismissed the suit.'

184.
185.
186.

See id. at 237-44.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
446 U.S. 14 (1980).

187. No. 78-1261 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 11, 1978), rev'd, 581 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1978),
aff'd, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). The court of appeals, in the context of an appeal from
a dismissal of the complaint, took the plaintiff's allegations as true. 581 F.2d at
670 n.2.
188. 581 F.2d at 670-71. The plaintiff had alleged that her son, a prisoner in a
federal penitentiary, had been diagnosed a chronic asthmatic. His condition had necessitated hospitalization for eight days, after which he was returned to the penitentiary despite a medical recommendation that he be transferred to a prison in a more
favorable climate. His medication was not continued and as he entered the prison
hospital he suffered an asthmatic attack. He remained in the prison hospital in serious condition for eight hours. No doctor was on duty and none was called in. No
emergency procedure had been established to deal with such situations. One of the
defendants, a nurse, left the prisoner to dispense medication elsewhere. He later returned with a respirator which he tried to use on the prisoner, although he knew it
was broken. The prisoner then received an injection of a drug contraindicated for
asthmatics. Half an hour later he suffered respiratory arrest and was removed to a
hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Id.
189. IND. CODE ANN. 34-1-1-2 (Burns 1973). Because the decedent left no wife,
dependent children, or dependent next-of-kin, damages were limited to the reasonable value of hospital, medical, and surgical expenses, and costs and expenses of administration of his estate. Id. As decedent was a federal prisoner at the time of his
death, the court determined, to a legal certainty, that costs could not have exceeded
$10,000.
190. See 581 F.2d at 671-72.
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, 19 1
holding that "whenever the relevant state survival statute would
abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common law allows survival of
the action."' 19 2 In the court of appeals' view, application of Indiana
law would have subverted Bivens' policy goals of compensation and
deterrence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 193 and affirmed. 194 Two issues were presented for decision. The first was a
question of exclusivity of remedy: Given the availability of Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) relief 19 5 for the conduct complained of,
could Green also maintain a Bivens action? The second was a question of choice of law: Was the circuit court correct in its determinalaw, govtion that federal common law, rather than state statutory
96
claim?'
Bivens
plaintiffs
the
of
survival
the
erned
Justice Brennan, who had written for the Court in Bivens and
Davis, was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in the Green majority. 197 The majority first explained that a
Bivens action may not be maintained if either of two situations exists in a given case:
The first is when defendants demonstrate "special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress." The second is when defendants show that Congress
has provided for an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective.' 9 8
The Court held that neither alternative applied in Green. First,
federal prison officials enjoy no special constitutional status that
counsels against judicial creation of a damages remedy against
them. The majority believed that a qualified immunity would ade191.

Id. at 676.

192.
193.

Id. at 675.
442 U.S. 940 (1979).

194. 446 U.S. at 18, 25.
195. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976), waives the
sovereign immunity of the United States for certain intentional tort claims where
federal officials would otherwise be the only defendants.
196. 446 U.S. at 16-17.
197. Id. at 15. Justice Powell wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment,
joined by justice Stevens. Id. at 25. Chief Justice Burger, id. at 30, and Justice
Rehnquist, id. at 31, filed separate dissents.
198. Id. at 18-19 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979)).
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quately protect such officials in the performance of their duties. 19

Second, Congress had not explicitly declared that an eighth amendment cause of action is not available and that the petitioner must
sue instead under the FTCA. The Court noted that Congress must

state that a particular remedy is meant to replace Bivens, rather
than merely parallel it. Indeed, the legislative history of the FTCA

indicated that Congress had intended to create a new remedy
against the government itself in order to supplement relief available under Bivens, not to replace it. 200 Moreover, since Congress had
stated the conditions under which the FTCA is to be regarded as an
exclusive remedy,201 and had not included the type of injury presented in Green, the Court concluded that congressional silence could
properly be construed as approval of an election of remedy.202
In support of this conclusion, the majority presented four factors indicating that the Bivens-type remedy is a superior form of
relief in comparison with the FTCA remedy. 20 3 First, Bivens

serves the dual purposes of compensation and deterrence, while
the FTCA's purpose is merely compensatory.2 0 4 In the Court's

view, a damage remedy against an individual officer is more effective in deterring unconstitutional conduct than a remedy against

the United States. Implicit in this view is a determination that the
individual, with more limited resources, will be more likely than
the government, with its vast resources, to alter patterns of con-

duct so as to avoid liability. No empirical data was presented by

199. Id. at 19.
200. The Senate Report indicated that
after the date of enactment of this measure, innocent individuals who are
subjected to raids [like that in Bivens] will have a cause of action against the
individual Federal agents and the Federal Government. Furthermore, this
provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its
progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to
make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of
conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case
imposes liability upon the individual Government officials involved).
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973)).
For further discussion of the 1974 amendments to the FTCA, see Note, supra note
33, at 670-72.
201. See, eg., 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) (1976); 22 U.S.C. § 817(a) (1976); 38 U.S.C. §
4116(a) (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 233(a), 2458(a) (1976) (malpractice by certain government health personnel); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1976) (operation of motor vehicles by
federal employees); 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k) (1976) (manufactures of swine flu vaccine).
202. 446 U.S. at 20.
203. Id. at 20-23.
204. Id. at 21.
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the Court in support of this determination. Second, the majority
observed that punitive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit
but are statutorily prohibited by the FTCA. 20 5 The second factor,
like the first, is concerned with the efficacy of the deterrence aspect of a Bivens action. The third factor presented was the availability of jury trials, which are barred under the FTCA. Although
juries have often been unsympathetic to Bivens plaintiffs-favoring
official defendants, such as police and prison officials-the majority6
20
believed that the plaintiff should have the option of a jury trial.
The fourth factor presented was in fact inextricably linked to the
Court's holding on the second issue in Green-that of choice of
law. 20 7 The FTCA allows an action only "where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
20 8
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
This congressional decision to defer to state law on the crucial issue
of liability is inconsistent with a basic teaching of Bivens: that uniform rules of federal law are desirable where remedies are implied
directly from the Constitution. If Mrs. Green had pursued her
FTCA remedy, state tort law would have governed a federal action
seeking to vindicate constitutional rights.
On the choice-of-law issue, the Green Court held that because Bivens actions are a creation of federal law, the question of
survivorship of the action should be decided in accordance with
federal law. 20 9 One of the problems to which the Court had responded in Bivens was the undesirability of forcing plaintiffs whose
federal constitutional rights were violated to depend on the vagaries of state tort law for recovery. 2 10 The Bivens Court determined
that uniform rules of liability were necessary to avoid the possibility of a federal official escaping liability in one state, while another
official was forced to pay a large damage award in another, though
both were accused of the same unconstitutional conduct.
The majority distinguished Robertson v. Wegmann,2 11 a section 1983 case in which the Court allowed an action to abate in accordance with the law of the reference state.2 12 The Green Court
205. Id. at 21-22; see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) (prohibiting punitive damages).
206. 446 U.S. at 22-23; see 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) (prohibiting jury trials).

207. 446 U.S. at 23.
208.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).

209. 446 U.S. at 23.
210.

403 U.S. at 394-95; accord, id. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring in the

judgment).
211. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
212. See 446 U.S. at 24-25 & n.11.
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noted that section 1988,213 which mandates the choice of law in
section 1983 cases, determined the Robertson result. Justice
Brennan was careful to point out that
[s]ection 1988 does not in terms apply to Bivens actions,
and there are cogent reasons not to apply it to such actions even

by analogy. Bivens defendants are federal officials brought into
federal court for violating the Federal Constitution. No state in-

terests are implicated by applying purely federal law to them.
While it makes some sense to allow aspects of § 1983 litigation

to vary according to the laws of the States under whose authority
§ 1983 defendants work, federal officials have no similar claim to
be bound only by the law of the State in which they happen to
work .... 214

Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in the result, but disagreed with the Court's reasoning. The Justice stated
that the majority's framework for considering factors that would defeat a Bivens cause of action contained "dicta that go well beyond
the prior holdings of this Court." 2 15 Justice Powell primarily disagreed with the Court's holding that only an explicit statement by
Congress that a legislative remedy substituted for the judicial remedy would suffice to limit the Court's discretion. While he agreed
that the "Federal Tort Claims Act . . . simply is not an adequate

remedy,"2 16 Justice Powell believed the judiciary should be willing
to utilize effective alternative remedies regardless of whether
"Congress has

garb."

2 17

.

.

.

clothed them in the prescribed linguistic

213. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) provides in part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this Title . . . for the protection of all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far
as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where
they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the
trial and disposition of the cause ....
214. 446 U.S. at 24 n.11 (citation omitted). The Court left open the possibility
of applying state law, as a matter of convenience, in different circumstances. Id.
215. Id. at 26 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Stewart, J.).
216. Id. at 28 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Stewart, J.).
217. Id. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Stewart, J.); see
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The concurring Justices also agreed with the Court's result on
the choice-of-law issue. They felt, however, that it was unnecessary
to create the impression that federal courts should never look to
state law in considering Bivens-type actions. 218 Justice Powell
pointed out that only the Term before, in Butz v. Economou,2 19
the Court had stressed that the immunities available to a federal
official in a Bivens action should mirror those available to a state official in a section 1983 context. The concurrence, apparently
seeking to avoid the creation of a completely new body of judicially
made federal law, and the attendant burdens on the federal docket,
would "routinely refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national remedial schemes,"220 in the absence of state law frustration

of the federal right.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, offered an historical approach to
support the proposition that Green "still further highlights the
wrong turn this Court took in Bivens .... "221 Justice Rehnquist
first pointed out that article III of the Constitution created a limited federal judicial power.2 22 Indeed, the ability to create lower
federal courts and to define their jurisdiction belongs to Congress.2 23 Although the legislature could specifically grant the federal courts the power to award damages for violations of the Constitution by federal officials, 2 24 it had not done so. For Justice
Rehnquist, this fact was dispositive: Congress must have intended
that those in Bivens' situation file suit in state court to vindicate a
common law right to remain free of unreasonable search and seizure. Justice Rehnquist supported his position by mentioning that
until 1875 no federal question jurisdiction existed in the lower federal courts to hear constitutional claims.22 5 Further justification for
this limited view of federal jurisdiction was found by reference to
403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment): "[I]t seems to me that the
range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad as the

range of a legislature .... "
218. 446 U.S. at 29-30.
219. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
220. 446 U.S. at 29 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Stewart, J.).
221. Id. at 31-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
223. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
224. 446 U.S. at 39-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
225. 446 U.S. at 42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18
Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976)); pp. 962-965 supra.
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Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 226 which Justice Rehnquist characterized as recognizing that the federal courts cannot create com22 7
mon law in civil fields, absent statutory authorization.
Justice Rehnquist's view of the separation of powers and the
role of the federal court system is unnecessarily narrow. While article III courts are indeed of limited jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
has always possessed jurisdiction over constitutional claims. In
1875, Congress effected a major change in the jurisdiction of the
inferior federal courts, allowing them to entertain constitutional
claims. 2 28 Congress, however, did not write the Constitution. Moreover, the Bill of Rights is in large part a restriction on legislative
action. Just as Congress cannot constitutionally limit the Court's
power to hear constitutional questions, and cannot limit the substantive content of constitutional provisions, it cannot limit the Supreme Court's exercise of a preconstitutional function: the enforcement of a remedial scheme effectuating rights intended by the
framers to lie in the hands of a party before the Court. Thus, the
fact that the lower federal courts did not exercise jurisdiction to the
full extent of article III prior to 1875 is of no consequence: As explained in section II of this Project, the late development of the
federal court system is attributable to the tensions of federalism,
2 29
not those of the separation of powers.
The assertion that the Erie decision counsels a contrary result
is likewise open to question. A characterization of that case as limiting the ability of the federal courts to create common law in any
civil area is overly broad. At issue in Erie was the propriety of
Swift v. Tyson, 2 30 which began a tradition of creating federal common law in diversity cases, under the section 1332 jurisdiction of
the federal courts.2 3 1 Erie reinterpreted the Rules of Decision
Act 232 to forbid this practice. Not at issue, and unquestioned in
that case, was the ability of the courts to create a common law un226. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
227. 446 U.S. at 37-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
228. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1331(a) (1976)).
229. The discussion is developed at pp. 962-965 supra.
230. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000 ... and is between-(1) citizens of different states ......
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976): "The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."
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der the federal question jurisdiction of section 1331, in the performance of its constitutional responsibility to protect constitutional
rights from infringement by any branch of government. 23 3 The Erie

decision responded to federal neglect of state law, perhaps a direct
result of the growth of the inferior federal courts in the sixty-three
years following the expansion of jurisdiction. Justice Rehnquist
analogized Erie's statement of the principles of comity and federalism to cases involving comity and the separation of powers. The
analogy, however, is flawed: In the area of federal constitutional
law no state-and no branch of the federal government-can limit
preconstitutional protection afforded by the judiciary in the effectuation of constitutional rights.
As the Court's latest word on substantive law in the Bivens
area, Carlson v. Green merits careful scrutiny. The decision on the
exclusivity-of-remedy issue removed what previously appeared to
be a significant limitation on a Bivens cause of action-the requirement that a Bivens plaintiff have no other basis on which to seek
relief in the federal courts. Although the Court never expressly so
held, the implication that those who sued on a Bivens cause of action had to be otherwise without a remedy might be fairly inferred
from both Bivens and Davis. Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Bivens stressed the fact that the implied remedy was to effectuate
233. The Erie holding, that "[t]here is no federal general common law," Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), has been characterized as a "clarion yet

careful pronouncement." Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (footnote omitted). Judge Friendly posits
that the demise of a general federal common law gave rise to a new, specialized
common law developed by the federal courts where there is a truly federal concern
at issue. Id.; see, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (government sought recovery from bank that innocently cashed forged government
check; statute of limitations for action was federal question). Justice Rehnquist's
opinion does not discuss United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947),
which dealt specifically with the issue of the common law powers of the federal
courts in light of Erie. The Court there held that where necessary or appropriate, the
federal courts could create common law to deal with exclusively federal concerns.
Id. at 307.
Logically, in a federal question jurisdictional context, the twin values of
Erie-avoidance of inconsistent results within the same geographic location from
state to federal court and unconstitutional federal judicial lawmaking exceeding the
congressional lawmaking power by dealing with areas that are exclusively the concern of the states-do not apply. The supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, will
prevent inconsistent results between state and federal forums, because the federal
interpretation of the Constitution and federal law will supersede inconsistent state
interpretations. The exclusively federal law created under the federal question jurisdiction will not surpass the grant of lawmaking power under the Constitution.
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the fourth amendment's guarantee of the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure in the absence of any other effective
remedy. 234 The majority in Bivens stressed the inadequacy of the
state tort remedy. 235 In Davis, the Court analogized the plaintiff's
situation to Bivens' plight: In the absence of a damage remedy, she
would be without relief for her injuries. 236 However, the Green
Court clarified the situation in which the Court would avoid implication of a Bivens remedy: an explicit congressional statement that
the legislative remedy was meant to be exclusive and 237
was equally
as effective as recovery directly under the Constitution.
The reasoning for the original interpretation that Bivens was a
remedy of last resort is apparent: When the courts infer a damage
remedy from the Constitution, they must be mindful of the extraordinary nature of their task. Where Congress has acted to provide a remedy, courts will defer to its judgment both because the
legislature has at its disposal the means the courts lack to conduct
exhaustive inquiry into social needs and because the legislature
purports to reflect the popular will in its decision.2 38 To act where
Congress has spoken would be to ignore principles of comity.
The decision in Green to allow the plaintiff to retain a choice
of remedy in the absence of explicit congressional declaration to
the contrary is not without policy justifications. It was the only
choice that would further Bivens' policy goals of compensation and
deterrence. 23 9 The alternative would have been to leave plaintiffs
with a remedy that would be less than completely effective for
vindicating their constitutional rights.
Equally important was the Green Court's holding on the
choice-of-law issue. Its impact is potentially great, since it represents a definite break with the prior practice of the lower federal
courts. 2 40 When confronted with substantive gaps in Bivens law,

the lower federal courts had often looked to section 1983 case law
as appropriate precedent to fill them, regardless of the potentially
234. 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
235. Id. at 391-92.
236. 442 U.S. at 248.
237. 446 U.S. at 18-19.
238. See L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 1-7, 3-6 (1978).
239. See text accompanying notes 123-135 supra.
240. See, e.g., Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977) (statute of limitations), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir.
1975) (good faith defense); Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975) (good faith
defense).
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disparate results that could be created. Section 1983 and Bivens ac-

tions are often perceived to be parallel causes of action which share

common purposes. 2 4 1 Yet they differ in one crucial respect: Con-

gress has instructed the federal courts that in trying section 1983
cases, they are to fill the interstices of federal law with appropriate
state law. 2 42 This may reflect, in part, a judgment that the states
have an interest in applying their own law to their officials. 24 3 In
large measure, however, it is likely that section 1983 reflects an ac-

commodation of interests in the Reconstruction Congress that was
responsible for its passage. One of the purposes of the statute was

to combat the denial of equal protection in the South by the very
entities whose duty it was to uphold it-state governments and

their officials. 244 Although the laws of the states themselves were
usually not inherently unfair, their disparate application to different

classes of citizens within state borders presented a classic example
of an equal protection violation. 245 Once a federal forum was provided, the small minority of laws that were discriminatory on their

face could be disregarded and remaining state law would be vigorously applied without discriminatory effect. There, was, therefore,

no need for the development of a new body of federal common law
to combat discrimination in section 1983 cases.
Although deference to state law is thus entirely viable in a
section 1983 context, problems would arise if the same principle
were to be indiscriminately applied in Bivens actions. The states

have little interest in the application of their law to federal officials
who happen to violate the Federal Constitution. The states'
stronger interest, that of assuring their citizens' rights, is properly
vindicated by applying federal common law to Bivens claims.
241. See, e.g., 446 U.S. at 24-25; Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
242. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Lattimore, 612 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1978).
243. See 446 U.S. at 24 n.11.
244. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961), summarizes the debates that
led to the adoption of § 1983. Three rationale were advanced: (1) to override discriminatory state law; (2) to provide a remedy where state law did not; (3) to provide
a federal remedy where a state remedy was adequate in theory, but unavailable as a
practical matter to certain classes of people. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, it
was not so much the unavailability of state remedies but rather the failure of the
states to enforce their laws evenhandedly that furnished the impetus for passage of §
1983. The remedy was created "against those who representing a state in some capacity, were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law." Id. at 175-76 (emphasis in
original).
245. For example, the testimony of a black man would not have been accepted
against a white man in Kentucky courts at that time. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 345 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
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Moreover, a real problem arises when one considers the variety of possible results when fifty different bodies of law are applied
to determine the liability of federal officials for similar offenses.
The vindication of federal constitutional rights might then vary
from state to state, a result that would be undesirable. To borrow
section 1983 law indiscriminately would thus introduce a note of
unpredictability into Bivens actions. As the court of appeals noted
in Green,146 Indiana law allowed abatement, while Illinois law
would have provided for survivorship of the Bivens claims. 247 The
Supreme Court in Green adopted the federal common law rule to
govern survivorship in order to avoid these problems. Although
Green counsels uniform standards to determine liability of federal
officials for similar violations of constitutional rights, the standard
for liability in a Bivens action will not necessarily mirror that of a
state action under section 1983, although the state official may be
charged with similar constitutional violations. Even at this price,
Green teaches that uniformity of result is the value to be furthered
in resolving questions of choice of law in the Bivens context.
D. Expansion of the Cause of Action
in the Lower Federal Courts
As currently defined by the Supreme Court, nearly a decade
after the original Bivens decision, its scope is still remarkably openended. Eight years after Bivens, the Court recognized a cause of
action for violations of the fifth amendment. 248 One term later, it
extended Bivens to allow damage suits based on the eighth
amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 249
The Court has expressly reserved the question of the propriety of
extending Bivens to rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment 250 and has yet to address the issue of extending Bivens' logic
to other constitutional provisions. During the same nine-year period, the lower federal courts, in addition to allowing damage actions for violations of the fourth, 25 1 fifth,2 52 and eighth2 53 amend246. 581 F.2d 669, 674 (7th Cir. 1978).
247. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 339 (1975).
248. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
249. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 18 (1980).
250. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977).
251. E.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 916 (1978).
252. E.g., Loe v. Armistead, 528 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); Mark v. Groff, 521
F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th
Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972).
253. E.g., Hernandez v. Lattimore, 612 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ments, have expanded the cause of action to cases presenting
first, 254 sixth,2 5 5 and fourteenth2 56 amendment violations. This sub-

section examines the expansion of Bivens by the lower federal
courts and analyzes the reasoning by which this expansion was accomplished. Because unique policy questions arise in the context of
each amendment, the analysis will proceed on an amendment-byamendment basis.
1. FirstAmendment Claims.-The District Court for the District of Hawaii was one of the first courts to consider extending
Bivens to an area other than the fourth amendment. In Butler v.
United States,257 the plaintiffs were kept off a military base where
then-President Nixon was appearing. They sued for violation of
their right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for
redress of grievances. 258 The Butler court considered and rejected
an argument that characterized Bivens as merely a recognition of
the practical convenience of permitting an original action in federal
court when state tort actions would generally be removed to the
federal system. 259 The defendants had argued that no Bivens action
could be brought in the federal courts on a first amendment claim
inasmuch as there is no parallel state cause of action removable to
the federal system. Bivens, however, reflected far more than a desire for judicial economy and clearly established that state law
could not govern a federal action based directly on the Constitu0
tion. 26
The court pointed also to the historical interrelation of the
first, fourth, and fifth amendments to justify its result: " 'These
three amendments are indeed closely related, safeguarding not
only privacy and protection against self-incrimination but "conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as
well."' '"261 The Butler court then noted that each liberty guaran254. E.g., Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973).
255. E.g., Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C.
1976).
256. E.g., Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977).
257. 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973).
258. Id. at 1037-38.
259. Id. at 1040.
260. 403 U.S. at 390-95.
261. 365 F. Supp. at 1039 n.8 (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376
(1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Black and Brennan, JJ.)
(quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting,
joined by Black, J.)). The district court, relying on the above-cited opinions of Justice
Douglas, cited Entick v. Carrington, discussed at pages 952-956 supra, as evidence

that the historical justifications offered (implicitly) in Bivens of the fourth amend-
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teed by the first amendment is also secured by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments against encroachment by federal or state governments. 262 The court concluded that
the "irresistible logic of Bivens leads to the conclusion that damages are recoverable in a federal action under the Constitution for
2 63
violations of First Amendment rights."

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Paton v. La
Prade,26 4 approved the extension of Bivens to a damage action for
violation of the first amendment rights of freedom of speech and
association. The plaintiff, a high-school student, wrote to the Socialist Worker's Party as part of a social studies assignment. In the
course of its surveillance of that organization, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation began to maintain a file on the student.26 5
In considering the extension of Bivens to a first amendment
claim, the court of appeals' only guidance from the Supreme Court
was the Bivens decision itself. The Third Circuit's earlier decision
in United States ex rel. Moore v. Koezler,266 which had allowed a
fifth amendment Bivens cause of action, was largely without analysis, relying only on the conclusion that Bivens was self-extending.
Rejecting that reasoning, the Paton court noted what it considered
to be a possible distinction between the fourth amendment, which
had been the basis for Bivens, and the first amendment, on which
the plaintiff's claim was based. The court noted that the fourth
amendment is addressed to the rights of citizens, while the first
amendment limits congressional action. 267 It concluded, however,
that the difference in wording was unimportant, inasmuch as what
the Constitution prohibits the government from doing is a freedom
reserved to its citizens.268
The absence of specific congressional authorization did not
limit the court's inquiry. It believed that because a section 1983 action would lie against a state official who violated first amendment
rights, a federal official should be similarly liable on a federal cause
ment action applied with equal force to first amendment actions. 365 F. Supp. at
1039-40 & n.8. Entick in result led to the fourth amendment; its facts, however, deal
with governmental harassment of the British press.
262. 365 F. Supp. at 1040.
263. Id. at 1039.
264. 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
265. Id. at 865.
266. 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972).
267. 524 F.2d at 869.
268. Id. at 870.
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of action. 2 69 As the damage to an individual's first amendment right
of free speech and free association was the same regardless of who
employed the perpetrator, a Bivens action was necessary and appropriate to protect the plaintiff's constitutional70rights, even in the
2
absence of specific congressional authorization.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit followed the lead of the Third Circuit in Dellums v. Powell,2 71 a class
action brought by nine persons representing all those arrested on
May 5, 1971, for protesting the Vietnam War on the steps of the
Capitol. 272 As Representative Abzug addressed the demonstrators,
police officers sealed off the area and began arresting them. Plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy by the District of Columbia police and Police Chief Powell to violate their first and fourth amendment rights
by arresting and detaining the members of the class without proba273
ble cause.
Although it deemed the award of $7,500 per class member excessive, the court upheld the propriety of an award of damages for
the violation of first amendment rights. It observed that Justice
Harlan's cautionary language in Bivens regarding problems of causation and valuation of damages was not a concern in a first amendment context.2 74 The court was familiar with causation problems in
first amendment cases because it had previously faced the issue in
granting equitable relief. It also found that the measurement of
damages was no more troublesome than in any other constitutional
2 75
case where intangible liberty interests were implicated.
The District Court for the Central District of California, in
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 276 similarly extended Bivens to first amendment violations. Plaintiffs argued that
an FCC regulation, adopted by television broadcasters and the major networks, which restricted programming to a "family hour" format during certain evening hours, was an impermissible form of
2 77
censorship and thus violative of the writers' free speech rights.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
272. Id. at 173.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 194-95 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408-09 (Harlan, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
275. Id.
276. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Writers Guild of America v. American Broadcasting, Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979).
277. Id.
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The Writers Guild court first echoed Bivens' assertion that damages are the ordinary remedy for invasions of personal interests in
liberty and then noted that the first amendment creates federal
personal rights. 278 Defendants' argument that prior cases had allowed damages only where an interference with a plaintiff was direct and almost physical in nature was rejected. 279 Since the distinction had never been suggested by the policy or reasoning of
Bivens or its progeny, and did not explain the results in prior
cases, such as Paton, the court dismissed the proposed distinction
as fanciful and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed.280
Since no sound policy reason has been advanced against a first
amendment Bivens claim, and because the Supreme Court has recognized Bivens actions for violations of the fourth 28 1 and fifth
amendments, 2 82 which, as the Butler court noted, are historically
linked to the first amendment,28 3 little question remains as to the
propriety of such first amendment claims. The reasoning of both
Davis28 4 and Green,285 decided since these lower court cases, gives
no reason to question a first amendment Bivens cause of action.
2. Sixth Amendment Claims.-Two courts have considered
Bivens claims in a sixth amendment context. While the Eighth Circuit's result in Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee V.
FB128 6 is highly questionable, the decision of the District Court for

287
the District of Columbia in Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld
is the product of a better-reasoned analysis. In Wounded Knee, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit allowed attorneys to maintain suit for the violation of their clients' sixth amendment right to
counsel. 288 The attorneys did not seek money damages on their clients' behalf but instead prevailed on the court to hear their claim
for equitable relief based on a Bivens theory. The court cited

Bell 28 9 and Bivens 2 90 to support section 1331 jurisdiction over an
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 1088-89.
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1970).
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
365 F. Supp. at 1039 n.8.
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
446 U.S. 14 (1980).
507 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1974).
410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976).
507 F.2d at 1284.
327 U.S. 678 (1946).
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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equitable cause of action, 2 9 1 thus avoiding the amount-in-controversy requirement existing at the time. 2 92 The court correctly

noted that Bivens' logic is not limited to the fourth amendment.
Yet the analogy to Bivens was unnecessary to support equitable jurisdiction of the federal court on a constitutional claim, as the
court's equitable powers, without regard to the amount-incontroversy requirement, had been established long before
Bivens. 293 To rest equitable relief on a Bivens theory would seem
to suggest that the suit be subject to legal defenses, such as goodfaith claims by the defendant-officials. The Eighth Circuit's result
thus raised more questions than it set to rest.
The District Court for the District of Columbia, in Berlin
Democratic Club, 294 rejected the defendants'

contention that

Bivens should be limited by its facts to fourth amendment claims
and went on to consider whether relief in damages was a necessary
or appropriate remedy for an alleged interference with the right to
effective assistance of counsel.2 95 The court reasoned that a violation of this right could also affect the right to a fair trial and then
asserted that even a reversal on appeal could not eradicate some of
the injury a plaintiff might suffer, such as loss of reputation, damage to financial resources, and loss of freedom pending appeal. Following Justice Harlan's lead in Bivens, 296 the court concluded that
damages were a necessary remedy and that questions of causation
and valuation in right-to-counsel cases were "always thorny, but
never insuperable." 297 Thus the court believed that damages were
an appropriate remedy.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Claims.-Most of the Bivens case
law in the lower federal courts has been generated by claims
against municipalities on a fourteenth amendment theory. Yet
291. 507 F.2d at 1284.
292. Section 1331(a) was amended in December 1980 to remove the $10,000
amount-in-controversy requirement. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §

1331(a)). The amendment and the relevant case law are discussed at pp. 1042-1050
infra.
293. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
294. 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976).
295. Id. at 161-62.
296. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivens cautioned courts to consider
the difficulty involved in questions of causation and valuation, 403 U.S. at 408-09
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment), although the primary consideration in his
view was whether damages were necessary or appropriate. Id. at 407, 411 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
297. 410 F. Supp. at 162.
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when Bivens is so extended, new concerns arise-those of federalism. In the Bivens decision, no federalism values were implicated
since the remedy created was against a federal employee, sued in a
federal court, on a federal cause of action. In a fourteenth amendment Bivens claim, plaintiffs seek to hold cities, towns, villages,
and other municipal governments liable for constitutional violations. The federal courts, where plaintiffs are successful, will award
damages against the treasury of a political subdivision of a state.
2 99
Though the eleventh amendment 298 may not bar such a result,

the special nature of a damage award against a branch of a state
government remains a factor to be reckoned with.
In the landmark decision of Monroe v. Pape,300 the Supreme
Court redefined the scope of section 1983 by broadly defining the
term "under color of state law" to include unconstitutional acts by
state officials even where the state had not explicitly sanctioned the
conduct complained of.3 01 This decision gave section 1983 a new

life in the civil rights battles of the 1960's,302 rescuing the statute
from nearly a century of disuse. In the same case, however, the
Court interpreted the legislative history of the statute to exclude
municipalities from liability. 30 3 Plaintiffs who wished to sue municipal governments in the 1970's began to predicate their liability on
a fourteenth amendment Bivens theory, invoking jurisdiction under
section 1331(a) rather than section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, section 1343, 304 thus avoiding the limitation placed on sec298.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial power of the United

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
299. The eleventh amendment concerns introduced here are discussed more
fully at pp. 1089-1090 infra.
300. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
301. Id. at 170-87.
302. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1131, 1136 n.7 (1977).
303. 365 U.S. at 187-92.
304. Section 1343 provides in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statutes, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States:
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tion 1983 by the Supreme Court. Virtually all the circuits faced the
question of the propriety of so extending Bivens, 30 5 if only in the
context of appeals from orders of summary judgment. Most held

that plaintiffs had stated claims on which relief could be granted,
thus allowing municipal liability under Bivens to bypass the prohi-

bitions established by Monroe.
The First Circuit, in Kostka v. Hogg, stood alone in forbidding
such a result. 30 6 Plaintiffs in the case represented the estate of

Kostka, who had been shot and killed by a Westford, Massachusetts police officer in the course of an arrest. The plaintiffs at-

tempted to predicate liability of the town on its failure to train and

7
properly supervise the officer in his duties. 30 Recognizing that it

had subject matter jurisdiction, the court stated that Bivens teaches
caution in implied-remedy cases. The court refused to allow the
plaintiffs to circumvent what it saw in section 1983 as "something

(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the
right to vote.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. III 1979).
305. E.g., Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977) (refusing to allow fourteenth amendment Bivens cause of action against municipality); Gentile v. Wallen,
562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977) (allowing fourteenth amendment Bivens cause of action
against municipality); Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975) (panel
decision), vacated on other grounds, id. at 736 (en banc); Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d
112 (3d Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction exists to hear fourteenth amendment Bivens claims
against municipalities); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974) (allowing fourteenth amendment Bivens claim against municipality), vacated on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (dictum)
(approving of Bivens claim against municipality); Roane v. Callisburg Independent
School Dist., 511 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975) (allowing fourteenth amendment Bivens
claim against school district); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975) (allowing fourteenth amendment Bivens claim to vindicate fourth amendment rights violated by municipality); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976) (allowing fourteenth amendment due process claim against a municipality); Wiley v.
Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822
(1977) (allowing fourteenth amendment Bivens claim against municipality); Hostrop
v. Board of Jr. College Dist., 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction exists for fourteenth amendment Bivens claim against municipality); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977) (allowing fourteenth amendment Bivens claim
against municipality), vacated and remanded in light of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), 438 U.S. 902 (1978); McSurely v. McClellan, 553
F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (fourteenth amendment Bivens theory alternative ground
for jurisdiction). [The cases have been arranged numerically by circuit for convenience of identification.]
306. 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977).
307. Id. at 39.
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akin to an explicit Congressional determination that political subdivisions are not to be held liable in damages for violation of consti308
tutional rights."
The court then inquired whether the remedy sought was constitutionally compelled, so that it would be forced to act even if
inferring a Bivens remedy against municipal governments would be
an unwise exercise of judicial discretion on grounds of comity. To
infer a damages remedy, in the court's opinion, would be to decide
that the fourteenth amendment embraces a right of those suffering
violation of their constitutional rights to full compensation of their
injuries. In the absence of a remedy against the individual responsible, such compensation would come from the treasury of the state
and/or its political subdivisions. Since the eleventh amendment
barred such a result, and since there was no support for the proposition that municipal and sovereign immunity should be subordinated to the Bivens goals of compensation and deterrence, the
court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. 30 9
The Second Circuit reached the opposite result, allowing a
plaintiff to proceed against a municipality on a Bivens theory in
Gentile v. Wallen.310 The court there adopted the reasoning of its
earlier (reversed 1 ) panel decision in Brault v. Town of Milton. 312
Plaintiffs in Brault had alleged that their due process right was violated by a town zoning ordinance which restricted the use of their
property. In answer to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the court held that plaintiffs' "invocation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause as the source of their claim for
relief comes within Bivens' sweeping approbation of constitutionally
based causes of action." 313 The only factor noted by the panel as
counselling hesitation was the defendant's municipal status. 314 Yet
the town would be sheltered from liability to some extent even un308. Id. at 43.
309. Id. at 44.
310. 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977).
311. The panel discussion in Brault was reversed on the ground that plaintiffs,
in failing to allege malice, had not stated a fourteenth amendment claim. 527 F,2d
736 (2d Cir. 1975) (en bane).
312. 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 527 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1975) (en bane).
313. Id. at 734.
314. Id. at 734-35. This analysis was criticized as oversimplistic for ignoring the
federalism concern inherent in a federal court's interference with the finances of municipal governments. Note, Municipal Liability in Damagesfor Violation of Constitutional Rights-Fashioning a Cause of Action Directly from the Constitution
-Brault v. Town of Milton, 7 CONN. L. REv. 552 (1975).
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der a Bivens action, the court noted, because the federal question
jurisdiction under which it was brought required more than
$10,000 in controversy. 3 15 A section 1983 action, by contrast,
31 6
would have required no jurisdictional amount in controversy.
One factor the Brault court failed to consider was the textual
argument that the fourteenth amendment, by its very terms, envisions a central role for Congress in the enforcement of its guarantees. 31 7 Previous cases extending Bivens, as well as the original decision, were all concerned with provisions of the Bill of Rights and
accordingly were never faced with such an explicit determination
of Congress' role. While the court may not have considered this to
be dispositive, the argument certainly merited discussion in the
31 8
opinion.
The Supreme Court, in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 31 9 reversed that part of the Monroe decision that barred all
section 1983 suits against municipalities, holding that Congress had
meant to bar liability only on a "respondeat superior"3 20 theory:
A local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury
inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by
its lawmaker or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy, inflict the injury that the government
as an entity is responsible under § 1983.321

Since the Monell decision, plaintiffs have sought to predicate municipal liability on a respondeat superior theory under a fourteenth
amendment Bivens claim. No court considering the question has
322
allowed this use of Bivens.
315. Since the Brault decision, the protection envisioned by the court was removed by congressional amendment of the federal question provision. Federal Question jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)).
316. E.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
317. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
318. The merits of the argument that congressional power preempts the judiciary's discretion to create a fourteenth amendment Bivens action are discussed at pp.
1089-1090 infra.
319. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
320. Id. at 691-95. Respondeat superior is generally relied upon to hold an employer liable for the tortious acts of his employees. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971).
321. 436 U.S. at 694.
322. E.g., Cale v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d 1311 (4th Cir. 1978); Molina v.
Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978). For a
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The Mental-State Requirement in Bivens Actions-A Model

One major issue still undecided by the federal courts is the
scienter requirement in Bivens claims. Supreme Court opinions offer no guidance on the question. 32 3 Since Butz,3 24 questions of

good faith defenses have been determined by reference to section
1983 precedent, and in conformity with section 1988,325 section

1983 provides a convenient starting point for developing a mentalstate requirement for Bivens actions.
The first line of inquiry with respect to section 1983 is the

statutory language, which is not particularly helpful in this context:
"Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected
.... '326 It indicates only a causation requirement and has even
been found amenable to a construction permitting liability without fault. 3 27 In the Bivens context, the statutory language of section
1983 could not be dispositive in any event, as Bivens is a judicially

created remedy and should be administered by the courts in light
of the policy goals that informed its creation. Yet inasmuch as the
two causes of action fulfill similar purposes, a study of the judicia-

ry's development of the mental-state requirement in section 1983
case law is instructive.

The Supreme Court indicated in Monroe that section 1983
"should be read against the background of tort liability that makes
a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." 3 28
discussion of Cale, see Case Comment, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1150 (1979) (arguing
for congressional amendment of § 1983 to reach municipality on respondeat superior
theory).
323. Neither Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Butz, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Davis, 442
U.S. 228 (1979); nor Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), addressed this issue.
324. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
taken a position on the good faith defense in the Bivens remand similar to that later
taken by the Supreme Court in Butz. See Bivens, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
325. The text of § 1988 is reprinted in part in note 213 supra. For discussion of
the propriety of extending the § 1983/§ 1988 analogy to Bivens case law, see text accompanying notes 240-247 supra.
326. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
327. See Note, Section 1988: An Alternative to Vicarious Liability Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 58 NEB. L. REv. 1156 (1979). For other views on the
mental-state question in § 1983 cases, see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v.
Pape, And The Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277, 327 (1965) (suggesting defendant's conduct be "outrageous" so as to deserve appellation "constitutional tort");
Comment, The Evolution of the State of Mind Requirement of Section 1983, 47 TUL.
L. REv. 870 (1973) (suggesting negligence standard for individual liability and
back-up strict liability standard for governmental entities as guarantee of compensation).
328. 365 U.S. at 187.
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Bivens would seem to be susceptible to the same construction. By
this interpretation, a defendant must have intended to commit or
fail to commit an act or have been negligent. The threshold question in a section 1983 action is whether a constitutional right has
been violated. 3 29 Liability is imposed for violation of constitutionally protected rights and not for violations of duties of care arising
from common law tort. Neither section 1983 nor Bivens was an attempt to give state tort suits a federal forum. The mental-state requirement in both actions is thus intimately connected with the
particular constitutional violation charged. Thus, for example, the
fact that a plaintiff is a prisoner and the defendant a prison official
will not suffice to transform a medical malpractice suit into a violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 3 30 Similarly, to claim invidious discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment, it is not enough to show the
discriminatory impact of a defendant's actions: the defendant must
have intended to discriminate in order for plaintiffs to make out a
claim. 3 34 When a specific mental state is necessary to violate a constitutional right, plaintiffs must so allege in order to avoid dismissal
for failure to state a claim.332
The biggest remaining question concerning intent in a section
1983 context is whether negligence is sufficient to make out a claim
under an amendment where no specific scienter requirement is apparent. Twice the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
this issue; both cases were decided on other grounds. 33 3 The only
indication the Court has given of a resolution to the issue is the following dictum in Baker v. McCollan:
[W]e have come to the conclusion that the question whether an
allegation of simple negligence is sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983 is more elusive than it appears at first blush.
It may well not be susceptible of a uniform answer across the
entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional violations .... 3
329. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
330. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
331. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
332. E.g., Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc) (by
failing to allege malice, plaintiffs had not stated valid fourteenth amendment claim);
Pace v. Fauver, 479 F. Supp. 456 (D. N.J. 1979) (to state proper eighth amendment
claim plaintiff must show deliberate indifference to particular medical needs).
333. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139 (1979); Procunier v. Navarette, 434
U.S. 555, 559 n.6 (1978).
334. 443 U.S. at 139-40.
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Thus the mental-state requirement in a section 1983 context is far
from completely settled. In light of this fact, courts facing the scienter requirement in Bivens actions should look to the constitutional provision on which the Bivens suit is based. When a particular amendment can be violated without entertaining any culpable
mental state, as in a fourth amendment case where the applicable
constitutional provision is prohibitory in nature, then the plaintiff's
prima facie case may be made out without regard to a defendant's
fault; it should be sufficient to allege the violation. Where a mental
state is necessary to violate a constitutional provision, as with
claims of invidious discrimination under the fourteenth amendment, then once that mental state has been alleged, and the violation shown, plaintiff's prima facie case has been made out. In either situation, the individual defendant may still plead and show
good faith as an affirmative defense. The seriousness of the violation and the culpable mental state entertained by the defendant
will also be a part of the calculation of punitive damages. 335
F.

The Future of the Action

With violations of the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and
fourteenth amendments already proper bases for Bivens claims, its
scope appears to be limited only by the substance of the Constitution itself. At least two courts have indicated that it may extend to
all constitutional provisions, thus paralleling section 1983 in
scope. 336 The Supreme Court has recognized certain limitations on
Bivens actions. They may not be maintained in the face of "special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress." 3 37 Examples given by the Bivens court of such situations include cases where questions of federal fiscal policy are implicated, raising questions of comity for decisions of coordinate
branches of government, 3 38 or cases where plaintiffs seek to impose
liability on a congressional employee for actions taken in excess of
delegated authority, but not in contravention of any specific constitutional provision. 33 9 Special status afforded a defendant by the
335. For a discussion of issues related to punitive damages, see p. 1107 n.96
infra.
336. Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. Il. 1974); Washington
v. Brantley, 352 F. Supp. 559, 564 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
337. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 18; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 245;
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398.
338. 403 U.S. at 396 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311
(1947)).
339. 403 U.S. at 396-97 (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963)).
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Constitution need also be considered. In Green, the Court found
that federal prison officials enjoyed no special status under the
Constitution suggesting that judicial creation of a damage remedy
against them might be inappropriate. 340 In Davis, where defendant's status as a Congressman is the clearest example yet presented
of a factor counselling hesitation for reasons of comity, the Court
only briefly hesitated to imply the Bivens remedy. Instead, Representative Passman was given a qualified immunity, coextensive
with the protection afforded him by the speech or debate clause of
the Constitution. 34 1 In light of holdings that legislators and high
executive officials such as the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons are amenable to suit, it is apparent that few individuals can
claim such special constitutional status suggesting the judiciary hesitate to allow actions against them on a Bivens theory.
The second limitation on the Bivens cause of action is presented where Congress has explicitly declared that a person in the
plaintiff's position may not recover damages directly under the
Constitution but must instead utilize an alternative remedy equally
effective in the view of Congress. 342 Although several of the lower
federal courts believed that section 1983 implicitly embodied such
a determination, at least with respect to municipal liability for constitutional violations, 343 the particular limits of section 1983 caused
many courts to allow Bivens claims against municipalities. 344 Since
the Monell Court overturned this limitation on the 1983 remedy,
however, municipal liability under Bivens has mirrored that of sec345
tion 1983.
Justice Harlan's Bivens concurrence added the considerations
3
of causation and valuation of damages to the Court's opinion. 46
While these factors have been analyzed in the context of each
Bivens extension, the federal courts have yet to find these questions so insuperable that they have defeated the implication of a
Bivens cause of action. Indeed, it is questionable whether the
Bivens policy goals of compensation and deterrence should be de340. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 19.
341. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 246.
342. Id. at 246-47; see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
343. See, e.g., Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977); Farsworth v. Orem
City, 421 F. Supp. 830 (D. Utah 1976); Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist.,
387 F. Supp. 552 (D. Colo. 1974).
344. E.g., Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977).
345. E.g., Cale v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d 1311 (4th Cir. 1978); Molina v.

Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1977).
346. 403 U.S. at 408-09 & n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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feated by such considerations as causation and valuation of damages, especially since these questions are frequently left to the
jury.
In spite of these limitations, the reach of Bivens remains impressively wide. The tripartite analysis created by the Davis Court
to guide Bivens' expansion is not limited on its face by reference to
particular amendments.3 47 Certainly, no fine lines within the Bill
of Rights meaningfully separate those provisions already sued on
from those which have yet to be recognized as proper Bivens actions. Furthermore, the constitutional embodiment of these rights
and their historical interrelation caution against the creation of such
lines. Because some provisions will more frequently be the basis of
Bivens claims than others, it is worth recalling Justice Harlan's admonition of ten years ago: "Of course, for a variety of reasons, the
remedy may not often be sought. .

.

. Although litigants may not

often choose to seek relief, it is important, in a civilized society,
that the judicial branch of the Nation's government stand ready to
afford a remedy in these circumstances."3 4s
IV.

PROCEDURAL CONCERNS

In 1971 the Supreme Court endorsed the creation of a federal
cause of action against federal officials in their individual capacities
for violations of the constitutional rights of private citizens.' In the
subsequent decade, however, it has become increasingly apparent
that a Bivens plaintiff is faced with numerous, and perhaps crippling, procedural obstacles. 2 In particular, plaintiffs have often had
trouble locating a court where venue is both proper and convenient, serving process on defendants who cannot be found within
the forum state, establishing subject matter jurisdiction in the district courts, and determining which statute of limitations the court
will apply to their claim. Briefly stated, these problems have
stemmed from the following four issues.
347.
348.

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 347.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).

1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). The various Bivens opinions will hereinafter be cited as Bivens.

2. Many of these obstacles stem from the fact that the Bivens cause of action is
judicially created and neither the Supreme Court nor the legislature has ever set
forth thorough procedural guidelines for instituting such a claim. Thus, plaintiffs and
the courts have been forced to create an avenue for bringing these claims based on
existing procedural statutes.
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The first issue involves venue considerations. Recently, in
Stafford v. Briggs,3 the Court barred any future use by Bivens
plaintiffs of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). 4 Assuming there is no real property involved in the action, section 1391(e) allows claims to be
brought in the district where the plaintiff resides thereby avoiding

any costly or inconvenient travel. However, in Stafford, the Supreme Court held that section 1391(e) is not applicable to damage
actions. 5 As such, venue for a Bivens action is now controlled by 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b), 6 which allows an action to be brought only in the

district where all the defendants reside or in the district where the
cause of action arose. Thus the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of section 1391(e) has deprived Bivens plaintiffs of the benefit of bringing their actions in the local district unless the cause of
action arose there.

Second, considering that the defendants in a Bivens action will
often reside outside the forum state, and that nationwide service of
process under section 1391(e) is no longer available to plaintiffs
after Stafford, 7 a realistic alternative for service of process must be
found. Service of process from federal courts is governed by rule 4

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 Process on a Bivens de-

3. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976):
A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under
color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United
States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial
district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4)
the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. Additional
persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements
as would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees,
or agencies were not a party.
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of
the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules
may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in
which the action is brought.
5. 444 U.S. at 535-36, 543-45.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976): "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not
founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district
where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law."
7. 444 U.S. at 535-36, 543-44.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
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fendant must be served in compliance with rule 4(d)(1), 9 which
provides that service must be made upon the defendant personally
or by leaving it at the defendant's home with a person of reasonable age and discretion. Subsections 4(e)10 and (f) add that service under rule 4 is confined to the territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is located unless otherwise authorized by a
statute of the United States, by an order of a United States court,
or by a statute of the state in which the district court is sitting.
Thus, absent resort to section 1391(e), the plaintiff is required to
serve the defendant within the forum state, as section 1391(b) has
no provision authorizing out-of-state service. The plaintiff does
have the alternative of resorting to the forum state's long-arm statute,' 2 and the concomitant provision for out-of-state service of
9.

Rule 4(d)(1) provides that "service shall be made"
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or incompetent person, by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or
by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 4(d)(1). Rule 4(d)(5), which governs service on "an officer or agency
of the United States," FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(5), is inapplicable as it is limited to suits
against officials in their official capacity, Griffith v. Nixon, 518 F.2d 1195, 1196 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975), while Bivens defendants are sued in their individual capacities. E.g., Note, "Damages or Nothing"-The Efficacy of the Bivenstype Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 667, 674 n.31 (1979).
10. Rule 4(e) provides in part that
[wihenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides . . . for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in
lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state
...
service may ... be made under the circumstances and in the manner
prescribed in the statute or rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f): "All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, and
when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state ......
12. The New York long-arm statute is representative of most state provisions:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or
his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply
goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he
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process or authorization of a state official to receive process for the
long-arm defendant. 1 3 However, before a plaintiff can call upon a
long-arm statute to justify out-of-state service, the court must be
satisfied that the defendant has one of the requisite contacts with
the forum state as set forth in the long-arm provision.' 4 This problem would be avoided by allowing nationwide service of process
from all federal courts, as long as subject matter jurisdiction and
venue are proper in that court. Such an arrangement would not violate due process, as the minimum-contacts test associated with
personal jurisdiction relates only to determining the limits of a
state court's jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant; a federal defendant need only have minimum contacts with the United States
to be subject to personal jurisdiction in any federal court.15
Third, Bivens plaintiffs will generally need to invoke subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) as no other federal
statute will consistently grant the district courts appropriate jurisdiction.' 6 Prior to the Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments
Act of 1980,17 section 1331(a) required a showing of a minimum of
$10,000 in controversy in certain cases. 18 As such, plaintiffs had to
satisfy the court either that a constitutional deprivation, absent ac(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAvs § 302(a) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980).
13. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 313 (McKinney 1972).
14. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. See text accompanying notes 60-66, 82-85 infra.
16. For discussion of why Bivens plaintiffs will generally need to invoke subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331(a) as opposed to other provisions, see text accompanying notes 147-162 infra.
17. Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1331(a)): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
18. Prior to the 1980 amendment, § 1331(a) read as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, except that no such sum or value shall be required
in any such action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or
any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.
Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721.
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tual injury, could be valued at or above the jurisdictional amount,
or that the 1976 amendment 19 to section 1331(a) removed the
amount-in-controversy requirement for Bivens actions. However,
the 1980 amendment eliminated these obstacles to invoking jurisdiction under section 1331(a) by removing the20 amount-in-controversy requirement in all federal question cases.
Finally, in deciding which statute of limitations controls in a
Bivens action, the courts have applied the limitations period covering analogous causes of action pursuant to forum law. However,
there has been disagreement 21 concerning which state action is
most closely analogous to a Bivens action, leaving the plaintiff uncertain as to which statute of limitations will prevail. This uncertainty unfairly jeopardizes the institution of the action and can
22
seemingly be resolved only through legislative intervention.
This section shall proceed to examine the history of the issues
presented, the resolution of these issues, and the procedural realities presently facing a Bivens plaintiff.
A. Venue and Service of Process
1. Lower Court Decisions Prior to Stafford v. Briggs.-The
most serious procedural problem presently facing Bivens plaintiffs
is finding a convenient federal forum 23 and bringing the defendants
within its jurisdiction. The recent Supreme Court decision in
Stafford v. Briggs2 4 barred any future use of section 1391(e) in
19. Section 1331(a) was amended in 1976, id., to remove the $10,000 requirement in federal question actions "against the United States, any agency thereof, or
any [federal] officer or employee ... in his or her official capacity."
20. For the text of § 1331(a) as amended in 1980, see note 17 supra.
21. See text accompanying notes 193-221 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 222-230 infra.
23. Plaintiffs have overwhelmingly avoided the option of bringing a Bivens action in state court apparently fearing that state court judges will not have the expertise to adjudicate such a claim, that questions will arise as to the propriety of a state
court adjudicating a claim against a federal official, or that state court remedies may
be inadequate. E.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390-95 (Court considered state law insufficient to fully vindicate fourth amendment rights and potentially inconsistent with
fourth amendment policies). Further, one commentator has noted that state courts are
not hearing Bivens actions: "Whether state courts provide a viable alternative to a
federal forum is unknown. A review of the reported decisions of California, Georgia,
Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas yielded no constitutional tort suits
against federal officials. Federal courts are more appropriate for Bivens-type suits."
Note, supra note 9, at 682 n.83. The Supreme Court has, however, noted that state
courts can, but are not compelled to, hear § 1983 claims. Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 277, 283-84 n.7 (1980).
24. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
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holding the statute inapplicable to damage actions.2 5 Prior to
Stafford, the most convenient method of satisfying personal jurisdiction, venue, and service-of-process requirements was resort to
section 1391(e). 26 Section 1391(e) appears to be tailored to the
Bivens action, which is clearly "[a] civil action in which a defendant
is an officer or employee of the United States or agency thereof
27
acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority."
Thus the provision would allow the plaintiff to bring his or her
claim in any one of three forums, and to serve process for personal
jurisdiction on out-of-state defendants through certified mail. However, the courts were not unanimous in this interpretation and application of section 1391(e).
The first major split in the courts centered on whether Congress intended section 1391(e) to apply to personal damage actions
or only those actions in the nature of mandamus. 28 Section 1391(e)
was passed in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1361,29 as the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.30 Various courts insisted that the two
provisions be read together and as a result held that section 1391(e)
was intended only to provide broadened venue and service of pro-

cess for those actions covered by section 1361-those in the nature
of mandamus. 31 Other courts were not inclined to read section
1391(e) so narrowly, as the provision does not expressly limit itself
to actions in the nature of mandamus. These courts either held or
proceeded under the assumption that section 1391(e) was applica32
ble to Bivens actions.
25. Id. at 535-36, 543-44.
26. For the text of § 1391(e), see note 4 supra.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
28. The phrase "in the nature of mandamus" includes actions for injunctive relief. Although the Court held in Stafford that § 1391(e) does not apply to damage actions, the majority expressly noted that the statute was designed to provide expanded
venue and nationwide service of process for actions for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as for mandamus-type relief. 444 U.S. at 534.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff."
30. Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361,
1391(e) (1976)).
31. E.g., Blackburn v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Congress
could hardly have intended ... that section 1391(e) apply to cases such as the one at
hand. This is a personal damage action against a federal official in his individual capacity."); Kenyatta v. Kelley, 430 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("[Section
1391(e)] does not apply where suit is brought against a federal official in his individual capacity."); Davis v. FDIC, 369 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Colo. 1974) ("Since the action at bar is one for damages," § 1391(e) does not apply.).
32. E.g., Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Section 1391(e)
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The second major tension questioned whether section 1391(e)
was applicable to both present and former federal officials and employees. Those courts holding that section 1391(e) applied only to
present officials, and not to officials who resigned from federal employment after the cause of action arose, generally followed three
lines of reasoning. First, if section 1391(e) applies only to actions in
the nature of mandamus, then any court order issued to a federal
official is meaningless if the official is now a private citizen. 33 Second, section 1391(e) is written in the present tense ("A civil action
in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States
or agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority"), and therefore excludes past actions of former officials. 34 Finally, other courts held that Congress, in drafting section
1391(e), did not intend to subject every individual ever serving as a
federal employee to the substantially broadened provision of sec35
tion 1391(e).
Other courts have held36 that former officials are included
within the scope of section 1391(e), as "an official should not be
able to defeat an action against him for illegal acts merely by reencompasses "suits for money damages against federal officials who had acted under
color of law though in excess of legal authority."); Ellingburg v. Connett, 457 F.2d
240 (5th Cir. 1972); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979);
United States ex rel. Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1977);
Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952, 961 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Patmore v. Carlson,
392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Il. 1975); Wu v. Keeney, 384 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (D.D.C.
1974) (Although plaintiff "has brought a private, tort action for damages, and not an
action for review of an agency decision," § 1391(e) is applicable.), affd mem., 527
F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
33. E.g., Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("Congress's emphasis upon mandamus actions, which would logically be brought only
against an individual currently in office and thus capable of taking the desired action, suggests . . .that Congress did not contemplate that retired officials and employees would fall within the scope of [§ 1391(e)].").
34. E.g., id. at 876 ("All verbs in the provision are in the present tense; the
statute refers neither to former government official nor to private citizens.").
35. E.g., Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("One searches
Section 1391(e) in vain for even so much as a hint of any congressional desire to
widen venue or ameliorate service of process in suits against those whose federal incumbency is a thing of the past."); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 877
(N.D. Cal. 1976) ("The Court finds it inconceivable that Congress would so substantially broaden the venue provision applicable to every individual once employed by
the federal government without comment."); Wu v. Keeney, 384 F. Supp. 1161, 1168
(D.D.C. 1974) (emphasis in original) ("Nothing in the legislative history [of §
1391(e)] indicates that Congress intended to include past employees who are being
sued for damages in the category of persons subject to extra-territorial service.").
36. E.g., United States ex rel. Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240, 245
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952, 961-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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signing his position."3 7 Section 1391(e) requires only that the actions complained of were committed "under color of legal authority." The fact that the official has since resigned does not affect his
or her status at the time the alleged offense occurred. The actions
complained of need only be part of the official's job-related activities and a subsequent resignation cannot logically alter the nature
of prior actions. 38 Moreover, when bringing "an action for damages
and not for injunctive relief, the fact that the defendants have re39
tired or changed posts is irrelevant."
The final split in the courts concerned due process of law in
the context of minimum contacts with the forum state. 40 Section
1391(e) allows for service of process on out-of-state defendants
through certified mail. 4 1 A Bivens plaintiff satisfying the venue requirements of section 1391(e) would therefore not need to contend
with the problem of finding the defendant within the boundaries of
the forum state. However, in Kipperman v. McCone, 42 the court
held that in addition to satisfying the venue requirements of section 1391(e), the plaintiff was also required to satisfy the court that
the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify
subjecting him to suit in that state. The court reasoned that
"[w]hile Section 1391(e) makes possible the exercise of jurisdiction
over individuals found beyond the territorial limits of the district
court by providing a mechanism for effective service of process, its
invocation cannot dispel the need to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with due process." 43 Yet, the
majority of courts have held that there is no need to show that the
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state when
invoking personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 1391(e). 44 Rather,
"in authorizing service of process by certified mail beyond the

37. Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. at 961.
38. Id. at 962: "To assert that because the defendants are no longer in government service the plaintiff may not utilize section 1391(e) . . . would .. . defeat the

purposes of the statute."
39. United States ex rel. Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. at 245 (emphasis
added).
40. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41. For the text of § 1391(e), see note 4 supra.
42. 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
43. Id. at 871.
44. E.g., Blackburn v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919, 925 n.12 (2d Cir. 1979); Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1382 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel.
Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
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boundaries of the forum state, Congress intended to provide a
source of nationwide in personam jurisdiction in suits where venue
is established under section 1391(e)." 45 Such an arrangement does
not deny a defendant due process of law, as he need only have
minimum contacts with the United States46in order to be subject to
personal jurisdiction in any district court.
2. Stafford v. Briggs: Proceedings Below.-The debate concerning the interpretation and application of section 1391(e) was
4v
finally addressed by the Supreme Court in Stafford v. Briggs,
which reached the Court on appeal from two circuit court decisions, Briggs v. Goodwin48 and Driver v. Helms. 49 In Briggs v.
Goodwin, the plaintiffs sued three federal attorneys and an agent of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, seeking a declaratory judgment and damages. 50 The cause of action arose in Florida,
stemming from alleged false testimony proffered by one of the defendants, the consequences of which were allegedly violative of
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 51 The plaintiffs brought suit in the
District of Columbia, personally serving process on one defendant
residing in the District of Columbia, and serving the other defendants, who were Florida residents, by certified mail. 52 In reversing
the district court, 53 the circuit court held that venue and service of
process for the action were controlled by section 1391(e), 54 as the
suit was "[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or em-

45. Blackmun v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919, 925 n.12 (2d Cir. 1979).
46. For further discussion of this concept, see text accompanying notes 62-66,
82-85 infra.
47. 444 U.S. 527 (1980). Stafford was decided together with Colby v. Driver,
444 U.S. 527, 527 n. (1980).
48. 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527
(1980).
49. 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 444 U.S. 527
(1980); see 444 U.S. at 527 n.
50. Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem. & order), rev'd,
569 F.2d 1. The circuit court actually reversed an unreported order. Briggs v.
Goodwin, No. 74-803 (Mar. 4, 1975), reprinted in 569 F.2d at 3 n.15.
51. 569 F.2d at 2.
52. Id. at 2-3.
53. In its unreported order, the district court held that § 1391(e) is inapplicable
to damage actions and therefore dismissed the action for lack of venue and in
personam jurisdiction. In addition, the court held that out-of-state service of process
was insufficient, as the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants had the requisite
minimal contacts with the forum. See Briggs v. Goodwin, No. 74-803 (Mar. 7, 1975),
reprintedin 569 l.2d at 3 n.15.
54. 569 F.2d at 7, 10.
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ployee of the United States . . . acting in his official capacity." 55
Further, both venue and service of process were held to have been
properly satisfied as section 1391(e) allows an action to be brought
in any forum where a defendant resides 56 and allows out-of-state
57
defendants to be served process by certified mail.
The circuit court supported its finding that section 1391(e)
applies to damage actions by noting that in drafting the provision
"both the House and Senate committees rejoined with the observation that the 'venue problem' which the bill [Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962] sought to rectify was as troublesome in damage suits
against officials as in other sorts of civil litigation. "58 In view of this
language, the court was not persuaded that the consolidated
passage of sections 1361 and 1391(e) justified limiting the scope of
section 1391(e) to actions in the nature of mandamus. Rather,
"[t]he conscious addition by Congress of language designed to extend Section 1391(e) to suits for damages against federal officials
acting under color of legal authority, coupled with its adherence to
that language despite highly respectable protest, manifests beyond
peradventure an intent to broaden venue in just such suits." 5 9
The circuit court was equally unpersuaded that service of
process upon three of the defendants by certified mail was a denial
of due process. The court refuted this contention by noting first6"
that the expansion of venue under section 1391(e) would be of little
value unless coupled with a simultaneous expansion of service of
process:
That venue exists in a particular district would hardly console a
plaintiff unable to serve officials who, though responsible for his
plight, had withdrawn beyond the limits of effective service. And
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
56.

569 F.2d at 3, 10.

57. Id. at 7-8, 10.
58. 569 F.2d at 5 (footnote omitted) (citing H.R. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1961), reprinted in Petition for Certiorari app. E, at 89a, 92a, Colby v.
Driver, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Petition]; S. REP. No. 1992, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2784,

2786). The committees were responding to a contrary suggestion made by the Justice
Department. S. REP. No. 1992, supra, at 5 (Letter from Byron R. White, Deputy Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, to James 0. Eastland, Chairman of Senate
Committee on the judiciary (Feb. 28, 1962)), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2784, 2788.
59. 569 F.2d at 5 (footnote omitted); see note 77 infra.
60. Id. at 7-8 (citing H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 58, at 4, reprinted in Petition, supra note 58, at 89a, 94a-95a).
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Congress must not have been content to rely simply on state
long-arm statutes, for it chose to supplement them in the category of cases encompassed by Section
1391(e) by providing extra61
territorial service of its own device.

Further, as to the defendants' claim that they did not have minimum contacts with the District of Columbia and therefore could
not be subjected to its judicial decisions, the court noted that the

defendants were misapplying notions of state sovereignty to federal
courts.

62

The defendants incorrectly believed "that Congress' con-

stitutional authority to provide for the sound operation of the federal judicial system is limited by the same constraints that apply to
extraterritorial service by state tribunals." 63 Congress has no constitutional mandate regarding the organization of the inferior federal courts. 64 Rather, "Congress might have established only one

such court, or a mere handful; in that event, nationwide service
would have been a practical necessity clearly consonant with the

Constitution." 65 In short, Congress established the federal judicial
districts in harmony with state boundaries merely for the sake of

convenience and expediency; the creation of these lines did not alter congressional power to broaden the sovereignty of the district
66
courts by providing for nationwide service of process.

The holdings in Briggs v. Goodwin were echoed by the First
Circuit in Driver v. Helms. 67 In Driver, the plaintiffs brought a

class action for damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief
against thirty present or former federal officials in their individual

and official capacities for alleged illegal interference with the plaintiffs' mail. 68 In affirming the district court, 69 the circuit court ap61. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted) (citing H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 58, at 4, reprinted in Petition, supra note 58, at 89a, 94a-95a). The court also noted that these

considerations are equally relevant to all cases brought under § 1391(e), "and indeed
any exception would be difficult to justify." Id.
62. Id. at 8-10.
63. Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 9 (citing United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 602-03 (1878)).
65. Id. (footnotes omitted). The foundation of this reasoning is that minimum
contacts need only be established with the United States, and not any particular
state, as the geographical boundaries of a district court could conceivably have been
designed to extend to the entire United States. Id. at 9 nn.70-71.
66. Id. at 9.
67. 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978).
68. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 387 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), reo'd sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 444 U.S. 527
(1980).
69. The district court held that § 1391(e) applies to damage actions against fed-
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plied section 1391(e), holding that the statute is applicable to actions for damages against federal officials in their individual or
personal capacities. 70 The court noted that although sections 1361
and 1391(e) were passed together as the Mandamus and Venue Act
of 1962, 7 1 the language of section 1391(e) 72 expressly applies the
statute to civil actions and does not limit its application to actions
in the nature of mandamus. 73 The court also found that the legislative history of section 1391(e) reveals that Congress may have
passed the statute with damage actions expressly in mind. 74 Specifically, comment at hearings before the House judiciary
committee 75 defined the scope of section 1391(e) as covering an action against "a postal worker slapping a housewife as he delivered
the mail," 76 but not covering a " 'situation in which a postman,
after he had gone home for the night, proceeded to run over somebody's child.' "77 Thus, while an action based on non-job-related
activities would not be covered by section 1391(e), an action to redress unlawful conduct occurring in the course of business was
seen as meriting inclusion within the scope of the statute. In addition, the court held that the 1976 amendment to section 1391(e)
serves as further proof that the statute applies to damage actions. 78
eral officials sued in their individual capacities for actions taken "under color of legal authority." Id. at 397.
70. 577 F.2d at 152 (citing, e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1; Driver v.
Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382).
71. Pub. L. No. 87-746, 76 Stat. 744 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361,
1391(e) (1976)).
72. For the text of § 1391(e), see note 4 supra.
73. 557 F.2d at 151.
74. Id. at 152, 154.
75. Hearings on H.R. 10089 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (copy on
file in office of Hofstra Law Review). The hearings have not been published. For
accounts of § 1391(e)'s evolution from H.R. 10089 in 1960 to the revised bill that
passed both houses in 1961, see Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. at 536-41; id. at 548-51
(Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.);
Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 152-54;
Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d at 4-5.
76. 557 F.2d at 153 (citing Hearings,supra note 75, at 50, 58 (remarks of Rep.
Whitener during statement of Donald B. McGuineas, chief of Gen. Litigation Section, Civil Div., Dep't of Justice)).
77. Id. (quoting Hearings, supra note 75, at 50, 61-62 (remarks of Murray
Drabkin, counsel to House Subcomm., during statement of Donald B. MacGuineas)).
78. Id. at 154. Section 1391(e) was amended in 1976, Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-574, § 3, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976)), changing
the word "each" to "a"in the first sentence, and adding the following sentence to
the end of the first paragraph: "Additional persons may be joined as parties to any
such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such
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The amendment, as Chief Judge Coffin found, allows defendants
who are not federal officials to be joined in an action against federal
officials brought under section 1391(e): "It would make little sense
to join someone who is not an officer if the suit were limited to an
action in the nature of mandamus. Therefore, the suit Congress
was contemplating must be aimed at acts that can give rise to lia79
bility for private remedies."
In affirming the district court,8 0 the circuit court in Driver, as
had the Briggs court, 8 1 noted that Congress did indeed expect that
providing nationwide service of process by certified mail would
correspondingly broaden personal jurisdiction, and "recognized
that it would serve no purpose to broaden venue without also
broadening service of process." 82 The court held that there need
be no showing that the defendants have minimum contacts with
the forum state, as that standard relates only to the limits of state
court jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and not a federal
83
court's jurisdiction over a federal defendant:
The circumscription of state court jurisdiction is a product of
boundaries to states' sovereignty. The United States, however,
whose court is here asserting jurisdiction, does not lose its sovereignty when a state's border is crossed. The Constitution does
not require the federal districts to follow state boundaries. That
decision was made by Congress, and Congress could change its
mind. 84

Again, the logical extension of this reasoning is that the defendant
need only have minimum contacts with the United States, rather
than the state where the federal court is located, in order to fall
within the jurisdiction of a district court. 85 As to the defendants'
concern that the court's reading of section 1391(e) would result in
subjecting federal officials to the unreasonable burden of defending
other venue requirements as would be applicable if the United States or one of its
officers, employees, or agencies were not a party."
79. 577 F.2d at 154.
80. The district court held that § 1391(e) authorizes nationwide jurisdiction
over the defendants in the action. 74 F.R.D. at 389.
81. See text accompanying notes 60-66 supra.
82. 557 F.2d at 156 (emphasis added) (citing H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 58,
at 4, reprinted in Petition, supra note 58, at 89a, 94a-95a; Briggs v. Goodwin, 569
F.2d at 7-8).
83. Id. at 156-57 (citing Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d at 8-10).
84. Id. at 156 (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 156 n.25 (citing United States ex rel. Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F.
Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)).
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themselves in forums throughout the United States, the court
noted8 6 that such defendants may be protected by 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a), which states that "[flor the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
87
been brought."'
The court in Driver, unlike the Briggs court, addressed the
question whether section 1391(e) applies to former federal officials.
In reversing the district court, 88 the circuit court held that it does
not, 89 as (1) the statute is written in the present tense and therefore excludes past officials or employees; 90 (2) there is no indication
in the legislative history that section 1391(e) was designed to include former officials; 91 and (3) it is unrealistic to assume that a
government official will resign his position simply to avoid an action against him, particularly since resignation would not terminate
his liability. 92 At best, resignation would allow the official to avoid
venue in the district where a plaintiff resides, 93 as venue would
then be controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which limits the
plaintiffs choice to the district where all the defendants reside or
where the cause of action arose.
86. Id. at 157.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
88. The district court held that § 1391(e) applies to former officials. 74 F.R.D.
at 399-400.
89. 557 F.2d at 150-51.
90. Id. at 149-50.
91. Id. at 150. The court found langauge in the legislative history stating an intention to exclude from the reach of § 1391(e) "at least those former officials who
have moved away from Washington." Id. & n.10 (citing H.R. REP. No. 536, supra
note 58, at 2, reprinted in Petition, supra note 58, at 89a, 90a).
92. Id. at 150 (citing Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. at 399-400).
93. Id. The court oversimplified this argument on two grounds. First, beyond
holding that § 1391(e) does not apply to former federal officials, the court also held
that the statute does not apply to federal officials still serving the government,
though in a different capacity. Id. at 150-51 & n.ll. Thus, while it may be unrealistic
to assume that an official will resign his position merely to escape the reach of §
1391(e), it is conceivable that he or she would change departments of service, purposely or otherwise, and thus avoid the broadened venue and service-of-process provisions available to plaintiff under § 1391(e).
Second, the court stated that resignation will only allow an official to avoid
venue in the plaintiff's home district. Id. at 150. However, this in turn may enable
the defendant to avoid the action altogether, as bringing the suit in the district where
all the defendants reside or where the cause of action arose may prove to be too
costly and inconvenient for the plaintiff. Further, absent the availability of the provision for out-of-state service of process in § 1391(e), the plaintiff may be unable to
bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court the plaintiff chooses.
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3. The Supreme Court Opinion.-The decisions in Briggs V.

Goodwin and Driver v. Helms were jointly reviewed by the Supreme Court in Stafford v. Briggs.94 The Court barred any future

use of section 1391(e) by Bivens plaintiffs, holding the statute inapplicable to both damage actions and actions involving former offi-

cials. 95 The narrow reading of section 1391(e) was not, however,
98
compelled by the statute's legislative history.

Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, noted that sec-

tions 1361 and 1391(e) were passed together9 7 in response to the
problems created by existing law, 98 which in most cases allowed

actions in the nature of mandamus against federal officials to be
brought only in the District of Columbia.9 9 Since section 1361 was
created to allow an action in the nature of mandamus to be brought
in any district court in the United States,1 0 0 the Court concluded
that it was intended to provide a similarly expanded choice of

venue and means of service of process solely for mandamus-type
actions.1 0 1 The Court dismissed the fact that the language of section 1391(e) is not limited to actions in the nature of mandamus, 10 2
noting that a statute cannot be literally construed without regard to

its legislative intent: "'[I]t is well settled that, in interpreting a
statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in
which general words may be used, but will take in connection with
it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the
law .....
"103 However, as noted in the dissent, "neither the

legislative history nor public policy is inconsistent with the plain
04
meaning of § 1391(e)."1

94. 444 U.S. 527 (1980)); Colby v. Driver, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); see id. at 527 n.
Chief Justice Burger delivered the Court's opinion, in which Justices Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Brennan joined. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of the cases.
95. Id. at 535-36, 543-45.
96. At best, the legislative history of §1391(e) can be characterized as ambiguous and often self-contradictory, failing to delineate clearly the statute's intended
scope. Note, Driver v. Helms and the Long-Arm, Strong-Arm Effects of 28 U.S.C. §
1391(e), 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 84-85 (1979).
97. Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1976)).
98. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
99. 444 U.S. at 533-34.
100. Id. at 534. For the text of § 1361, see note 29 supra.
101. 444 U.S. at 534-36, 543-44.
102. For the text of § 1391(e), see note 4 supra.
103. 444 U.S. at 535 (ellipses in original) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 183, 194 (1857)).
104. Id. at 548 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). Justice Stewart's
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The Court cited the following language from the House
committee report as support for the proposition that section 1391(e)
does not apply to personal damage actions:
By including the officer or employee, both in his official capacity and acting under color of legal authority, the committee
intends to make the proposed section 13 91(e) applicable not only
to those cases where an action may be brought against an officer
or employee in his official capacity. It intends to include also
those cases where the action is nominally brought against the officer in his individual capacity even though he was acting within
the apparent scope of his authority and not as a private citizen.
Such actions are also in essence against the United States but
are brought against the officer or employee as an individual only

to circumvent what remains of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The considerations of policy which demand that an action
against an official may be brought locally rather than in the District of Columbia require similar venue provisions where the action is based upon the fiction that the officer is acting as an individual. There is no intention, however, to alter the venue
requirements of Federal law insofar as suits resulting from the
10 5
official's private actions are concerned.
Yet, the concern set forth in this passage does not affect Bivens actions, which are not "suits resulting from the official's private actions." Rather, a Bivens suit is brought against a federal official for
actions taken while acting in his or her official capacity or under
color of legal authority; bringing the suit against the official in his
or her individual capacity does not change the fact that the alleged
wrongdoings were official, as opposed to private, actions. 10 6 Further, the Court emphasized the portion of the above passage that
defines 1391(e) as covering actions that are essentially against the

mention of the plain meaning of § 1391(e) refers to the fact that the language of the
provision expressly applies it to civil actions, and not merely actions in the nature of
mandamus. "Thus, by its owns terms, § 1391(e) unambiguously extends to the second type of suit against a federal officer, that is, one in which, as here, money damages are sought directly from the federal officer himself." Id. at 547 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.); accord, Jacoby, The Effect of Recent Changes in the
Law of "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review, 53 GEo. L.J. 19, 32 (1964) ("[Section
1391(e)] has a much wider application than section 1361 in that it is not limited to
mandamus actions. Rather, it potentially covers all the different types of suits against
federal officers and agencies .... ").
105. 444 U.S. at 539 (emphasis in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1936, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1960)).
106. For a discussion of the significance and development of the individualofficial distinction, see pp. 960-61 n.87 supra.
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United States; Bivens actions are essentially against the government, brought against the official in his individual capacity "to circumvent what remains of the doctrine of sovereign immunity," and
to serve as a deterrent to abuse of government power. The majority seemed to mistakenly classify a Bivens action as purely private.
The Court also relied on testimony, offered in House hearings
on section 1391(e), that the language, "under color of legal authority," might erroneously lead to the conclusion that section 1391(e)
10 7
is intended to cover damage actions against federal officials.
However, as noted in the dissent, the fact that the quoted language remained in the statute despite this warning implies that
Congress did not find application of section 1391(e) to damage ac10 8
tions either erroneous or unreasonable.
The Court referred to other comments before the House indicating that section 1391(e) may not have been intended to cover
personal damage actions, 10 9 including a remark by the bill's author, Congressman Budge, that " 'I have no intention of bringing
[within this bill] tort actions against individual government employees.' "110 However, Justice Stewart noted that even in face of these
comments subsequent committee reports expressly referred to
personal damage actions when defining the scope of the problem
addressed by the Mandamus and Venue Act: " '[T]he venue problem also arises in an action against a Government official seeking
damages from him for actions which are claimed to be without legal authority but which were taken by the official in the course of
107. 444 U.S. at 537-38 (citing Hearings,supra note 75, at 50, 61-62 (exchange
between Murray Drabkin, counsel to House Subcomm., and Donald B. MacGuineas,
chief of Gen. Litigation Section, Civil Div., Dep't of Justice)).
108. Whatever may have been the intent of the Subcommittee Members who
conducted the hearings of the original bill, the Committee Reports accompanying
subsequent bills-all of which included the phrase "acting .. .under color of legal
authority"--indicated an intent to reach suits against federal officers not only for equitable relief, but also for damages. Id. at 551 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, J.) (ellipsis in original) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1960); H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 58, at 3, reprinted in Petition, supra note 58,
at 89a, 94a; S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 58, at 3, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2784, 2786.).
109. Id. at 537-38 (citing Hearings, supra note 75, at 50, 62-63 (remarks of
Reps. Forrester and Poff during statement of Donald B. MacGuineas); id. at 78, 86
(statement of Judge Albert B. Maris, representing the Judicial Conference of the
United States); id. at 78, 87 (exchange between Rep. Dowdy and Judge Albert B.
Mars)).
110. Id. at 538 (brackets in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hearings,supra note 75, at 78, 102 (remarks of Rep. Budge during statement of Judge Albert B.
Maris)).
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performing his duty.' "11 Further, Congressman Budge's exclusion
of tort actions from the scope of section 1391(e) does not necessarily bar a Bivens claim, as a constitutional deprivation is not neces2
sarily the equivalent of a common law tort."1
Finally, the Court contended"i3 that it would be unfair to subject a government official to an action for damages in the plaintiff's
home district when a private defendant in the same type of action
could be sued only in the district of his residence or in the district
where the cause of action arose.114 However, as the dissent noted,
this view fails to consider that both present and former government
officials, unlike private citizens, will generally be represented in
such an action by the Justice Department. 1 5 As such, federal offi111. Id. at 551 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.) (emphasis in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 108, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 536, supra
note 58, at 3, reprinted in Petition, supra note 58, at 89a, 92a; S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 58, at 3, reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2784, 2786).
112. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394: "The interests protected by state laws
regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy, and those protected by the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, may be inconsistent or even hostile."
113. 444 U.S. at 544.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976). For the text of § 1391(b), see note 6 supra. For
the text of the 1976 amendment to § 1391(b) allowing private defendants to be joined
in the same action, see note 78 supra.
115. 444 U.S. at 551-53 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). The
availability of representation by the Justice Department is set forth in 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.15(a) (1980), cited in 444 U.S. at 552 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.):
Under the procedures set forth [in § 50.51(a)(1)-(8)], a federal employee
(herein defined to include former employees) may be represented by Justice
Department attorneys in state criminal proceedings and in civil and Congressional proceedings in which he is sued or subpoenaed in his individual
capacities, not covered by § 15.1 of this chapter.
The willingness of the Justice Department to exercise its option to defend government officials in Bivens actions is evidenced by then-Deputy Attorney General
Katzenbach's instructions to all United States Attorneys shortly after the passage of §
1391(e). The instructions stated in part:
The venue provision [§ 1391(e)] is applicable to suits against Government officials and agencies for injunctions and damages as well as suits for
mandatory relief.... As an example, suits for damages for alleged libel or
slander by Government officials (which the Department defends on the
ground that statements made by a Government official within the scope of
his authority are absolutely privileged...) fall within the venue provision of
this statute.
444 U.S. at 552 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.) (brackets in original)
(ellipses in original) (quoting Memorandum by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Deputy
Attorney General, for all United States Attorneys 7 (Jan. 18, 1963) (Memo No. 337)
(emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (copy on file in office of
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cials are relieved of the burdens of obtaining counsel and of personally defending themselves in a forum away from their home.
This substantially undercuts the Court's concern that construing
section 1391(e) to cover personal damage suits would unfairly single
out and subject federal officials to broader venue and service-of16
process provisions.'
In sum, the majority ignored the plain meaning of section
1391(e) and held that the statute applies only to actions in the nature of mandamus. The key flaw in the Court's opinion is the erroneous classification of a Bivens suit as a purely private action. Section 1391(e) was passed in order to facilitate actions against the
United States and its officers stemming from their official activities;
a Bivens claim is precisely such an action. Neither the legislative
history of section 1391(e) nor public policy compels the Supreme
Court's narrow interpretation of the statute.
4. Future Effects of Stafford v. Briggs and Suggestions for
Reform.-As a result of the holding in Stafford v. Briggs, section
1391(e) is no longer available for use in damage actions against federal officials, forcing Bivens plaintiffs to resort to section 1391(b) to
satisfy venue requirements. 1 7 Contrary to the liberal provisions
set forth in section 1391(e), section 1391(b) allows the action to "be
brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or
in which the claim arose.""" The fact that the plaintiff's home district is no longer a permissible alternative venue for a Bivens action
will often result in the inconvenience and injustice that section
1391(e) was intended to cure.11 9
Hostra Law Review), excerpted in Brief for the Respondents app. C, at 16a, 17a,
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980)). This indicates that the Justice Department
believed that § 1391(e) was intended to cover damage suits against federal officials
for actions taken under color of legal authority. Moreover, "it indicates that the Justice Department has long assumed a special responsibility for representing federal
officers sued for money damages for actions taken under color of legal authority."
444 U.S. at 552; cf. Jacoby, supra note 104, at 37 (Bivens actions usually defended by
Justice Department).
116. The subjection of federal officials to § 1391(e) is further justified by the
nature of federal service: "[Oifficers of the federal government are different from private defendants because they can anticipate that their official acts may affect people
in every part of the United States." Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 157.
117. A recent district court decision noted that Stafford v. Briggs made it clear
that § 1391(e) does not apply to Bivens actions. Rather, the question of proper venue
is controlled by § 1391(b). Schenker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 85 F.R.D. 696,
697 (D. Colo. 1980); accord, Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 240 (3d Cir. 1980);
McKnight v. Civiletti, 497 F. Supp. 657, 659 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Fox v. Harris, 488 F.
Supp. 488, 492 (D.D.C. 1980).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
119. See H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 58, at 3, reprinted in Petition, supra
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Beyond the loss of the plaintiff's home district as a choice of
venue there is the further danger that neither alternative venue
under section 1391(b) will assure the plaintiff of a reasonably con-

venient forum. 120 The district where the cause of action arose may
be far from the plaintiffs home, while the alternative of bringing
suit in the district where all defendants reside may prove to be valueless, as such a district may not exist. Bivens actions are generally

filed against numerous federal officials, thereby decreasing the
12
chance that all of the defendants will reside in the same district. 1
Yet, even if the plaintiff is fortunate enough to reside in, or

near, the district where the cause of action arose, he or she is still
faced with the obstacle of serving process on nonresident defendants, as section 1391(b), unlike section 1391(e), does not provide
for nationwide service of process. 122 Thus, absent contrary federal
authority, service is limited to the boundaries of the state in which

the district court is located. 123 The only available alternative for
note 58, at 89a, 92a-93a; S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 58, at 3, reprinted in [1962]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2784, 2786:
The Government official is defended by the Department of Justice whether
the action is brought in the District of Columbia or in any other district. U.S.
attorneys are present in every judicial district. Requiring the Government to
defend Government officials and agencies in places other than Washington
would not appear to be a burdensome imposition.
On the other hand, where a citizen lives thousands of miles from
Washington, where the property involved is located outside the District of
Columbia, where the cause of action arose elsewhere, to require that the action be brought in Washington is to tailor our judicial processes to the con-

venience of the Government rather than to provide readily available, inexpensive judicial remedies for the citizen who is aggrieved by the workings
of Government.
120. The federal transfer-of-venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976), will
not be of any help to the plaintiff, as that provision only allows for transfers to a district where the action could have initially been brought. For the text of 1404(a), see
text accompanying note 87 supra.
121. It seems illogicial to restrict the number of available fora as the number of
alleged wrongdoers increases. Seidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Hearing
Federal Cases: An Examination of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by
Venue Restrictions, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 82, 84 (1968). Of course, the plaintiff
could avoid losing this choice of forum by bringing an individual action against each
defendant in his or her home district. However, this would be very costly and inconvenient for both the plaintiff and the courts. Further, "[pliecemeal litigation carries
with it the possibilities of repetitive, incomplete, and inconsistent adjudication."
Hazard, Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 711, 715 (1979).
122. Service of process will not be a problem if all the defendants reside in, or
can be found in, the district where the cause of action arose. However, such good
fortune is rare, as the number of cases based upon § 1391(e)'s provision for out-ofstate service of process would indicate.
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). For the text of rule 4(f), see note 11 supra.
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serving process on a nonresident defendant becomes resort to the
forum state's long-arm statute.12 4 For example, state law may pro-

vide that personal jurisdiction can be obtained over a long-arm de5
12
fendant by personal service of process anywhere in the world.

However, the plaintiff is then saddled with the burden of satisfying
the court that the defendant meets one of the requirements of the
long-arm statute, 126 which generally entails a showing of certain
minimum contacts with the forum state. 127 The definition of minimum contacts will vary from state to state 128 but will generally
center on the notion of doing business in the forum state or having
committed a tortious act within the forum state. As such, a Bivens

plaintiff will have to question whether a constitutional deprivation
is a tortious act or whether, in light of the range and nature of the
defendant's activities, the forum state's definition of "doing busi-

ness" is satisfied. While there will be instances when the mini124. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). For the text of rule 4(e), see note 10 supra.
125. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 313 (McKinney 1972).
126. For the text of a typical state long-arm statute, that of New York, see note
12 supra.
127. See Rush v. Savchuck, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
128. It is important to note that a Bivens plaintiff is not guaranteed that every
state will consistently exercise long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
the constitutionally permissible limit. Exercising long-arm jurisdiction is a matter of
legislative discretion and failure to do so is not a denial of due process. Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Clarendon, Inc., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922). For example, West Virginia did not enact a comprehensive long-arm statute covering nonresident persons, as opposed to corporations, until 1978. See Act of Feb. 28, 1978, ch. 1, 1978 W. Va. Acts 2 (current version
at W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (Supp. 1980)). See generally Note, Civil Procedure
-Jurisdiction-The West Virginia Long-Arm Statute, 79 W. VA. L. REv. 382 (1977)
(discussing limited scope of long-arm jurisdiction in West Virginia prior to passage of
§ 56-3-33). Further, the discretionary nature of long-arm jurisdiction can also lead to
the interpretation of existing long-arm statutes with differing degrees of liberality.
Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) (Ohio corporation that did no business and had no agent in Illinois subject to personal jurisdiction in that state when valve manufactured by corporation allegedly caused Illinois resident's water heater to explode) with Erlanger
Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) (New York corporation that had never done any business in North Carolina prior to transaction in
question not subject to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina when corporation
shipped allegedly defective order to North Carolina customer) and O'Brien v.
Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963) (New York corporation not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Vermont when Vermont resident injured by glass
in can of beans packaged in New York by corporation). As a result, a nonresident

Bivens defendant may not be subject to long-arm jurisdiction despite the presence of
constitutionally adequate contacts with the forum.
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mum-contacts requirement will clearly be satisfied, the defen-

too tenuous to
dant's connection with the forum state will often be
9
2
satisfy the court that the requisite contacts exist.'
In light of the problems created by the failure of section

1391(b) to provide a means for serving process on nonresident defendants, there is a need for liberalization of federal service-of-

process requirements. 130 The institution of a legitimate federal
cause of action, filed in a court where venue is proper, should not

and need not be frustrated by the plaintiff's inability to serve process on an out-of-state defendant. Rather, in keeping with due process requirements, Congress could provide for a federal system in

which nationwide service of process would be permitted in all
cases, as long as subject matter jurisdiction and venue were

satisfied.'

31

There need be no concern whether the defendant

129. For examples of Bivens actions in which the court held that long-arm jurisdiction was not satisfied, see Marsh v. Kitchen, 480 F.2d 1270, 1272-74 (2d Cir.
1973); McKnight v. Civiletti, 497 F. Supp. 657, 659 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Kenyatta v.
Kelley, 430 F. Supp. 1328, 1330-31 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F.
Supp. 860, 870-75 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 375 F.
Supp. 318, 320-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rimar v. McCowan, 374 F. Supp. 1179, 1182
(E.D. Mich. 1974). But see, e.g., Logiurato v. ACTION, 490 F. Supp. 84, 90 (D.D.C.
1980).
130. See R. FIELD & B. MISHKIN, ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, TENT. DRAFT NO. 1 (1963); Barrett,
Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions For Reform, 7
VAND. L. REv. 608 (1954); Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdictionto Interstate Venue,
50 OR. L. REV. 103 (1971); Hazard, supra note 121; Jacoby, supra note 104;
Seidelson, supra note 121; cf. Abraham, ConstitutionalLimitations Upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963) (while agreeing that inability to obtain personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants may stand in way
of justice, author warned of due process violations that may result from liberalization
of federal venue and service-of-process requirements).
131. Responding to the problems created by the restrictive nature of federal
venue and service-of-process provisions, Professor Wright has noted that "the ultimate solution seems likely to be that of permitting nationwide service of process in
all cases, with inconvenience to parties avoided by adjustment of the venue requirements and provision for transfer to the most convenient forum." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 64, at 305 (3d ed. 1976) (footnote
omitted). Professor Barrett has similarly endorsed the notion of allowing nationwide
service of process from all federal courts:
Congress might reasonably have . . . treated the continental United
States as a single jurisdiction. On this basis service of process would have
been permitted throughout the United States, venue rules would have been
designed to channel litigation into the most convenient district, and provision would have been made for a motion for change of venue to be granted
whenever the suit was commenced in a district which did not have venue.
Barrett, supra note 130, at 608. Professor Seidelson agreed, stating that "a United
States court hearing a congressionally created cause of action ought to enjoy
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would be subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular district, as
he or she need only have minimum contacts with the United States
in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction in every federal court
in the country.1 32 Further, with venue governed by section
1391(b), the defendant will be required to have some contact with
the district chosen by the plaintiff, either by residence or by involvement in a cause of action that arose in the district. 133 In
short, Congress need not maintain blind adherence to a system of
federal process that does not accommodate the judicial needs of society.134 Allowing nationwide service of federal process would facilnationwide jurisdiction." Seidelson, supra note 121, at 82. Regarding analogous

problems caused by unreasonably narrow state venue and service-of-process provisions, Professor Ehrenzweig believed that "[j]urisdiction must become venue."
Ehrenzweig, supra note 130, at 113.
132. See text accompanying notes 60-66, 82-85 supra; accord, Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) ("Congress has power ... to provide that
the process of every district court shall run into every part of the United States.").
The Court did not address, and accordingly did not affect, the lower courts' holding
that § 1391(e) constitutionally provides all district courts with personal jurisdiction
over any defendant who has minimum contacts with the United States (and otherwise falls within the purview of the statute). This position finds support in the dissenting opinion in Stafford:
[D]ue process requires only certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the sovereign that has created the court. The issue is not whether
it is unfair to require a defendant to assume the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather whether the court of a particular sovereign has
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a named defendant. The cases
before us involve suits against residents of the United States in the courts of
the United States. No due process problem exists.
444 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.) (citation omitted); accord, Logiurato v. ACTION, 490 F. Supp. 84, 88-89 (D.D.C. 1980) (power of federal
court to redress federal constitutional rights not limited by state boundaries). Justice Stewart further noted that if a federal official is faced with a suit in an extremely
inconvenient forum, he or she can request a transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1976): "It is not unreasonable to expect that district courts will look sympathetically upon a motion for a change of venue in any case where a federal officer
could show that he would be substantially prejudiced if the suit were not transferred
to a more convenient forum." 444 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, J.).
133. Any inconvenience suffered by the defendant as a result of allowing
nationwide service of process would not seem to be any greater than the inconvenience presently suffered by the plaintiff. Further, unlike the plaintiff, the defendant
will be able to request a transfer of venue under § 1404(a) if it appears that the
plaintiff has chosen a particular district to deliberately inconvenience the defendant.
Seidelson, supra note 121, at 86-87.
134. Barrett, supra note 130, at 612 (federal venue and process "[r]ules devised
in horse and buggy days have been perpetuated in the days of the airplane and the
telephone."); Hazard, supra note 121, at 713-14 ("if federal court venue and range of
process are inconvenient, congressional legislation can and should be amended to
remedy the situation, as indeed it sometimes has been.").
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itate the institution of the ever-increasing number of interstate and
multistate cases in the federal courts, without infringing on the defendant's right to due process.
Finally, mention must be made of the arbitrary prejudice suffered by a Bivens plaintiff as a result of the narrow scope of section
1391(b). An action based on diversity of citizenship may be brought
in the district where the claim arose, where all the defendants reside, or where all the plaintiffs reside. 135 In contrast, federal actions not based on diversity can be brought only in the district
where the claim arose or where all defendants reside. 136 As one
commentator has observed, "[n]either legislative history nor decisions reveal the reason why the venue was made more restricted in
federal question than in diversity cases."' 137 The unavailability of
the plaintiff's home district as an alternative venue will further
prejudice a Bivens plaintiff if he or she chooses to bring the action
in his or her state court. The federal removal provision 138 would
enable the defendant to remove the case to the corresponding district court, as long as the district court would have had original jurisdiction. Thus, the defendant is afforded the opportunity to bring
the case into a court to which the plaintiff was initially denied access.
The decision in Stafford v. Briggs has created serious procedural problems for a Bivens plaintiff. The Court's ruling that section 13 91(e) does not apply to personal damage actions deprives
Bivens plaintiffs of the option of bringing their claim in their home
forum unless the cause of action arose there. More seriously, ser135. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1976): "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded
only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in
which the claim arose."
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
137. Barrett, supra note 130, at 612 n.25. As for invoking jurisdiction in Bivens
actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976) (diversity of citizenship), two problems
arise: First, considering that Bivens actions generally involve numerous defendants,
complete diversity-a prerequisite to the invocation of § 1332(a)-often will not exist; second, § 1332(a) requires an amount in excess of $10,000 in controversy, a
requirement which has often proved troublesome for Bivens plaintiffs. See text accompanying notes 163-180 infra; pp. 1094-1107 infra. Even if jurisdiction could

successfully be invoked under § 1332(a), the more serious problem of service of
process on out-of-state defendants would still exist.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976):
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.
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vice of process on defendants is now limited to the boundaries of
the forum state, unless the plaintiff can satisfy the court that the
defendant has one of the requisite contacts with the forum state set
forth in the state's long-arm statute. This procedural arrangement
is unnecessarily restrictive and can constitutionally be improved by
allowing for nationwide service of process from any federal court
which satisfies federal subject matter jurisdiction and venue requirements.
B. Subject MatterJurisdiction
Bivens plaintiffs generally need to invoke subject matter jurisdiction in the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), 139 the
federal question provision. Bivens actions, by definition, satisfy the
statute's sole requirement that the action arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.14 0 However, prior to its
1980 amendment, 141 section 1331(a) also required a minimum
amount in controversy in excess of $10,000,142 the satisfaction of

which often raised serious problems for Bivens plaintiffs. Specifically, many courts dismissed actions for failing to satisfy the
$10,000 requirement, holding that a constitutional deprivation, absent actual injury, is incapable of valuation and therefore cannot
satisfy an amount-in-controversy requirement. 143 While this problem was seemingly resolved when section 1331(a) was amended in
1976 to remove the amount-in-controversy requirement in actions
against federal officials in their official capacity, 144 the courts were
divided on whether this amendment applied to Bivens actions. 145
The fact that Bivens actions, clearly federal question claims, were
still being dismissed for failure to satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement emphasized the need for the 1980 amendment. The
removal of the $10,000 minimum-amount-in-controversy requirement was a necessary and logical change in federal jurisdiction.
The propriety of the 1980 amendment of section 1331(a) is
best evidenced through a review of the problems facing a Bivens
139.
140.

For the text of § 1331(a), see note 17 supra.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-97.

141. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)).
142. For the text of § 1331(a) before and after the 1980 amendment, see notes
17-18 supra.
143. See, e.g., cases cited note 166 infra.
144. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721. For the text of §
1331(a) after its 1976 amendment, but before its 1980 amendment, see note 18 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 179-180 infra.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss3/5

100

Callahan et al.: Constitutional Torts Ten Years after Bivens
1981]

PROJECT-CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

plaintiff, prior to the amendment, when invoking subject matter jurisdiction in the district courts.1 4 6 An examination of federal jurisdiction statutes reveals that subject matter jurisdiction for a Bivens
action is best invoked under section 1331(a). Other federal jurisdiction statutes are simply not accommodating. For example, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) 14 7 states in relevant part that the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction over any civil action against the

United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded upon the
Constitution, and not sounding in tort. Aside from the question

whether a Bivens action sounds in tort, and the inevitable problems of sovereign immunity,' 48 a Bivens action is not formally

against the United States.'

49

This problem similarly bars use of 28

U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680,150 as these provisions are also
expressly related to the liability of the United States and make
no mention of actions brought against federal officials in their individual capacities.

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and (a)(4)15i also fail to provide subject
matter jurisdiction for Bivens actions. Section 1343(a)(3) applies

only to actions to redress constitutional deprivations committed under color of state authority, while Bivens actions are concerned
with deprivations committed under color of federal authority. Section 1343(a)(4) applies to actions to recover damages "under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights": Bivens

146. For a discussion of plaintiffs' option to bring a Bivens action in state court,
see note 23 supra.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
148. See pp. 1083-1091 infra.
149. See pp. 970-986 supra.
150. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)-(4) (Supp. III. 1979):
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the
right to vote.
These provisions, prior to 1979, were cited as § 1343(3)-(4). Congress changed the
numeration to (a)(3) and (a)(4) in order to incorporate the provisions of § 1343(b),
which are not relevant here. Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 2, 93 Stat.
1284 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. III 1979)).
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actions are brought under the Constitution, which does not qualify
15 2
as an Act of Congress.
There are numerous other federal statutes granting the district
courts jurisdiction over certain classes of cases without regard to a
minimum amount in controversy. However, the class of cases covered by each statute is very specific--such as cases in the areas of
admiralty,' 53 bankruptcy, 154 some commerce and antitrust regulations,' 5 5 patents,' 56 postal service,1 5 7 internal revenue affairs, 158
alien suits for tortious violations of a United States treaty, 5 9 Indian
rights to land, 160 seizures under any law of the United States on
land or waters not within admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,' 6' or
federal questions instituted by Indian authorities' 6 -- and rarely
will cover the subject matter of a Bivens action.
In light of the limitations of other jurisdictional statutes, section 1331(a) becomes the only choice for invoking subject matter
jurisdiction in the district courts for Bivens actions.163 This has not,
however, always been an easy matter. Prior to 1976, when the
amount-in-controversy requirement still applied to all cases
brought under section 1331(a),1 64 there was a sharp split among the
152. In an action alleging an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to trial by
jury, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that subject matter juris-

diction could not be invoked under § 1343(4), as there was no Act of Congress providing for the protection of this right. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Judge Tamm, dissenting on other grounds, noted that
[although 1343(4) does not contain the "color of any State law" phraseology
of 1343(3), neither its brief legislative history ... nor its subsequent judicial
interpretation ... indicates that it was intended to encompass actions of federal officials. While 1343(4) has been successfully asserted as a basis for jurisdiction over actions of state officials, . . . appellant has not cited, and I
have not uncovered, so much as a single case, holding 1343(4) to be a proper
jurisdictional basis over actions of federal officials.
Id. at 1150-51 (Tamm, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1976).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. III 1979).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1339 (1976).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1976).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1353 (1976).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1356 (1976).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976).
163. Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a ConstitutionalCause of
Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531,
551 (1977).
164. The 1976 amendment of § 1331(a) removed the $10,000 requirement for
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federal courts as to whether a constitutional deprivation, absent ac-

tual injury, was capable of valuation, and thus able to satisfy the
66
$10,000 requirement.'

65

Many courts held in the negative,'

noting that despite the questionable virtue of the $10,000 requirement, it could not be excused on the ground that the alleged damages were incapable of measurement. Thus, despite allegations of
serious constitutional deprivations, the actions were dismissed.
In contrast, other opinions exemplified an increasing reluc-

tance to dispose of federal constitutional issues on jurisdictional
grounds, arguing that constitutional rights are so fundamental that

their "inherent 'value' must be equal to any amount set for jurisdictional purposes.' 67 Moreover, because section 1343(a)(3)16 8 alfederal question actions against the United States or against a federal official in his
official capacity. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721. Prior to
that amendment, the amount-in-controversy requirement applied to all cases brought
under § 1331(a). In Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), the Supreme Court expressly noted that satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement
was necessary in actions against federal officials for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights. Id. at 547.
165. For a detailed digest of federal court decisions in this area, see Earnest,
The JurisdictionalAmount in Controversy in Suits to Enforce Federal Rights, 54
TEx. L. REv. 545, 563-69 & nn.91-120 (1976).
166. E.g., Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395, 1397 (6th Cir.) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970) ("there is no exception to
the $10,000 requirement simply because the alleged damages under the asserted
claim may be incapable of a monetary valuation. . . .[J]urisdiction under Section
1331 cannot be founded on a right secured by the Constitution unless it is capable of
money valuation."); Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366, 368 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965) ("Courts may not treat as a mere technicality the jurisdictional amount essential to the 'federal question' jurisdiction, even in this case
where there is allegedly unwarranted invasion of plaintiff's privacy."); Post v.
Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799, 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("However unwise the $10,000 requirement may seem to be in establishing federal question jurisdiction, it nevertheless remains in the statute and we find no exception based upon the reason that the
alleged damages may be incapable of measurement."); Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp.
561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 316 (1969) ("It is firmly settled law that
cases involving rights not capable of valuation in money may not be heard in federal
courts where the applicable jurisdictional statute requires that the matter in controversy exceed a certain number of dollars.").
167. E.g., West End Neighborhood Corp. v. Stans, 312 F. Supp. 1066, 1068
(D.D.C. 1970); pp. 1094-1107 infra; accord, Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1052 (3d
Cir. 1972) (Though the value of constitutional rights "may be difficult of precise
measure, that difficulty does not make the claim nonjusticiable under § 1331.");
Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1964) (Swygert, J., dissenting)
("The complaint alleged that defendant and his agents deprived plaintiff of the use
of his home and that they violated his right of privacy and personal liberty. From
these allegations the district court could infer ... that the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000."); CCCO-West. Region v. Fellows, 359 F. Supp. 644, 647 (N.D. Cal.
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lows the district courts to hear actions for alleged constitutional
deprivations against state officials regardless of the amount in controversy, strict adherence to the $10,000 requirement in actions
brought pursuant to section 1331(a) was found to create an unreasonable and unjust distinction between actions brought against fed69
eral, as opposed to state, officials.'
Those courts adopting a middle ground noted that while
"price-tagging of fundamental human rights is dangerous business,"1 70 section 1331(a) does have a $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement that needs to be satisfied. These courts refused
to allow for an automatic finding of the required amount in controversy merely because constitutional rights were in issue, but also
refused to dismiss such actions as being incapable of valuation.
Rather, the plaintiffs were given the opportunity to satisfy the
court that the value of the rights sought to be protected did in fact
meet the required jurisdictional amount.' 7 '
Thus, while there was general agreement that the amount-incontroversy requirement of section 1331(a) was an unreasonable
and "unfortunate gap in the statutory jurisdiction of our federal
1972) ("At one time courts took the view that because basic constitutional rights are
invaluable, they could not be the subject of an accounting, and the determination required by § 1331 could never be made. Fortunately, we are no longer constrained by
such contorted reasoning."); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp.
238, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (footnotes omitted) ("I conclude that the better and modem view in cases where the complaint alleges abridgment of constitutional rights by
federal officials is to give the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint a broad and
liberal interpretation ....
Certainly they may be difficult of evaluation, but 'priceless' does not necessarily mean 'worthless.' "'); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797,
809-10 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 965 (1972) ("The allegation of an amount in controversy in excess of the
$10,000 limitation, so far as it applies to grave constitutional deprivations . . . has
taken on an almost formal and incontestable status .... [Constitutional rights, in this
case free speech, are] almost by definition, worth more than $10,000."); Boyd v.
Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Edelstein, J., dissenting) ("The court
could easily assume that freedom from an unconstitutional discrimination exceeds
the sum or value of $10,000.00.").
168. For the text of § 1343(a)(3), see note 151 supra.
169. Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1050 (3d Cir. 1972); Fifth Ave. Peace
Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F.
Supp. 797, 811 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); see Earnest, supra note 165, at 545; Lehman, supra

note 163, at 556; Note, supra note 9, at 685.
170. Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 421 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
171. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Gomez v. Wilson,
477 F.2d 411, 421 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964, 968-69
(E.D.N.C. 1972) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331(a) because
plaintiffs, although given opportunity, failed to satisfy court that required amount in
controversy existed).
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courts,"'172 judges and commentators alike disagreed as to whether

this gap should be filled by the judiciary or by Congress. 173 Either
way, strict adherence to the $10,000 requirement was frustrating "the very policy of access to the federal courts which Bivens
sought to establish't 74 and led to widespread calls for the remov175
al of "a jurisdictional bar no longer meaningful."'
Congress answered these calls in 1976 by amending section
1331(a) to remove the amount-in-controversy requirement in all actions "brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or
any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity."' 176 Congress
joined in the criticism of the amount-in-controversy requirement,
noting that "anachronisms in the law of judicial review such as the
jurisdictional amount in controversy... have outlived their usefulness, continue to cause confusion and injustice, and are overdue
for elimination or reform."177
Still, there was uncertainty as to whether the amendment applied to damage actions against federal officials in their individual
capacities. The amendment referred to actions against federal officials in their official capacities but Congress "omitted an 'under
color of legal authority' clause, the phrase commonly used to denote personal damage actions."' 178 As such, it was arguable that the
amendment did not exempt Bivens actions from the amountin-controversy requirement. 179 There was also confusion as to
172.

Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir.

1967); accord, C. WRIGHT, supra note 131, § 32, at 125-26; 13 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3561, at 390-91

(1975); Burke, What Price Jurisdiction? The Jurisdictional Amount in Injunctive
Suits Against Federal Officials, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 215, 219-23 (1973); Earnest, supra
note 165, at 54546; Friedenthal, New Limitations of FederalJurisdiction, 11 STAN.
L. REV. 213, 216-18 (1959); Strausberg, The JurisdictionalAmount Requirement and
Actions to Enjoin Deprivation of Constitutional Rights by Federal Officials: The
Lynching Effect, 17 How. L.J. 867, 879 (1973); Note, supra note 9, at 682-85; Note,
The Constitutional Implications of the Jurisdictional Amount Provision in Injunctive Suits Against Federal Officials, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1474, 1476-79, 1499
(1971); Comment, A Federal Question: Does Priceless Mean Worthless?, 14 ST.
Lois U. L. REV. 268, 281-82 (1969).
173. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 172, § 3561, at

394-96.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Lehmann, supra note 163, at 553.
Earnest, supra note 165, at 588.
Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721.
H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1976), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS 6121, 6140.
178. Note, supra note 9, at 683. See also Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 153.
179. In Treho v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 113 (D. Nev. 1978), the court
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whether the amendment's language, "in his official capacity," required only that the actions complained of be part of the defendant's official activities or required that the action be brought against
80
the defendant in his official capacity.'
Looking beyond the confused judicial treatment of the 1976
amendment to the legislative history and subsequent discussion of

the amendment by federal courts, one finds persuasive evidence
that Congress intended for the amendment to apply to Bivens actions. Specifically, the House Report on the 1976 amendment
noted that, as a result of the amendment, "no jurisdictional amount

requirement would apply to cases against the Federal Government,
a Federal agency, or any official or employee where the plaintiff alleges that the official or employee has acted in his official capacity

or under color of law.''

The Report made further reference to

Bivens actions in defining the scope of the amendment by noting
that it would remove the amount-in-controversy requirement in
cases where "it is impossible to place a monetary value on the right

asserted by the plaintiff"' 8 2 The amendment was passed to assure

jurisdiction in the district courts of all cases "seeking 'non-statutory'
review of Federal administrative action."' 8 3 There was no mention
of any intention to exclude claims seeking monetary relief, or of
claims against an individual official. Rather, "[tihis Act as a whole
had a broadly generous objective: to eliminate what had come to
be regarded as merely technical restrictions on a given plaintiff's
18 4
right to seek judicial review of official action."
noted that "the elimination of the section 1331 jurisdictional amount requirement
was intended to apply only to actions against the government, its agencies and officers seeking relief other than money damages." Id. at 116 (footnote omitted). However, a contrary interpretation was applied in Fayerveather v. Bell, 447 F. Supp.
913, 915-17 (M.D. Pa. 1978), where a federal prisoner brought a damage action
against prison officials and other federal officials for an alleged taking of his property
without due process. Noting that, in regard to three of the defendants, the complaint
stated a Bivens action, the court held that jurisdiction was proper under § 1331(a).
The court bypassed any discussion of the amount in controversy, pointing out that
the 1976 amendment to § 1331(a) eliminated the requirement.
180. Compare Sharrock v. Harris, 473 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(court inferred that 1976 amendment did not remove amount-in-controversy requirement in Bivens actions) with First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 445 F. Supp. 1117, 1119 (D.
Minn. 1977) (court inferred that 1976 amendment removed amount-in-controversy requirement in Bivens actions).
181. H.R. REP. No. 1656, supra note 177, at 14-15, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6121,
182. Id. at 14, reprinted
6134-35.
183. Id. at 13, reprinted in
184. Ortiz v. Department

6135.
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6121,
[19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6121, 6134.
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 448 F. Supp. 953, 956
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The fact that courts nonetheless dismissed Bivens actions for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction emphasized the need for the
1980 amendment of section 1331(a), which eliminated the amountin-controversy requirement in all federal question cases. This
amendment was merely the logical extension of the congressional
belief, first set forth when passing the 1976 amendment,18 5 that
"[t]he factors relevant to the question whether a Federal court
should be available to a litigant seeking protection of a Federal
right have little, if any, correlation with the minimum jurisdictional
amount."186 Further, the amount in controversy "is an erratic factor to begin with, not necessarily related to either the private or
public importance of the issue involved."' 8 7 The Senate Report on
the 1980 amendment also argued that federal courts should bear
the responsibility of deciding federal law,' 88 thus leading to the
conclusion that the amount-in-controversy requirement acted "as
an undesirable impediment to the exercise of Federal court jurisdiction, ' 189 so defined. Congressional drafters concluded, as the
1976 drafters had, 190 that " '[w]e do nothing to encourage confidence in our judicial system or in the ability of persons with substantial grievances to obtain redress through lawful processes when
(D.P.R. 1977) (dictum); accord, Welch v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 75, 77 (D.
Conn. 1978) (dictum) ("the amendment of § 1331(a) 'undoubtedly evinces Congress'
intention and understanding that judicial review should be widely available to challenge the actions of federal administrative officials.' " (quoting Califano v. Sanders,
430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977))); Russel v. Town of Mamaroneck, 440 F. Supp. 607, 610 n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("The cases to which the amount requirement remains applicable
have been described as 'rare and insignificant.' In addition to suits against municipalities, the requirement might apply to suits challenging a state statute as inconsistent with a federal statute.").
185. The Senate Report on the 1980 amendment to § 1331(a) noted that the
amendment "will complete the work begun in 1976 and finally eliminate this anomalous barrier to the proper exercise of federal court jurisdiction." S. REP. No. 827,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980).
186. H.R. REP. No. 1656, supra note 177, at 15, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6121, 6135.
187. Id. at 29 (exhibit C: Letter from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, to Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of
Subcommittee on Administrative Procedure of Senate Committee on the Judiciary
(May 10, 1976)), reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6121, 6148.

188. S. REP. No. 827, supra note 185, at 1.
189. Id. at 3. The report added that the determination whether the amount-incontroversy requirement is satisfied "wastes scarce judicial resources." Id. at 1.
190. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1656, supra note 177, at 17 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryj, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1970) (statement of
Charles A. Wright, Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law)), reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6121, 6137.
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we close the courthouse door to those who cannot produce $10,000
as a ticket of admission.' "191 Any concern for unreasonably
increasing the caseload of the federal courts by completely
eliminating the amount-in-controversy requirement was addressed
in the House report on the 1980 amendment: "Because of the relatively small number of cases involved, the Committee believes
that the impact this measure will have on the Federal court
192
caseload will be minimal."'
In short, a Bivens plaintiff will no longer be faced with any difficulties in invoking subject matter jurisdiction in the district
courts. A Bivens action is based on the deprivation of fundamental
constitutional liberties; it was both illogical and impractical to have
barred such claims from federal court because the damages involved were incapable of precise valuation. Removal of the
amount-in-controversy requirement in section 1331(a) was a necessary and just change in federal jurisdiction.
C. Statutes of Limitations
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever expressly
determined the appropriate limitations period for Bivens actions.
As such, the lower courts are guided only by reference to the rule
mandating that in the absence of a congressionally created statute
of limitations for a federal cause of action, the district courts should
apply the forum state's limitations period for analogous types of
state actions. 193 While this rule seems simple to apply, the courts
have been unable to agree upon which state action is most closely
analogous to a Bivens action, leaving plaintiffs unsure of which limitations period a court will deem appropriate. 19 4 In New York
alone, three different federal courts have made four different deter191.

H.R. REP. No. 1461, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) (quoting Hearings Be-

fore the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1970) (statement of Charles A. Wright)),
reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 9123, 9124.
192. Id., reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9123, 9124. This
concern was also addressed in the House report on the 1976 amendment: "According
to leading authorities, elimination of the amount-in-controversy requirement in Federal question cases, even if it were also to be eliminated in strictly private litigation,
will have no measurable impact on the caseload of the Federal courts." H.R. REP.
No. 1656, supra note 177, at 15 (footnote omitted), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6121, 6136; accord, S. REP. No. 996, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1976).
193. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971).
194. Note, supra note 9, at 682.
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minations as to which statute of limitations should apply in Bivens
195
actions.
In Ervin v. Lanier,1 96 the plaintiff brought an action in the
Eastern District of New York for damages against various United
States law-enforcement officials and Pan American Airlines for their
alleged physical and mental abuse of the plaintiff during and after
his arrest. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that after his arrest in
East Germany for hijacking a jet to Cuba, he was beaten and coerced into signing papers of repatriation. 19 7 Noting that "the
proper response to an unspecified limitations period in a federal action is the application of the limitations period for analogous New
York actions,"' 198 the court found that either the three-year period
provided by section 214(2) of New York's Civil Practice Law and
Rules, 19 9 governing actions based upon a liability created by stat-

ute, or the one-year period provided by section 215(3),200 generally
applicable in intentional tort actions, could be applied in Bivens actions. 2 0 ' The court decided that section 214(2), the three-year period, was more appropriate, noting that "a judicial preference has

been indicated for treating federal defendants in Bivens actions in

20 2
the same way as state defendants in Civil Rights Act actions."

195. Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g in relevant part 417
F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Ervin v. Lanier, 404 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
Felder v. Daley, 403 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
196. 404 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
197. Id. at 17.
198. Id. at 20.
199. New York applies a three-year statute of limitations to "an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute except as
provided in sections 213 and 215." N.Y. Civ. PIRAc. LAw § 214(2) (McKinney Supp.
1980). (Section 214(2) would thus apply to actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. III 1979)).
200. New York applies a one-year statute of limitations to "an action to recover
damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, false words causing special damages, or a violation of the right of privacy under
section fifty-one of the civil rights law." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 215(3) (McKinney
1972).
201. 404 F. Supp. at 20.
202. Id. In De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors Local
8, 449 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the court noted that while a Bivens action is
not literally a statutory cause of action, applying the limitations period for actions
based upon a liability created by statute allows for "uniformity between Bivens and
§ 1983 actions." Id. at 1351. In Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978), where the claim alleged that constitutional deprivations
were committed by both state and federal officials, the court held that the claim
against the state officials brought under the Civil Rights Act was governed by Illinois' five-year statute of limitations for claims based upon a liability created by statute. Id. at 335. However, this limitations period was held inapplicable to Bivens ac-
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Thus, while a Bivens action is not actually statutorily created, the
court chose the limitations period for actions based upon a liability
created by statute to avoid treating state and federal officials differently in similar circumstances.
Just four days later the Southern District of New York, in
Felder v. Daley,2 03 held that section 215(3), the one-year statute of
limitations for intentional torts, governed the Bivens action under
consideration.2 0 4 Plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants, including a federal law-enforcement officer, illegally entered the plaintiffs' apartment by smashing the door with a sledge hammer, and
then ransacked the apartment and physically molested one of the
plaintiffs. 20 5 The court held that the cause of action sounded in intentional tort and therefore applied the one-year limitations period
found in section 215(3).206
The confusion grew worse as the Eastern District applied yet
another statute of limitations to a Bivens action in Regan v. Sullivan.2 0 7 The plaintiff in Regan alleged that various federal lawenforcement officers had, without probable cause, arrested and
searched him, and authorized the filing of a criminal complaint
against him, in violation of his constitutional rights. 20 8 The court
departed from its ruling in Ervin, where it had held that Bivens actions are governed by section 214(2), the three-year statute of limitations for actions based upon a liability created by statute, noting
that "[u]nless a cause of action itself is founded upon a statute,
CPLR § 214(2) cannot apply."2 0 9 The court also rejected the defendant's claim that a Bivens action should be governed by section
215(3), the one-year limitatiors period for intentional tort claims,
pointing out that such an action cannot be equated with intentional
tions "since Bivens actions are not creatures of statute." Id. at 338. Instead, the
five-year, catch-all period for actions for which no other Illinois statute of limitations
can appropriately be applied was held to govern the claim against the federal defendants. The court noted that while different statutes governed the actions against
the state and federal officials, it was important that the same time period ultimately
govern both claims: "A contrary result could lead to the incongruous application of
inconsistent limitations periods to different members of a single conspiracy, based
solely on whether an officer alleged to have committed the constitutional violation
was employed by the state or federal government." Id.
203. 403 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
204. Id. at 1326.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 417 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
208. 557 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g in relevant part 417 F. Supp. 399.
209. 417 F. Supp. at 403.
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torts created by state law, as "the conceptual character of the rights
are distinctly different." 210 Instead, the court held2 11 that the appropriate statute of limitations for this Bivens claim was provided
212
by section 215(1) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules,
which states that an action against a sheriff, coroner, or constable
based on action taken in his or her official capacity must be commenced within one year.
The district court's ruling in Regan was overturned on appeal. 2 13 The Second Circuit noted that New York's laws provide

four limitations statutes that could conceivably govern a Bivens action,214 including the previously discussed sections 214(2),215
215(1),216 and 215(3),217 and section 213(1) of New York's Civil

Practice Law and Rules, which applies a six-year period to "an 2ac18
tion for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law."
The circuit court agreed with the lower court's rejection of section
215(3), the limitations period for intentional torts, noting that a
constitutional deprivation is not analogous to a common law or
state tort claim.2 19 The court disagreed with the lower court's use
of section 215(1), the limitations period for claims against a sheriff,
coroner, or constable, noting that "[n]othing in the history indicates a legislative intent to extend the benefits of § 215(1) to law
enforcement officers other than those specifically named." 220 Thus
the court concluded that the Bivens action was governed by either
section 214(2), the three-year period for actions to recover upon a
statutory liability, or section 213(1), the six-year period for actions
for which no limitation has been set, and that in either case the
2 21
plaintiff's claim was not time-barred.
One possible remedy for the confusion created by these dif210. Id.; accord, Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir. 1977).
211. 417 F. Supp. at 403-04.
212. New York applies a one-year statute of limitations to "an action against a
sheriff, coroner or constable, upon a liability incurred by him by doing an act in his
official capacity or by omission of an official duty, except the non-payment of money
collected upon an execution." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 215(1) (McKinney 1972).
213. 557 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1977).
214. Id. at 304.
215. For the text of § 214(2), see note 199 supra.
216. For the text of § 215(1), see note 212 supra.
217. For the text of § 215(3), see note 200 supra.
218. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 213(1) (McKinney 1972).
219. 557 F.2d at 304.
220. Id. at 305.
221. Id. at 307; cf. Logiurato v. ACTION, 490 F. Supp. 84, 90-91 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (court applied District of Columbia's three year catch-all limitations period for
actions for which there is no statute of limitations on point).
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fering decisions would be the application of a federal statute of limitations for Bivens actions. However, the Supreme Court has noted
that "[a] special federal statute of limitations is created, as a matter
of federal common law, only when the need for uniformity is particularly great or when the nature of the federal right demands a
particular sort of statute of limitations." 222 Bivens actions do not
satisfy either of these criteria and as such no court has fashioned an
applicable federal common law limitations period.2 23 As to the first
criterion, a federal statute cannot be drafted by the courts based on
a need for uniformity as the nature of such uniformity is yet to be
agreed upon and is particularly complex. Uniformity in this area
can exist in varying forms, including "nationwide uniformity among
federal courts for all Bivens actions; uniformity as between treatment of this right and of its analogue, the Civil Rights Act; or uniformity as between treatment of this federal right and of State
rights of a related conceptual character."2 24 Thus, while there is a
federal interest in selecting a uniform statute of limitations, complete uniformity could not possibly be achieved by the judiciary in
view of the multiple concerns organized under the heading,
"Bivens actions," and in light of the still unsettled status of the action's substantive law.2 25 The second criterion can not be met because Bivens actions do not demand a particular sort of limitations
period. In fact, "[tihe variety of constitutional torts makes it somewhat surprising that the same limitations provision would or should
apply to every type of Bivens action. Factors unique to one type
may require a different . . . statute of limitations than that appropriate for other types."22 6
A second solution, indeed the practical answer to this problem, would be a legislative determination of the appropriate statutes of limitations for Bivens actions. 22 7 In creating a federal statute, Congress can be assured that federal interests and policies will
be fostered to the extent that the substantive action should be de222. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971) (citations omitted).
223. Note, supra note 9, at 680 n.59.
224. Regan v. Sullivan, 417 F. Supp. at 402 (citing Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. (1961)).
225. De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 8, 449
F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
226. Id. at 1343.
227. The court in De Malherbe noted that "[tihe inherent arbitrariness of statutes of limitations makes them a peculiarly appropriate subject for legislative rather
than judicial control." Id. at 1352 (citing Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S.
304, 314 (1945)).
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limited. 228 Further, absence of federal statutes of limitations for
federal causes of action "forces federal courts into an uncertain,
problematic search,"2 2 9 and leaves plaintiffs unsure of the time period with which they must contend. Moreover, if a plaintiff incorrectly anticipates the statute of limitations ultimately applied by
the trial court, his or her claim may be unfairly time-barred; such
uncertainty undermines "the principle of access to the federal judiciary voiced by the Supreme Court in Bivens." 230 Yet, until Congress does act on this question, plaintiffs must either attempt to anticipate the limitations period that the court will apply or file their
claims within the time period allowed by the shortest statute of
limitations that may potentially be applied by the court.
D. The Need for CongressionalAction
Since the creation of the cause of action in 1971, many Bivens
plaintiffs have been unable to have their claim adjudicated due to
various procedural obstacles. In light of the removal of section
1331(a)'s amount-in-controversy requirement, establishing subject
matter jurisdiction in the district courts will no longer present any
problems for a Bivens plaintiff. The problems raised by the need to
anticipate the statute of limitations that will be applied by the
court can likewise be corrected only through congressional action.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court barring any future use
of section 1391(e) for Bivens actions is the most significant of the
remaining procedural obstacles. With his or her choice of forum
limited to the district where the cause of action arose or where all
the defendants reside, a Bivens plaintiff will often be faced with
the cost and inconvenience of bringing his or her claim far from
home. The plaintiff will also often be confronted with the problem
of serving process on an out-of-state defendant, which can now be
accomplished only by satisfying the forum state's long-arm statute.
Thus the plaintiff will then have to satisfy the court that the defendant has certain requisite contacts with the state in which the
district court sits.
228. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[s]tate legislatures do not devise
Occidental Life Ins.
their limitations periods with national interests in mind .
Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
229. De MaIherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 8, 449
F. Supp. at 1352 (citing Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 68, 77-78 & n.63 (1953); Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 97, 141).
230. Lehman, supra note 163, at 550.
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In short, there is serious potential for frustrating the institution of a Bivens action. Congress must see to it that plaintiffs with
legitimate federal causes of action are not denied their day in federal court because of unreasonable and unnecessary procedural
technicalities. Specifically, in keeping with due process, Congress
should allow for nationwide service of process from all federal
courts, as long as venue and subject matter jurisdiction are properly satisfied. Alternatively, Congress could draft statutory guidelines for instituting a Bivens action, similar to the statutes governing the analogous section 1983231 claim.2 32 But whatever the

plan of action chosen, Congress must not let the Bivens cause of
action become meaningless: "Few more unseemly sights for a democratic country operating under a system of limited governmental
power can be imagined than the specter of its courts standing powerless to prevent a clear transgression by the government
of a con23 3
stitutional right of a person with standing to assert it."
V.

IMMUNITIES

Constitutional tort plaintiffs often find that once they have
overcome procedural obstacles to filing a claim' and substantive
barriers to stating a cause of action, 2 they must then grapple with
an array of bars and defenses to their claims. The absolute immunity allowed certain officials, such as legislators, 3 prosecutors, 4 and
231. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
232. In Bivens itself, Chief Justice Burger advocated establishing a statutory
scheme that would provide for the institution of Bivens actions. 403 U.S. at 422-23
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
233. Bivens, 409 F.2d 718, 723 (2d Cir. 1969) (citation omitted).
1. See pp. 1018-1056 supra for a discussion of the procedural problems encountered in a Bivens action. The various Bivens opinions will hereinafter be cited as
Bivens..
2. See pp. 970-1018 supra for a discussion of the substantive problems encountered in a Bivens action.
3. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732-33 (1980);
United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111,
123 (1979); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 403-06 (1979); Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.
306, 311-13 (1973); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502-03 (1969); Dombrowski
v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
4. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 US. 409,
420 (1976); Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979); Martin v. Merola, 532
F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1976); Yaselli v. Coff, 12 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd
per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
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judges, 5 acts as a total bar to suit, while the defense of good faith is

available to other defendants. 6 Thus plaintiffs often find themselves

without a remedy for the violation of a constitutional right in spite
of advances made on the procedural and substantive fronts. Even if

the plaintiff succeeds in piercing the veil of immunity, the victory
is often Pyrrhic because the individual official is frequently judgment proof.7 In addition, a Bivens plaintiff cannot sue the employing federal agency on a respondeat superior theory." The cause
of action is therefore often nothing more than a paper tiger.
The existence of any form of immunity in a Bivens suit initially
seems paradoxical-for it suggests that the Constitution applies to
some people but not to others.9 In a democracy based on the prop-

5. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
6. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555, 561 (1978); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 315 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967).
7. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting), pointed out that actual recovery would be difficult since juries
often favored the defendant-officer and a plaintiff would have to find non-exempt assets of the police officer. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Recent studies have confirmed his opinion. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the

Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447,
456-57 (1978); Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 800-02
(1979).
8. The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity in Bivens actions
except for certain fourth amendment violations. Note, "Damages or Nothing"-The
Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 667, 670-72 (1979). The
eleventh amendment prohibits the recovery of money damages from state treasuries.
E.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). Cities are no longer immune from liability in § 1983 actions, but the Supreme Court has rejected a respondeat superior
theory of recovery against a municipal employer. Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
9. When the Supreme Court held that Bivens' complaint stated a cause of action for damages, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), it remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held that the defendant-agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, though not absolutely immune to suit, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d
Cir. 1972), would be entitled to defenses of good faith and probable cause. Id. at
1347-48. Good faith or qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be
pleaded by the defendant. It is usually a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 1348.
The same rule applies in § 1983 actions. E.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
For other studies of immunity in Bivens suits or § 1983 actions, see Buxbaum,
Liability of Federal Officials in Damage for Acts Unconstitutional or in Excess of
their Authority: Expanding the Concept of the Rule of Law, 8 CAP. U. L. REv. 465,
477-89 (1979); Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional
Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
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osition that no person is above the law, judicial recognition of immunity suggests that some government officials may violate the law
with impunity. Totally eliminating absolute and qualified immunity, however, would make constitutional violations strict liability

torts-the defendant would be liable regardless of the good faith
performance of duties. Such a state of affairs would discourage
many people from seeking public office or government jobs. 1 0
Those already working in government would be deterred from acting innovatively and courageously, fearing retaliation from those
adversely affected by their decisions.1 1 Moreover, it seems manifestly unfair to punish an official for exercising that discretion demanded by ordinary job responsibilities, especially in the absence
of bad faith.1 2 Alternatively, waiving sovereign immunity and al-

lowing suit directly against the federal government would mean
that the public would bear the cost of private injuries 3 and the
courts would be flooded with still more litigation. 14
This section will analyze the conflicting policy goals. It will
then propose a solution to the immunity dilemma seeking to com-

pensate the injured, deter the lawbreakers, and still allow lawabiding officials to perform their jobs without being harassed by
L.Q. 531, 587-97 (1977); Newman, supra note 7, at 458-63; Schnapper, Civil Rights
LitigationAfter Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 240-63 (1979); Note, supra note 8,
at 685-90.
10. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 320 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1974).
11. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 239-40; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
12. See 416 U.S. at 239-40; 177 F.2d at 581.
13. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 669-71 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). The cost of private wrongs can be a tremendous financial burden on limited
municipal treasuries. A jury in Alaska, for example, recently awarded almost
$500,000 to a policeman removed from duty without due process after he was accused of racism and brutality. Id. at 670 n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Wayson
v. City of Fairbanks, 22 ATLA L. Rep. 222 (Alaska Super. Ct. 4th Dist. Jan. 24,
1979)).
14. Justice Rehnquist has pointed out that the elimination of absolute immunity
for executive officials would increase the caseload of the already over-burdened federal courts. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 526 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Waving sovereign immunity would have a similar effect. Civil
rights actions have dramatically increased over the last 20 years. In fiscal year 1960
there were 247 civil rights cases filed in federal district courts. [1970] Din. OF AD.
OFFICE OF U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 109. By fiscal year 1970 there were 3,985 such suits.
Id. In the year ending June 30, 1980, there were 12,944 such suits, in addition to
13,000 civil rights suits filed by prisoners, for a total of 25,944. [1980] Din. OF AD.
OFFICE OF U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 61 table 19, 62 table 21. See Friedman, The Good
Faith Defense in ConstitutionalLitigation, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501, 501-03 (1977).
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the threat of unfounded litigation. The first part of the analysis will
trace the origin and development of absolute immunity, which acts
as a total bar to suit even though the tortfeasor has acted maliciously or willfully.' 5 The focus will be on the judiciary's tendency
to limit the extent of absolute immunity by examining the activity
or function of the official rather than looking to status in the hierarchy of government as a per se litmus test. 16 Cases brought pursuant to section 198317 will also be discussed, since the Supreme
Court has stated that immunities developed for state officials
should be made available to federal officials as well.' 8 The section's
second part will analyze the good faith defense-a qualified immunity that has severely limited the incidence of recovery in Bivens
suits. 19 It will be argued that eliminating this defense, without
offsetting changes in current law, will have adverse effects on the
conduct of government business by making officials second guess
their decisions in fear of potential liability for bona fide errors in
judgment. 20 Third, it will be suggested that the time has come to
allow suits based on a respondeat superior theory against the federal government for the constitutional violations of its employees.
The fourth part will focus on the outdated concept of sovereign immunity, 21 which prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages directly from the United States or from an individual state when
sued under the fourteenth amendment. Finally, it will be suggested that the only way to satisfy the twin goals of the Bivens
15. When absolute immunity is granted, the intent or mental state of the official
becomes irrelevant. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 579-81.
16. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 508-17.
17. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
18. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 500.
19. See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 685-90. The jury is more likely to favor the
defendant official over the sometimes-suspect plaintiff, who may have a criminal record or be a prison inmate. Id. at 692-93.
20. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 526-27 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
21. Many studies have attacked sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1963);
Newman, supra note 7, at 458.
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action-compensation of the victim and deterrence of the lawbreakers 22 -while fostering the public interest in effective and efficient government, is to permit the Bivens plaintiff to sue both the
United States and the individual defendant jointly. Under this proposal, the government will be held strictly liable for its employees'
good faith constitutional violations and the individual officials will
be held liable only on a showing of malice. 2 3 Thus the plaintiff
whose constitutional rights have been violated will have a remedy
without regard to an official's good faith, while an individual defendant who made a good faith error in judgment will not be
forced to pay damages personally. In support, it will be posited
that the abolition of sovereign immunity provides for more equitable risk-spreading among the citizenry.
A.

Absolute Immunity

No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance, with impunity.
All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the
lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. 24

The judicial tendency to grant absolute immunity to certain
government officials seems to belie this familiar proposition. The
argument most often offered to justify absolute immunity is that
government can operate efficiently only if certain officials are free
to perform their functions unfettered by the threat of law
suits-even when their actions violate clearly established constitutional rights.25 Yet the law-and the Constitution in particular-is
"the only supreme power in our system of government, and every
man who, by accepting office, participates in its functions, is only
the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." 26 These principles suggest that absolute immunity is foreign to our system of government. Nonetheless, the
Court has consistently declined to abolish the doctrine in Bivens or
section 1983 actions, although limiting it to certain officials acting
22.
23.

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.
This proposal was the subject of a recent report.

24.
25.
26.

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 508-17.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220.

COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
LEGISLATION, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REMEDIES
FOR DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY FEDERAL OFFICERS AND EMlPLOYEES: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 3-5 (1979).
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within the scope of their duty.2 7 The courts have relied on the
vell-established common law roots of absolute immunity, particularly in holding that Congress could not have intended to eliminate
it when enacting section 1983.28 (The statute does not address the
immunity question on its face.2 9 ) In light of the Supreme Court's

statement that immunities governing section 1983 and Bivens suits
should be the same, 30 a study of immunity under section 1983 is
the starting point for any discussion of immunity in Bivens suits.
Common law immunities, developed in state tort actions, may also
be informative, although the Court has noted that the immunities
available in cases involving constitutional torts will not be entirely
controlled by state common law immunity doctrines. 31
1. Judicial Immunity.-Absolute immunity has been granted

to judges in the performance of judicial acts32 within the jurisdiction of the court. 33 One of the earliest Supreme Court decisions

dealing with these issues was Bradley v. Fisher,34 decided in 1872.
In that case an attorney brought a civil action against a judge,
alleging that a declaration of the judge had disbarred him without
just cause or an opportunity to be heard. The Court held that the
judge was absolutely immune from suit, "however erroneous the
act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it
may have proved to the plaintiff."3 5 The Court stated that the prin-

ciple of judicial immunity was well established in England for
many centuries and "in all countries where there is any wellordered system of jurisprudence." 36 A judge must be "free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself."37 Since it is inevitable that the judge's decisions will make at least one party unhappy, the fear of liability to a
27.

See cases cited notes 3-5 supra.

28. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-38 (1980);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
29. For the text of § 1983, see note 17 supra.

30.

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 500.

31.

Id. at 495.

32. For a good discussion of what constitutes a judicial act, see Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360-64 (1978). For a recent update, see Lopez v.
Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (7th Cir. 1980).
33. For a general definition of jurisdiction, in the context of judicial immunity,
see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 357-60. For a more recent discussion, see Turner
v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
34. 80 U.S. (13 Vall.) 335 (1871).
35. Id. at 347.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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disappointed party "would be inconsistent with the possession of
this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which
no judiciary can be either respectable or useful."3 8 The Bradley
Court favored absolute immunity even in the face of malicious or
corrupt activities or those in excess of jurisdiction. 3 9 The only limitation on the judge's immunity, pursuant to Bradley, involves action where the judge is totally devoid of jurisdiction. The Court
reasoned that in such cases "an authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible." 40 In all
other instances, the remedy rested only in removal of a corrupt
41
judge through the legislative process.
The reasoning of Bradley v. Fisher was adopted by the Second
Circuit in Yaselli v. Goff,42 an action against a United States attorney for malicious prosecution. In stating that judicial officers are
absolutely immune to civil suits, the court echoed the British common law and the public policy considerations 43 stressed in Bradley.
After stating that the protection allowed judges extended also to
prosecutors, witnesses, grand jurors, and petit jurors, 44 the court
held a U.S. Attorney to be a quasi-judicial officer of the government entitled to absolute immunity4 5 for acts within the scope of
authority, 4 6 notwithstanding the presence of malice. 47 The court
reasoned that public policy "requires that persons occupying such
important positions and so closely identified with the judicial department of the government should speak and act freely and fearlessly in the discharge of their important judicial functions." 48
The classic defense of absolute immunity for judges and judicial officers, indeed for all to whom it has been extended, was offered by Judge Learned Hand in his 1949 opinion for the Second
49
Circuit in Gregoire v. Biddle:

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 354.

42.
43.
44.

12 F.2d 396 (2d
Id. at 399.
Id. at 403.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 404.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).

Cir.

1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
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It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in
fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or
for any other personal motive not connected with the public
good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so
cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery.
The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried,
and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty,
to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which
may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an
official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his
good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken
to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between
the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has
been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs
done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do
their duty to the constant threat of retaliation.5 0
Judge Hand's statement summarizes the conflicting policy goals at

issue. His solution, however, seems shortsighted insofar as it advocates the availability of absolute immunity to all government

officials. It is doubtful whether the Justice Department officials and
immigration officials 51 sued in Gregoire would now be entitled
to absolute immunity unless they performed a judicial or quasijudicial function.5 2 The procedural safeguards inherent in the judicial process--cross-examination of witnesses, the possibility of correcting errors on appeal, and the nature of adversary proceedings
-did not apply to the action taken by the executive officials 53 ac-

50. Id. at 581.
51. Id. at 579.

52. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 508-17, where the Court emphasized the
official's function rather than status. Only those immigration officials performing a judicial or prosecutorial function would be entitled to absolute immunity under Butz.
53. See id. at 512. The Court pointed out that judicial immunity was justified
because of the many procedural safeguards built into the judicial process:
Advocates are restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by
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corded the protection in Gregoire.

The common law immunity of judges was extended to section
1983 actions in Pierson v. Ray. 54 In that case members of a prayer

pilgrimage consisting of white and black clergymen were arrested
and charged with breaching the peace when they attempted to use
a segregated interstate bus terminal in Jackson, Mississippi, in

1961. When the statute under which they were convicted was declared unconstitutional, they brought a civil rights action for dam-

ages against the police officers who arrested them and the municipal police justice who convicted them. 5 5 The Supreme Court

reasoned that Congress had not intended to abolish wellestablished judicial immunities in enacting section 198356 and repeated the traditional reliance on appellate review. 57 The
correctability of error on appeal provides critical support for judicial immunities. Where unfettered and meaningful access to judi-

cial process is available, the redress of substantive infringements is
at least theoretically possible.

Appellate review, however, does not always provide a solu-

tion, even in theory. In Stump v. Sparkman, 58 a young woman

sterilized without her knowledge at her mother's request brought a
section 1983 action against the judge who had approved the petition for sterilization. The Supreme Court concluded that granting
the petition was a "judicial act" 59 within the court's general jurisdiction. 6 0 According to the Court, a "judge is absolutely immune
the knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their adversaries in
open court. Jurors are carefully screened to remove all possibility of bias.
Witnesses are, of course, subject to the rigors of cross-examination and the
penalty of perjury. Because these features of the judicial process tend to enhance the reliability of information and the impartiality of the decisionmaking process, there is a less pressing need for individual suits to correct
constitutional error.

Id.
54. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
55. Record at 1-6.
56. 386 U.S. at 554-55.
57. Id. at 554.
58. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
59. Id. at 360.
60. Id. at 358. Courts have distinguished between complete lack of jurisdiction
and specific acts in excess of jurisdiction, following the lead of the Supreme Court in
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351-53. Judges are not absolutely immune
when they lack all jurisdiction over the subject matter, but are absolutely immune
when they act in excess of their jurisdiction. Thus, in Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92
(5th Cir. 1980), a Texas justice of the peace with limited jurisdiction was held absolutely immune even though he convicted the plaintiff of a nonexistent crime. Such
an act was simply in excess of his jurisdiction. Id. at 97.
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from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is
flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." 61 Despite
the impossibility of correcting the judge's decision on appeal, the
majority held that "the tragic consequences of Judge Stump's ac62
tions" should not affect his total immunity from suit.
Justice Stewart, in a vigorous dissent, went beyond the "tragic
consequences" and reasoned that the principles counseling the provision of judicial immunity were not implicated in this case:
Not one of the considerations thus summarized in the Pierson
opinion was presented here. There was no "case," controversial
or otherwise. There were no litigants. There was and could be
no appeal. And there was not even the pretext of principled
decision-making. The total absence of any of these normal attributes of a judicial proceeding convinces me that the conduct complained of in this case was not a judicial act. 63
Calling the challenged conduct "lawless," Justice Stewart concluded that "if intimidation would serve to deter the occurrence,
that would surely be in the public interest."64 Justice Powell also
dissented, on the grounds that the reasoning of Bradley and
Pierson was inapposite as it assumed the availability of an
alternative forum where private rights could be vindicated. 65 Judge
Stump's action made resort to appellate review or other judicial
66
remedy impossible.
The Stump dissents correctly focus on the availability of
alternative remedies as a crucial prerequisite to allowing judicial
immunity. Where no other remedy exists, or where the judicial action renders alternative remedies meaningless, the immunity accorded judges should be limited. Recent decisions have limited the
scope of judicial immunity by not allowing it as a bar to action for
equitable relief.6 7 Judicial immunity has also been held inapplicable to judges' ministerial acts, 6 8 extrajudicial acts (including issuing
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

435 U.S. at 359.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 368-69 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 369 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). The Stump decision has been strongly attacked.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 4-5 (Supp. 1979).

67. E.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980)
(state's highest court and its members are proper defendants in § 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 86-87 (7th Cir. 1975)
(judicial and prosecutorial immunity will not bar action for injunction).
68. Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 1979); Doe v.
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press releases 69 or acting as a prosecutor"°), and for those acts not
even remotely judicial. 7 1 Because of their extrajudicial nature, the

excepted activities do not carry with them the protections normally
adhering to judicial activity.
The exceptions emphasize the importance of focusing on function rather than status. Where a judge or quasi-judicial officer acts
improperly in the performance of duties directly related to litiga-

tion, the decision to afford an absolute immunity represents a balancing of competing process values. Thus, to the extent that values
of equality of treatment, dignity, and general respect for the legal
system are less than perfectly served in the presence of immunity, 72 the loss may be offset by protections inherent in the legal
system and by the protection afforded all litigants by the presence
of a judiciary unfettered by vexatious litigation. Even in the ex-

treme case where an individual is convicted of a nonexistent crime
because of a judge's or prosecutor's malicious personal motives, 73

County of Lake, 399 F. Supp. 553, 556 (N.D. Ind. 1975). In Doe, the plaintiffs
brought an action against two judges challenging the adequacy of a juvenile detention center and the treatment of the persons detained there. Id. at 555. The court
held that the action was not barred by judicial immunity because it was directed at
the judges' ministerial and administrative duties and sought only equitable relief. Id.
at 556.
69. In Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 938

(1980), a black police lieutenant brought suit against a judge for making racist remarks about him to the press over the course of a year while he was awaiting trial on
criminal charges stemming from proceedings allegedly improperly instigated by the
judge. 419 F. Supp. 30, 31-32 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (judge's motion to dismiss denied);
436 F. Supp. 143, 145-46 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (judge's motion for partial summary judgment granted in part and denied in part). The court held that these acts were extrajudicial because they were not functions normally performed by a judge. Since the
press releases took place outside the courtroom, they were undertaken in total absence of jurisdiction. 605 F.2d at 336-37.
70. In Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980), the defendantjudge was held not absolutely immune because acting as a prosecutor was not within
his jurisdiction. Id. at 1235-37. In events stemming from Lopez's failure to pay rent
in a building that Vanderwater allegedly owned, Vanderwater had Lopez arrested for
criminal trespass after he was found in his apartment after being told to move out.
Vanderwater determined the offense to be charged, signed a warrant for Lopez's arrest, made entries on a standard plea form indicating that Lopez had pleaded guilty
and waived his right to jury trial, and then arraigned, convicted, and sentenced
Lopez in absentia to 240 days in prison. Id. at 1232.
71. In Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978), a verdict of $80,000 compensatory and $60,000 punitive damages was upheld. There a judge sent out for coffee from a local sandwich vendor. Because the coffee was "putrid," the judge had
the vendor dragged into court in handcuffs. The act was considered nonjudicial. Id.
at 53.
72. See pp. 1095-1097 infra.
73. Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 269
(1981), involved a boundary dispute between Turner and a neighbor. Raynes, a
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the plaintiff may resort to the appellate process. The key part of
the inquiry then becomes deciding whether the act complained of
is within the judicial function.
Butz v. Economou7 4 was the first case brought on a Bivens
theory to present the judicial-immunity question in the Supreme

Court. A commodities exchange merchant brought suit against
various Department of Agriculture officials (including the secretary

of agriculture, the judicial officer, and the chief hearing examiner),
alleging that they had violated his constitutional rights by
instituting proceedings against him in retaliation for his criticism of
that agency. 75 The majority held that the immunity available in a

Bivens action against federal officials should be no more restrictive

than that afforded state officials in section 1983 actions: 76 "To cre-

Texas justice of the peace, issued a peace bond at the request of the neighbor and
Turner was required to post bond conditioned on behaving himself peaceably. When
the dispute continued, Raynes issued a warrant for Turner's arrest on charges of "Violation of Peace Bond," tried and convicted him of this nonexistent crime, and sentenced him to a year and a day in jail. Id. at 93. The court held that Raynes acted
merely in excess of, rather than in absence of, jurisdiction and was therefore absolutely immune from suit. Id. at 96-97. This result is distinguishable from that in
Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980), where the judge not only acted
in his judicial capacity but also as a prosecutor. There the judge was immune for his
judicial acts but not for his prosecutorial acts. See note 70 supra. The Turner decision was based on the distinction between acts that are in excess of a judge's jurisdiction and those that are in total absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The Lopez decision turns on the definition of a judicial act.
74. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
75. Id. at 481-82.
76. Id. at 500-01; see Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975). The court
there reasoned that "the rights at stake in a suit brought directly under the Bill of
Rights are no less worthy of full protection than the constitutional and statutory
rights protected by § 1983." Id. at 1380. In States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498
F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974), the court suggested that "the qualified nature of executive
immunity would appear to be equally applicable to federal executive officers." Id. at
1159. In Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848
(1972), Judge Bell stated that "all police and ancillary personnel in this nation,
whether state or federal, should be subject to the same accountability under law for
their conduct." Id. at 205 (Bell, J., concurring). It would be incongruous to create
"one law for Athens and another for Rome." Id. (Bell, J., concurring). In Bivens, 456
F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972) (on remand), the court stated that having separate standards
of immunity for federal officials sued directly under the Constitution and state officials sued for the same violations, but under § 1983, would be "incongruous and
confusing." Id. at 1346-47. Other courts had reached similar decisions prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Butz. See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
560 F.2d 1011, 1015 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); Jones v.
United States, 536 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1976); Weir
v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1976); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 872 (3d Cir.
1975); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 90-95 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Brubaker v. King, 505
F.2d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 1974).
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ate a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the
conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to
stand the constitutional design on its head." 7 In approving the absolute immunity given to executive officials performing adjudicatory functions, the Court stated: "Absolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform
'7 8
their respective functions without harassment or intimidation."
The Court, however, authorized a distinction between executive
officials performing purely administrative functions and those
whose quasi-judicial roles placed them within the Bradley-Pierson
line of cases. Stressing the distinction between status and function,
the majority pointed out that the "features of the judicial process
tend to enhance the reliability of information and the impartiality
of the decisionmaking process [so that] there is a less pressing need
for individual suits to correct constitutional errors." 79 The extension of judicial immunity to the quasi-judicial acts of executive officials was then a natural step for the Court, as the functional safeguards were present in both instances. Individuals can seek agency
or judicial review80 and therefore are not left entirely without a
remedy.
The absolute immunity accorded participants in judicial
proceedings-judges, prosecutors, witnesses, grand jurors, and
petit jurors-seems at first glance to contradict the stated objectives of a Bivens suit-deterrence of the lawbreakers and compensation of the injured. Upon closer examination, however, the award
of absolute immunity is justified when plaintiffs whose rights are
violated in a judicial proceeding have the protection of procedural
safeguards inherent in our legal system. The focus of any such inquiry must first be on the process at issue. If, as for Webster
77. 438 U.S. at 504.
78.

Id. at 512.

79. Id. The Court continued:
[T~he safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the need for
private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.
The insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and
the correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many checks on malicious action by judges. Advocates are restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by the knowledge that their assertations will be contested by their adversaries in open court. Jurors are carefully screened to
remove all possibility of bias. Witnesses are, of course, subject to the rigors
of cross-examination and the penalty of perjury.
Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 514.
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Bivens, "it is damages or nothing," 8' the process-based justification
for absolute judicial immunity falls through its own foundation. The
quintessential conflict, however, may never be reached. For when
the action complained of is within judicial or quasi-judicial function, procedural protections should adhere by definition.
2. Legislative Immunity.-Immunity for Members of Congress
has its origins in the Constitution's speech or debate clause.8 2 The
first case to discuss legislative immunity in a constitutional tort
context was Tenney v. Brandhove.8 3 The plaintiff brought a section
1983 action alleging the deprivation of his constitutional rights in
connection with an investigation by a committee of the California
legislature. 8 4 After tracing the history of legislative freedom in the
United States and England, 85 the Court addressed the question
whether section 1983 was to be interpreted as overturning this traditional legislative freedom.8 6 The Court declared: "We cannot believe that Congress-itself a staunch advocate of legislative
freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in his"87 The Court noted that the privilege is abtory and reason ...
solute as long as the parties "were acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." 8 8 The legislators would not be immune if
they acted outside their legislative role. 89 The privilege, however,
is not subject to judicial inquiry into legislative motive. 9 0 In order
to find that "a committee's investigation exceeded the bounds of
legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of
functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive." 91
The Court also relied on the availability of nonjudicial correction of
error, the voters' power to remove legislators either directly
(through nonelection or recall) or indirectly (through available im92
peachment procedures).
81. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
82. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
83. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
84. Id. at 369.
85. Id. at 372-75. The Court pointed out that legislative immunity had its origin
in British parliamentary struggles. The American founding fathers deemed legislative
freedom of speech and action so important that it was written into both the Articles
of Confederation and the Constitution. Id. at 372. The Court also noted that forty-one
states protect legislative freedom by specific constitutional provisions. Id. at 375 n.5.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 376.
at 377 (citations omitted).
at 378.
Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, pointed out that the Court did
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When the activities complained of fall within the sphere of legitimate federal legislative activity, the absolute immunity of the
speech or debate clause governs. 93 One important reason for
allowing this absolute immunity is that "the clause serves the additional function of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately established by the Founders." 94 By "insuring the independence of individual legislators," 95 the cause protects the integrity
of the legislative process. Allowing legislators engaged in legitimate
legislative activity absolute immunity rather than qualified immunity protects the legislators from the consequences of litigation's results as well as from the burden of defending themselves. 96 Thus
absolute immunity has been accorded legislators even when there
is proof that they acted maliciously or in furtherance of a conspiracy. 97 The immunity also exists though the acts were clearly illegal
98
or unconstitutional.
The central inquiry in cases involving legislative immunity,
then, must be whether the activity complained of falls within the
sphere of legitimate legislative function. In Doe v. McMillan99 a
congressional committee investigating the District of Columbia
public school system ordered the printing and distribution of a
450-page report that included attendance records, examinations,
and documents concerning disciplinary problems of certain students. The plaintiffs-parents of the school children-sought to enjoin further dissemination of the report because it violated their
constitutional right to privacy.' 00 The Court held that the authorization of the investigation, the presentation of the sensitive information in hearings, the preparation of the report, and its publica-

not hold that the committee's investigation of Brandhove was legal conduct.
Brandhove could still challenge the committee action. If the Tenney Committee
were to attempt to fine or imprison Brandhove on charges of perjury or contempt, he
could raise the defense that the committee's actions were "unconstitutional and
void."Id. at 379-80 (Black, J., concurring).
93. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 608, 623 n.14 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502-04 (1969); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 201-04 (1881).
94. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
95. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507.
96. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. at 82, 85 (1967) (per curiam).
97. Id. at 83.
98. Id. at 82.
99. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
100. Id. at 309.
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tion were protected by the speech or debate clause. 10 1 The Court
did not, however, accept the proposition that Congress must also
be free to distribute the sensitive material to the public at large regardless of how damaging to an individual's reputation that material
might be.' 0 2 Thus the public printer and the superintendent of
documents would not be entitled to absolute immunity for printing
and distributing the report unless it served the legitimate legisla10 3
tive needs of Congress.
The Court's subsidiary holding in Doe is evidence of its reluctance to extend the blanket of absolute immunity to those activities
of legislators not essential to the legislative function. Thus, in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire,i0 4 the speech or debate clause was held
not to protect the issuance of press releases and newsletters by individual Members of Congress. The Court concluded:
A speech by Proxmire in the Senate would be wholly immune
and would be available to other members of Congress and the
public in the Congressional Record. But neither the newsletters
nor the press releases was "essential to the deliberations of the
5
Senate" and neither was part of the deliberative process. 10
In distinguishing this case from Doe v. McMillan, the Court stated:
"Voting and preparing committee reports are the individual and
collective expressions of opinion within the legislative process ...
Newsletters and press releases, by contrast, are primarily a means
of informing those outside the legislative forum; they represent the
10 6
views and will of a single Member."'
The action of the Proxmire Court in limiting legislative immunity evinces the same type of status-function distinction utilized in
judicial immunity cases. Members of Congress and state and local
legislators are entitled only to absolute immunity essential to
legislating.' 0 7 There is no need to protect the activity of legislators
101. Id. at 313.
102. Id. at 316.
103. Id. at 322-24.
104. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
105. Id. at 130.
106. Id. at 133.
107. There has been considerable debate as to what is "essential to
legislating." In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503-07
(1975), a congressional committee's right to subpoena the plaintiff's records was
deemed essential to legislating. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), a woman
brought suit against a United States Representative for violation of her fifth amendment rights. Ms. Davis had been dismissed from her post as deputy administrative
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"'outside" the legislative process when the rights of individual citizens are violated. Moreover, the public interest in an effective legislative process applies only to activity conducted within the reasonable boundaries of that process.
Since the legislative process has built-in safeguards, and since
the public has a general interest in having an efficient and effective
legislature, the absolute immunity accorded legislators acting
within the scope of legitimate legislative activity is justified. The
concern here is very much the same as in the judicial sphere:108
The public has an interest in the operation of government that outweighs the interest in redressing private injuries. Private rights
must yield to the public good under these circumstances. Except
for these two special categories, however, absolute immunity
should not exist.
3. Executive Immunity.-High-rankingexecutive officials traditionally have been accorded absolute immunity from damages for
common law tort violations. In Spalding v. Vilas, 10 9 an 1896 Supreme Court decision, the Postmaster General was held immune
in a suit resulting from his circulation among the postmasters of a
notice allegedly injuring the plaintiff's reputation and interfering
with his contractual relations. The Court held the presence of malassistant because the Representative had concluded that it was essential that the position be held by a man. Id. at 230. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of whether Representative Passman's conduct was shielded
by the speech or debate clause. Id. at 249. Dissenting opinions by Justice Stewart,
id. at 251, and Justice Powell, id. at 251, 254, suggest that the conduct was covered
by the clause.
The activities that the Court has considered essential to legislating include:
voting on legislation, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-92 (1881); making
speeches on the House floor, United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 176-77, 180-85
(1966); conducting subcommittee hearings, Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 608,
620 (1972); introducing legislation, United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979);
circulating reports internally, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973); and
participating in congressional investigations, id. at 313.
Whenever a legislator attempts to influence other branches of government, the
Court has interpreted the activity as not essential to legislating and therefore not protected by the speech or debate clause. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at
625 (communication with executive branch not protected); United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. at 172 (communication attempting to illegally influence Justice Department
not protected).
Unlawful acts committed during an investigation are not essential to legislating.
See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 526 (taking a bribe not protected by
clause). But see Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (conspiracy by United
States Senator with state officials to seize plaintiff's property and records in violation
of fourth amendment protected by clause).
108. See text accompanying notes 32-81 supra.
109. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
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ice irrelevant as long as the acts complained of "did not exceed his
authority, nor pass the line of his duty.""i 0 The functional approach
to the executive immunity question appeared once again, over seventy years later, in Barr v. Matteo."ii The Supreme Court granted
absolute immunity to the acting director of a federal agency sued
for malicious defamation by employees suspended for misconduct.
The defendant had announced the suspensions in a press release.
The Court held that a false and damaging publication-even if issued maliciously-was not actionable as long as its issuance was
2
within the official's authority."1
The long life of absolute executive immunity reached its demise when the Supreme Court confronted the issue for the first
time in a section 1983 context. In Scheuer v. Rhodes," i 3 a 1974
Court decision, the Governor of Ohio and other state officials were
sued for conduct leading to the deaths and injuries of several students on the Kent State campus during an antiwar rally. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had cited Spalding and Barr as
controlling." 4 The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the
purpose of section 1983 would be frustrated if state government officials as a class were totally exempt from liability."i 5 The Court
noted, however, that all the state officials would be entitled to assert the defense of good faith."i 6 The Court believed that the
broad responsibilities of the Governor and his principle subordinates mandated the protection of at least some form of immunity:
"These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified
immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion
and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared at the time of the action . . . . "i7 Thus state
executive officials no longer share in the blanket of absolute immunity accorded legislators and judicial officials. For the Court to
have decided otherwise would have made the guarantees of section
1983 meaningless in the presence of action by state officials.
110. Id. at 499.
111.

360 U.S. 564 (1959).

112. Id. at 575.
113.

416 U.S. 232 (1974).

114.

Krause v. Rhodes, 417 F.2d 430, 436-38, rev'd sub nom. Scheur v. Rhodes,

416 U.S. 232 (1974).
115. 416 U.S. at 248.

116. Id. at 247-48.
117. Id. at 247.
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The applicability of the Scheuer holding to federal executive
officers sued on a Bivens theory first reached the Supreme Court
in Butz v. Economou."1 8 The Court held that the officials were entitled to only a qualified immunity, except in the performance of
judicial functions. 119 Following the reasoning in Scheuer, the Butz
Court refused to extend the common law immunity accorded federal executive officials to cases based on constitutional violations:
The liability of officials who have exceeded constitutional limits
was not confronted in either Barr or Spalding.... Beyond that,
however, neither case purported to abolish the liability of federal
officers for actions manifestly beyond their line of duty; and if
they are accountable when they stray beyond the plain limits of
statutory authority, it would be incongruous to hold that they
may nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional
120
rights without fear of liability.
The Court's holding thus echoes the principle stated in United
States v. Lee, that "[n]o officer of the law may set that law at defiance, with impunity,"'12 ' and is in keeping with the general principles underlying a Bivens suit, insofar as it places a burden on the
officials charged with unconstitutional conduct to justify that conduct.
Butz and Scheuer, taken together, suggest that all government
officials-even the highest executives of a state-are entitled only
to a qualified immunity. Whether that reasoning should be fully
extended was presented in Halperin v. Kissinger,122 where the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
President of the United States is not absolutely immune from liability in a Bivens action. The plaintiff in Halperin, a former member of the National Security Council staff, brought suit for damages
against terf federal officials, including former President Richard
Nixon, alleging that his fourth amendment rights were violated by
an illegal wiretap of his home. Since the executive officials sued
had not been involved in quasi-judicial activity, the circuit court
ruled that they were not absolutely immune from suit and were
entitled to only a qualified immunity. 123 In considering the special
problem of presidential immunity, the court stated:
118.

438 U.S. 478 (1978).

119. Id. at 514-17.
120.
121.

Id. at 495.
106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).

122. 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 49
U.S.L.W. 4782 (June 22, 1981) (per curiam).
123. 606 F.2d at 1208.
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In order to accept defendant Nixon's argument that he, as a
former President, is absolutely immune from suit, we would
have to hold that his status as President sets him above the
other high Executive officials named as defendants to this action.
Such a distinction would have to rest on a determination either
that the Constitution impliedly exempts the President from all liability in cases like this or that the repercussions of finding liability would be drastically adverse. Because we are unable to
make that distinction, we do not believe he is entitled to absolute immunity to a damage action by a citizen subjected to an
124
unconstitutional or illegal wiretap.
The court gave several reasons for its decision. First, there is
no constitutional justification for granting the President absolute
immunity.1 2 5 Second, the doctrine of separation of powers does not
demand that the President be immune from judicial process. 126 According to the court, Isiuch an abdication of the judicial role
would sap the vitality of the constitutional rights whose protection
is entrusted to the judiciary."'. 2 7 Third, the court believed that
holding the President liable for violation of constitutional rights
would not have a significant inhibiting effect on the President's
ability to govern effectively. 1 2 8 Fourth, qualified immunity would
afford sufficient protection, since it would take into consideration
the broad range of responsibility and correspondingly broad discretion inherent in the Presidency. 1 29 Under these circumstances, a
plaintiff would have difficulty defeating even a limited immunity.' 30 Fifth, there would be no special burden on the President's
time, since representation would be provided by the government.' 3 ' Last, our "tradition of equal justice under law" demands
that the President be given only qualified immunity. 132
A President should be afforded absolute immunity only on a
showing that the conduct complained of was an exercise of a quasijudicial function or that it was "essential to the conduct of public
business."' 33 The President should be treated no differently than
124.
125.

Id. at 1210-11.
Id. at 1211.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at 1212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1213.
Id.
Id.

133.

Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also
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the Governor of a state. Both are bound to obey the Constitution.
The only difference between them is the range of their
responsibilities-a fact that is considered in the defense of qualified
immunity. For the Court to hold otherwise would contradict a long
line of cases stating that federal officials sued in a Bivens suit are to
be accorded the same immunity as state officials sued under section 1983.134

Federal executive officials sued on a Bivens theory are therefore not absolutely immune from suit. The common law immunity
accorded them in state tort actions does not carry over to constitutional violations. Unlike judicial misconduct, which is curbed by
procedural safeguards, executive misconduct will go almost wholly
unchecked if the courts were to allow high-ranking government officials absolute immunity.
B. Qualified Immunity: The Good Faith Defense
Those officials who are not entitled to absolute immunity in a
Bivens suit may still be allowed a qualified immunity, or a good
faith defense. The Supreme Court first discussed the good faith defense in the section 1983 context in Pierson v. Ray.135 The Court
decided that a police officer sued for fourth amendment violations
would be entitled to the common law defense of good faith and
probable cause even though the arrest might subsequently be declared unconstitutional. 136 This immunity was extended to federal
officers by the Second Circuit in the Bivens remand.1 37 According
to the court, to prove the defense of good faith an "officer must allege and prove not only that he believed, in good faith, that his
conduct was lawful, but also that his belief was reasonable .... We

think, as a matter of constitutional law and as a matter of common
sense, a law enforcement officer is entitled to this protection." 13
The court was strongly influenced by the fact that law-enforcement
officials perform dangerous yet necessary tasks and should not be
"left defenseless against the demands of every person who manages
National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There

President Nixon was held not absolutely immune because he was performing only a
ministerial duty when he was interpreting his legal obligations with regard to a pay
increase for federal employees. The employees were seeking a writ of mandamus
requiring the President to grant pay adjustments.
134. See cases cited note 76 supra.
135. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
136. Id. at 555-57.
137. 456 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972).
138. Id. at 1348.
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to escape from the toils of the criminal law." 139 The court concluded, however, that the necessities of law enforcement
must be
0
balanced against the constitutional rights of citizens. 14
The good faith defense has been extended to officials who are
not involved in on-the-street law-enforcement duties. In Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 14 1 the Governor of Ohio, officers of the National Guard,
and the president of Kent State University were all given a qualified immunity to suit. The Supreme Court outlined the requirements for establishing such a defense:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of
the executive branch of government, the variation being depen-

dent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the
time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is

the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with goodfaith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official con-

duct. 142
Thus, the good faith defense has both an objective and a subjective
requirement. 143 The absence of either element will serve to defeat
1 44
its invocation.
The Scheuer rationale was applied by the Court in Wood v.
Strickland.14 5 The Court held that a school-board member was entitled to a good faith defense and would be liable only if "he knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional
139. Id. at 1347.
140. Id.
141.
142.

416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Id. at 247-48.

143. The defendant must prove that he believed he acted properly (subjective
element) and that his belief was reasonable in light of all circumstances (objective
element). See, e.g., Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706,
712 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
560 F.2d 1011, 1015 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); Askew v.
Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1976); White v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077, 1080
(4th Cir. 1976); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 872 (3d Cir. 1975);
Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 903 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930

(1975).
144. For a thorough analysis of the elements of the good faith defense, see
Friedman, supra note 14.
145. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury . ... "146 The Court also expressed a concern that
competent individuals would be deterred from seeking public service positions in the face of potential liability for bona fide errors in
judgment.

14 7

Reliance on state law, even in the presence of constitutional
violations, may be sufficient to prove good faith. In O'Connor v.
Donaldson,148 the plaintiff alleged that he was confined to a state
mental hospital without treatment even though responsible people
had offered to care for him at home. In defending the allegation of
unconstitutional conduct, the defendant relied on a state statute
authorizing confinement of the mentally ill even in these circumstances. 149 The Court held that the superintendent was entitled to
150
rely on state law in proving his good faith defense.
There is, of course, no simple listing of constitutional rights.
Thus, in Procunier v. Navarette,15 ' the Court held that prison offi146. Id. at 322.
147. See id. at 320. Justice Powell, in his separate opinion, suggested that even
the good faith defense outlined by the majority does not give school boards enough
protection because they are charged with knowledge of the unquestioned constitutional rights of their students. Because of the constant reinterpretation of constitutional rights, Justice Powell believed it to be almost impossible to call any one right
"unquestioned." Id. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Powell then concluded:
There are some 20,000 school boards, each with five or more members,
and thousands of school superintendents and school principals. Most of the
school board members are popularly elected, drawn from the citizenry at
large, and possess no unique competency in divining the law. Few cities
and counties provide any compensation for service on school boards, and often it is difficult to persuade qualified persons to assume the burdens of this
important function in our society. Moreover, even if counsel's advice constitutes a defense, it may safely be assumed that few school boards and school
officials have ready access to counsel or indeed have deemed it necessary to
consult counsel on the countless decisions that necessarily must be made in
the operation of our public schools.
Id. at 331 (Powell J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even though a finding of good faith will prevent recovery, school-board members would have to bear
the cost of defending themselves in the litigation.
148. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
149. Id. at 576.
150. Id. at 577. Even if the law is unclear, a defendant may rely on it to prove
his good faith, and may cite to both statutory and case law. See, e.g., Raffone v.
Robinson, 607 F.2d 1056 (2d Cir. 1979); Saffron v. Wilson, 481 F. Supp. 228, 243
(D.D.C. 1979); Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 223 (D. Md. 1979); McCormick v.
Edwards, 479 F. Supp. 295, 298-99 (M.D. La. 1979).
151. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
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cials were entitled to assert the good faith defense if the constitutional right they were charged with violating had not been "clearly
established" at the time of the alleged violation. 152 The plaintiff in
Procunier had charged that prison officials had interfered with his
outgoing mail. 153 The Court agreed with the prison officials that
the prisoner's first amendment right protecting his mailing privileges was not established at the time of the alleged interference;
thus, though a right had been violated, the defendants cannot be
said to have acted in bad faith absent a showing of malice. 154
In extending the qualified immunity allowed state executive
officials to federal executive officials in Butz v. Economou, 155 the
Court echoed the holding of Procunier. Federal executive officials
may not "with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is
known to them to violate the United States Constitution or in a
manner that they should know transgresses a clearly established
constitutional rule."'156 The "reasonable knowledge" element serves
to protect those officials who make errors in judgment, while
precluding maintenance of the Procunier defense where the judiciary, in keeping with its constitutional role, has declared certain
rights to be constitutionally protected.
The Court has extended the good faith defense to nearly all
possible defendants in a constitutional tort suit. Since the defense
is usually a question of fact for the jury, 157 and because juries usually favor the official defendant to the somewhat suspect plaintiff,15 the practical result of the extension is that very few Bivens
152. Id. at 562.
153. Id. at 557.
154. Id. at 562-63. For other cases dealing with the qualified immunity of
prison officials, see Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
865 (1976); Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d
598 (1st Cir. 1974); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974).
155. 438 U.S. at 507. Some earlier § 1983 cases had indicated that a mistake of
law would not be a defense. See, e.g., Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 21 (9th Cir.
1965). The Supreme Court has also suggested that mistake of law would not be a defense. In Wood v. Strickland, the Court remarked that a violation of a student's constitutional rights cannot be "justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law." 420 U.S. at 321.
156. 438 U.S. at 507.
157. See, e.g., Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681, 685 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Kellerman v. Askew, 541 F.2d 1089, 1092 (5th Cir.
1976); Milwaukee Mobilization for Survival v. Milwaukee County Park Comm'n, 477
F. Supp. 1210, 1222 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1295
(D.D.C. 1976).
158. Dissenting in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger stated:
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plaintiffs will recover damages. Two 1980 Court decisions, while
not breathing new life into the cause of action, provided some limitations on its usage.

In Gomez v. Toledo' 59 the defendant claimed that the burden
was on the plaintiff to prove the bad faith of the tortfeasor. The

Court rejected the argument, holding that good faith is an affirma-

tive defense that must be pleaded by the defendant. The existence
of bad faith need not be alleged in order to state a cause of action
under section 1983.160 Although the Court's holding refers specifically to section 1983 actions, the reasoning in Butz dictates that

federal and state officials charged with the same wrongful conduct
should be treated similarly. Moreover, it is impractical and
unfair to impose on the plaintiff the additional burden of antici-

pating possible defenses. As the Court pointed out, plaintiffs are un-

16
likely to know in advance which defenses, if any, will be offered. 1
An ultimately more significant limitation on the defense was
the product of the Court's decision in Owen v. City of Indepen-

dence, 162 where the Court refused to extend it in claims against
municipalities. The majority reasoned that only defenses well es-

tablished at common law should be applied in section 1983 acThere is some validity to the claims that juries will not return verdicts
against individual officers except in those unusual cases where the violation
has been flagrant or where the error has been complete, as in the arrest of
the wrong person or the search of the wrong house. There is surely serious
doubt, for example, that a drug peddler caught packaging his wares will be
able to arouse much sympathy in a jury on the ground that the police officer
did not announce his identity and purpose fully or because he failed to utter
"a few more words".... Jurors may well refuse to penalize a police officer
at the behest of a person they believe to be a "criminal" and probably will
not punish an officer for honest errors of judgment.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 421-22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958)).
Even those juries finding liability are often reluctant to award high damages. In
Tatum v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1313-14 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd in relevant part,
562 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a jury awarded only $100.00 to each of two plaintiffs
who were unlawfully detained in jail for several hours. Thus, even when the good
faith defense does not totally defeat liability, it may influence the award of damages.
159. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
160. Id. at 640; accord, Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1329, 1331 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 175-76 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53,
61-62 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d
1210, 1213 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976); Martin v. Duffle,
463 F.2d 464, 468 (10th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Perrigan, 459 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1972).
161. 446 U.S. at 641.
162. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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tions; 163 it found no common law justification for according the
qualified immunity to cities. 164 Furthermore, the Court found that
the policy justifications for allowing the defense were not presented
in this case. 16 5 First, since the award of damages comes from the
public treasury and not the individual's own funds, there is no
need to worry about the injustice of imposing liability, in the absence of bad faith, on an official who may have had good intentions. 166 Second, imposing liability will not have an inhibiting effect on an official's judgment, since personal liability cannot
result. 167 Third, once the threat of personal liability is removed,

there is no need to worry that competent people will be discour-

aged from seeking public office.168
The Owen Court recognized a problem that exists for all plaintiffs claiming constitutional violations: there is rarely a potential de-

fendant who cannot assert at least a limited immunity. Plaintiffs are
often left remediless because the officials succeed in convincing the

jury that they acted in good faith. The good faith defensealthough warranted in many circumstances-thus stands as an almost impenetrable obstacle for the Bivens plaintiff. Yet its com-

plete elimination would likely have a chilling effect on the day-today functions of government.
The defense has therefore been attacked from opposing perspectives. At one extreme are those who believe the Court's

standard to be too lenient. 169 Justice Stevens, dissenting in
163. Id. at 637-44.
164. Id. at 650. The Court based its decision on two factors. First, Congress
abolished municipal sovereign immunity by including cities within the class of "persons" subject to § 1983 liability. Id. at 647-48. Second, although a city was granted a
common law immunity for its discretionary decisions regarding public policy issues,
a municipality does not have the discretion to violate the Constitution. Id. at 648-49.
Thus, the Court concluded that
when a court passes judgment on the municipality's conduct in a § 1983 action, it does not seek to second-guess the "reasonableness" of the city's decision not to interfere with the local government's resolution of competing
policy considerations. Rather, it looks only to whether the municipality has
conformed to the requirements of the Federal Constitution and statutes.
Id. at 649.
165. Id. at 654-56.
166. Id. at 654.
167. Id. at 655-56.
168. Id. at 654 n.38.
169. See, e.g., Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1975). The author suggests that
Bivens distorts the police officer's common law privilege by applying it in the wrong
context. The rationale of the good faith defense as presented in Bivens is based on a
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Procunier, stated that the majority had abandoned the limits of the
good faith defense by implying that "every defendant in a 1983 action is entitled to assert a qualified immunity from damage liability." 1 70 A recent study has suggested that the good faith defense
results in very few actual recoveries in Bivens suits, especially
against police officers. 17 ' Some commentators have suggested
eliminating it altogether and making violators strictly liable for
2
their acts.17
In addition to the argument that the good faith defense favors
the defendant, the claim has been made that it is illogical because
it "involves nearly circular reasoning that promotes confusion and
sometimes defeats meritorious claims.' 173 For example, a plaintiff
alleging the use of excessive force must, by definition, prove that
the officer used more force than was reasonably necessary under
the circumstances. Should the jury agree, it would be illogical to
then find that the officer reasonably believed that only necessary
74
force was used in making the arrest.1
misconception because the common law "did not allow an officer the luxury of pre-

senting his evaluation of his actions as a defense to a trespass case." Id. at 1010.
170. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 568 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. See Project, supra note 7, at 781-84. Of 149 cases surveyed, only eight had
resulted, by the time of the Project, in victory for the plaintiffs. Id. at 790 table 1.
Proposed explanations for the poor results were the juries' racial prejudice against
nonwhite plaintiffs, id. at 794-95, prejudice against plaintiffs with unusual or deviant
lifestyles, id. at 796-99, bias in favor of police defendants, id. at 800-02, jury confusion about the good faith defense, id. at 802-06, and bias inherent in the jury selection process that results in mostly white juries, id. at 806-08.
172. See Newman, supra note 7, at 461-62. Judge Newman suggests that the
good faith defense should never have been imported into § 1983 or Bivens suits.
Since § 1983 was passed by Congress "to provide a remedy for the deprivation of
constitutional rights," common law tort liability and defenses are irrelevant. Id. at
461.
173. Id. at 460.
174. Id. In the Bivens remand Judge Lumbard, in his concurring opinion, suggested that there are two standards of reasonableness. One is reasonableness as it
applies to defining probable cause under the fourth amendment and the other is "the
less stringent reasonable man standard of the tort action against government agents."
456 F.2d at 1348-49 (Lumbard, J., concurring). Judge Newman argued that even if
there is a difference in these two standards of reasonableness, it will be impossible
for a trial judge to "articulate the elusive distinction to the juries," who will not
likely understand the distinction, however artfully explained. Newman, supra note 7,
at 461. Therefore, Newman argues, the jurors will be told that
even if the plaintiff proves that an officer lacked probable cause by showing
that he could not have had a reasonable belief that the plaintiff had
committed a crime, the officer nonetheless has a defense if he acted in good
faith and reasonably believed that he did have probable cause.
Id. The jurors will eventually focus on the subjective good faith of the officer-the
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On the other hand, the good faith defense has been criticized
as an onerous burden on the defendant. In his dissenting opinion
in Butz, Justice Rehnquist characterized the majority opinion as
holding that "anytime a plaintiff can paint his grievance in constitutional colors, the official is subject to damages unless he can prove
he acted in good faith."1 75 Such a defense requires the "consumption of time, effort, and money on the part of the defendant official
in defending his actions on the merits."' 176 Justice Rehnquist also
feared that limitation of executive immunity will disrupt the government by allowing an increase in litigation that will harass government officials. 177 Although absolute immunity would result in
"an occasional failure to redress a claim of official wrongdoing," 7 8
that would be the "lesser evil than the impairment of the ability of
1
responsible public officials to govern. " 79
The sharp difference of opinion here illustrates the great debate over the good faith defense.' 8 0 While elimination of the defense is a theoretical possibility, even the Bivens Court alluded to
the potential need for some defenses to the action l l and remanded to the Second Circuit on this issue. 18 2 Nonetheless, the
state of the law is unfair to the aggrieved plaintiff, who is often left
remediless because of the good faith defense or other immunities.
The result directly contradicts the purpose of Bivens itself.
C.

In Search of a Solution: Respondeat Superior
and the Problem of Sovereign Immunity

There may be no perfect solution to the problems raised by
the good faith defense, but allowing a plaintiff to sue the employing municipal, state, or federal agency on a respondeat superior theory would be a step in the right direction.' 8 3 Such a proceonly part of the instruction that they can understand-and will decide against the
plaintiff whenever the police officer convinces them that "he thought he had the

right to arrest." Id.
175.
176.
177.
178.

438 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 522 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 526 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 529 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).

179. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
180. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 9.
181. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397-98.
182. Id. at 398. The remand is reported at 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
183. This proposal has been made before in reference to cities. See, e.g.,
Schnapper, supra note 9, at 263-66; Note, Monell v. Department of Social Services:
One Step Forward and a Half Step Back for Municipal Liability Under Section
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dure would assure the successful plaintiff of a solvent defendant
18 5
while protecting the official who has acted in good faith.

84

18
Respondeat superior is allowed in most areas of tort law. N

The general principle is that the employer should bear the cost of
torts committed by employees acting within the scope of their employment. 187 The theory behind the vicarious liability of the employer is that the employee is engaged in the enterprise for the
employer's benefit, who must therefore accept any loss resulting
from the employee's conduct as a cost of doing business.' 8 It was
also recognized at common law that the employer was better able
to bear the cost of liability than was the employee, 8 9 and could
avoid future losses by carefully selecting competent employees.
Respondeat superior represents a method of risk allocation that
places the burden of tort liability on the party best able to absorb
it. An employer can distribute this cost of doing business by adjusting prices or procuring liability insurance. Thus the community
at large, rather than the salaried employee or the innocent plaintiff, ultimately absorbs the costs of torts.
These same principles should apply to a constitutional tort
claim. The United States as the ultimate employer of all federal officials should bear the cost of the injuries inflicted by its employees. Although taxpayers would ultimately pay for constitutional
torts of city, state, and federal officials, they are the beneficiaries of
government services and should absorb the loss as one of the costs
of government. In a representative democracy, the people cede to
the government the responsibility for conducting certain public af1983, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 917-22 (1979); Comment, Respondeat Superior Liability of Municipalitiesfor Constitutional Torts After Monell: New Remedies to Pursue?, 44 Mo. L. REV. 514 (1979).

184. See Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,
551 n.51 (1971).
185.
186.

See COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION, supra note 23, at 15-16.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-74 (4th ed.
1971); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 83-89 (1964). See gener-

ally Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
187. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.9, at 1389-90 (1956);
see James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1954). In general, in order for
an employee's activity to be considered within the scope of employment, the act
must take place during the ordinary time and at the usual location of employment for
the purpose of carrying out the employer's business. If all three criteria are met, the
employer will be liable for the employee's tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 233-236 (1958).
188. W. PROSSER, supra note 186, § 69, at 459.
189. Id.
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fairs. Where a good faith error results in injury to an individual,
the "fault" lies not with any one person, but with the system itself.
Thus placement of the "costs of doing business" on any one person---be it the innocent official or the innocent plaintiffrepresents a tyranny of the majority. James Madison foresaw this
very possibility, writing that "the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary
to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constitu90
ents. "1
The second of Bivens' twin goals-deterrence-would also best
be served by allowing vicarious liability.' 91 There is no logical reason to distinguish between common law torts and constitutional
torts on the issue of vicarious liability. Allowing respondeat superior, however, raises problems of sovereign immunity, which will
be discussed in separate subsections on cities, states, and the
United States.
1. Municipal Immunity.-In Monroe v. Pape 9 2 the Supreme

Court held that cities were not "persons" for purposes of section
1983 damage actions and were thus absolutely immune to suit. The
Court eventually overruled this part of the Monroe decision in
Monell v. Department of Social Services'9 3 and held that cities

were persons under section 1983, but reserved the question of
94
what, if any, limited immunity the city would be allowed.1
Resolving a conflict among the circuits on this issue, the Owen
Court held that a city could not offer the good faith of its officials
as a defense to damages.' 9 5 Since the city officials involved were
entitled to the defense of good faith, "many victims of municipal
malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were also allowed
to assert a good-faith defense."' 9 6 In holding the city strictly liable,
the Court reasoned that "it is fairer to allocate any resulting financial loss to the inevitable costs of government borne by all the taxpayers, than to allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose
rights .
190.
191.

. .

have been violated."' 9 7 The Court also noted that

5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
See Newman, supra note 7, at 457.

192. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
193.
194.

436 U.S. 658 (1979).
Id. at 701.

195. 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
196. Id. at 651.
197. Id. at 655. (citations omitted).
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"[d]octrines of tort law have changed significantly. . . and our notions of governmental responsibility should properly reflect that evolution. No longer is individual 'blameworthiness' the acid test of
liability; the principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as
a factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct.' 198
The Court's focus on "equitable loss-spreading" is a significant
development in the area of constitutional litigation. Proper attention is given to the important question of who is best able to bear
the cost of official misconduct. A balancing test weighing the interest of the individual in redressing his injury and the public interest
in effective government is echoed in the Court's conclusion:
The innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of governmental authority is assured that he will be compensated for his
injury. The offending official, so long as he conducts himself in
good faith, may go about his business secure in the knowledge
that a qualified immunity will protect him from personal liability
for damages that are more appropriately chargeable to the populace as a whole. And the public will be forced to bear only the
cost of injury inflicted by the "execution of a government's policy
or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy."' 99
The majority's reliance on the desirability of equitable lossspreading was a crucial factor in its decision to hold the city liable
for the section 1983 violations of its employees. The belief that the
public should pay for official misconduct was not, however, shared
by all members of the Court. In a sharp dissenting opinion, Justice
Powell stated that "many local governments lack the resources
to withstand substantial unanticipated liability under § 1983."200
While Justice Powell's concern for the financial solvency of cities is
well-taken, it is also true that the city is in a better position to
avoid the loss by procuring liability insurance 20 1 than the innocent
victim of official wrongdoing.
198. Id. at 657.
199. Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
200. Id. at 670 (Powell, J., dissenting).
201. Procuring liability insurance may not be as easy as it seems, for some municipalities have been unable to procure insurance or have acquired it only at a very
high price. The burden is particularly great for small towns that have limited treasuries. One major recovery by a plaintiff in a constitutional tort suit could bankrupt an
entire town. The money that a small town may have to set aside for liability insurance may divert funds from municipal services. For a discussion of this problem, see
Transcript, CBS Reports, "See You in Court" 6-16 (July 9, 1980) (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
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The Owen Court cited MoneIl's holding that a city can be held
liable only when "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." 202 The Monell Court concluded that a city would be liable
for constitutional violations resulting from a city custom even if
such a custom has not been officially sanctioned by the city's
official decisionmaking channels. 20 3 However, that Court specifically rejected municipal liability based solely on a respondeat superior theory. 20 4 The Court reasoned that the language of section
1983 specifically requires a causal connection between the city's activity and the injury before liability could be imposed.20 5 Thus a
city is not liable just because it employs a wrongdoer. Most courts
have also refused to allow respondeat superior actions against a city
20 6
in a Bivens suit based on the fourteenth amendment.
Yet the reasoning in Owen outlined above is equally applicable
whether or not the constitutional violation can be tied to a policy
or custom of the municipality. The policy of equitable riskspreading serves to allocate costs and should not be limited only to
cases where a policy or custom of the city has "caused" the constitutional violation. 20 7 A plaintiff in City A would recover if he could
prove that his unlawful arrest was caused by a city policy, while a

202.

436 U.S. at 690.

203. Id. at 690-91, 694-95.
204.

Id. at 691.

205. Id. at 692.
206.

Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of respondeat

superior in a Bivens suit against a city based on the fourteenth amendment, various
courts of appeals have held that vicarious liability does not apply in a Bivens suit.
E.g., Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622, 623-25 (6th Cir. 1978) (incongruous to
allow respondeat superior in action based directly on fourteenth amendment and not
allow it in § 1983 suit against same city). Most courts hold that a city will be held liable only when a policy or custom causes the injury. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579
F.2d 152, 164 (2d Cir.) (en bane), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom.
City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978); Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d
846, 847-48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978); Nix v. Sweeney, 573 F.2d
998, 1003 (8th Cir. 1978); Jamison v. McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1977); Kostka
v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1977); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596,
600-01 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia,
454 F. Supp. 652, 676-77 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
207. The Monell Court interpreted the language of § 1983 as requiring a causal
relationship between the defendant's acts and the plaintiff's injuries. 436 U.S. at 692.
Furthermore, the Court found support for its interpretation of the statutory language
in the legislative history of § 1983. Id. at 692 n.57. For a contrary interpretation of
the legislative history, see Comment, supra note 183, at 526-36.
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plaintiff in City B would fail if he could not point to any such city

policy. 20 s Recovery should not depend on such fine distinctions.
There is no reason the restrictions imposed on respondeat superior in section 1983 actions should be imposed on a Bivens action

against a city based directly on the fourteenth amendment. 20 9 The
Court's decision in Monell was based on a reading of section 1983

requiring a causal connection between the defendant-city's act and
the injury before liability could be imposed. 210 Moreover, the
Court examined section 1983's legislative history and concluded that
Congress did not intend to impose vicarious liability on cities. 211
The Bivens cause of action should not be burdened by the legislative history of section 1983. The Bivens remand suggests that only

2 12
individual officials should be entitled to some form of immunity.
Moreover, the action was created to assure that plaintiffs not be

left without a remedy.2 13 This goal can be reached only if units of

government are liable for the constitutional violations of employees
regardless of whether the injury was caused by a municipal policy
or custom.
The dual objectives of section 1983 and Bivens suits-

deterring official misconduct and compensating the victim-would
be reached more frequently if respondeat superior actions were allowed.2 14 The plaintiff's chance of winning a civil rights action decreases when the defendant is a police officer.2 15 Juries are fre208. This creates substantial problems in line-drawing when determining
which constitutional injuries are the result of an official policy or custom. See 436
U.S. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring). Furthermore, the language of § 1983 need not be
read so narrowly. The argument has been made that the statute allows for respondeat
superior, since "[a]n official's acts are those of the municipal employer; the acts
'caused' by the official, so long as they fall within the scope of employment, are
'caused' by the municipality." Note, supra note 183, at 917.
209. The argument has been made that the restrictive interpretation given
respondeat superior in § 1983 actions will encourage many plaintiffs to sue a city in
a Bivens suit based directly on the fourteenth amendment. Note, supra note 183, at
550. But see Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1979).
210. 436 U.S. at 692.
211. The Court relied on congressional debate leading to the rejection of the
Sherman Amendment, which was viewed by its proponents "as a form of vicarious liability for the unlawful acts of the citizens of the locality." 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
Since Congress rejected this amendment and failed to use specific statutory language

creating vicarious liability in § 1983, the Court felt that the inference was quite
strong that Congress did not intend to impose respondeat superior liability on cities.
Id. But see Note, supra note 183, at 910-15.
212. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
213. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
214. See Newman, supra note 7, at 456.
215. See Project, supra note 7, at 800-02.
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quently sympathetic to the plight of the police officer who must
pay for a supposed error in judgment out of his or her own
paycheck.2 16 Even if the plaintiff wins, the officer is sometimes
judgment proof 2 17 Allowing respondeat superior actions not only
would assure a deserving plaintiff of compensation, but also would
"enhance the prospects for deterrence by placing responsibility for
the denial of constitutional rights on the entity with the capacity to
take vigorous action to avoid recurrence.- 2 18 If the appropriate employing agency-whether city, state, or federal-is liable for the
constitutional violations of its employees, there would likely be
greater monitoring of the employees' future actions to achieve con219
formity with constitutional requirements.
2. State Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment.-The eleventh amendment to the Constitution, though not so indicating on
its face, 220 has long been interpreted to bar suits by citizens of a
state against that state. 22 1 By section five of the fourteenth amendment, Congress is empowered to abolish a state's immunity. 222 Because section 1983 has been interpreted, on the basis of its legislative history, to allow suits against units of local government (which
are the creation of state governments), 22 3 one might conclude that
states are likewise subject to suit. However, in spite of compelling
evidence that Congress intended a waiver of state immunity when
enacting section 1983,224 a majority of the present Court have refused to allow the extension. 22 5 Bivens plaintiffs seeking damages
against a state government are unlikely to circumvent the Court's
roadblock, since only Congress-and not the judiciary--can enact a
2 26
waiver of the eleventh amendment immunity.
To speak of Bivens suits arising from unconstitutional state
conduct is therefore to speak of an unreality. With a variety of im216. Newman, supra note 7, at 456.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 457.
219. Id.
220. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI.
221. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
222. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
223. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1979).
224. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 349-66 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Marshall, J.).
225. Id. at 342-45; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-78 (1974).
226. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 456.
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munities and defenses, the likelihood of sympathetic juries, and
the potential of insolvent defendants, actions against state officials
are unlikely to bear fruit. The same policies underlying equitable
risk-spreading which support the creation of respondeat superior
suits against municipalities, likewise support the creation by Congress of similar actions against state governments. As Justice
Brennan indicated in Quern v. Jordan,227 only Congress can remove the shackles of immunity imposed by the courts on those
228
suing states.
3. The Immunity of the United States.-Sovereign immunity
as it applies to the United States is an outmoded concept, 229 with
its origin in the belief that the "King can do no wrong."2 30 It was
considered absurd for the King to be sued in his own court or to
send a writ to himself commanding his own presence in the King's
court.2 3 1 The monarch was looked upon with too much favor and
reverence to be subject to the same laws as ordinary persons. 232
But in the United States the people are sovereign. 2 33 The right of
the people should not yield to the sentiment of loyalty to the sovereign person of the monarch. A citizen's rights secured under the
Constitution of the United States should yield to no one. Congress
has waived the sovereign immunity of the United States in other
contexts and should do so for the violation of constitutional rights
by federal employees. The individual should not have to suffer official wrongdoing without redress just because the tortfeasors acted
in good faith and the United States will not take responsibility for
the actions of its employees.
One hundred and sixty years have passed since the Supreme
Court announced that no suit could be prosecuted against the
United States without the government's consent. 234 Nothing in the
227. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
228. Id. at 366 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Marshall, J.).
229. See Harley & Wasinger, Governmental Immunity: Despotic Mantle or
Creatureof Necessity, 16 WASHBURN L. REV. 12 (1976).
230. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695

(1949).
231. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 206.
232. Id. at 208.
233. Id.
234. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821); see
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 386, 389 (1850). Consent is established if Congress waives sovereign immunity by statute. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). Sovereign immunity also bars equitable relief against the United States. Jaffee v. United States, 592
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Constitution supports the antiquated doctrine of sovereign immunity. Reason dictates that since the cities are now liable for constitutional violations as determined by the Court in Monell and
Owen, the United States should also be responsible for the
unconstitutional activities of its employees. The Court's decisions
in these cases clearly focus on the principle of risk allocation. Individual fault is no longer the primary test for liability. It therefore
235
of sovseems logical that the "feudal and monarchistic doctrine"

ereign immunity should be abandoned by act of Congress and replaced by a policy of governmental responsibility. Financial loss is
best borne by all the taxpayers than by an individual officer-or by
the injured plaintiff.
D.

A Proposalfor Reform

Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens, made a suggestion
for reform in the context of fourth amendment violations: "Congress should develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy
against the government itself to afford compensation and restitution
for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated.
The venerable doctrine of respondeat superior in our tort law pro236
vides an entirely appropriate conceptual basis for this remedy."
The Chief Justice pointed out that if a person were illegally
searched by a department-store security guard, the obvious remedy would be an action against the department store for damages
based on a respondeat superior theory. 237 The same reasoning
should apply to an illegal search by an FBI agent: The plaintiff is at
least equally injured in either case-but a successful defense of
good faith by the FBI agent would leave the victim of that search
without a remedy. Chief Justice Burger also suggested that "the record of the police conduct that is condemned, could undoubtedly
become a relevant part of an officer's personnel file so that the
need for additional training or disciplinary action would be
identified or his future usefulness as a public official evaluated."238
This would provide for the second goal of a Bivens suitdeterrence of the unlawful behavior.239
F.2d 712, 717 n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); McKnight v. Civiletti,

497 F. Supp. 657, 660 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
235. W. PROSSER, supra note 186, § 131, at 971.
236. 403 U.S. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
237. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 423 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
239. Three years after Chief Justice Burger's remarks, Congress amended the
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Similar proposals have been introduced in the Senate 240 and
in the House of Representatives. 24 1 Judge Newman of the Second
Circuit has also proposed a statute that would be modeled on section 1983.242 Recently, the Committee on Federal Legislation of
Federal Tort Claims Act, effective March 16, 1974, to allow suits against the United
States for claims arising out of, inter alia, battery and false imprisonment. Act of
March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
2680 (1976)).
240. In introducing one such bill, S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. RBC.
S2919 (daily ed. March 15, 1979), Senator Edward Kennedy stated:
The current system for compensating citizens deprived of their constitutional rights by Federal officials is inadequate from the prespective of the
person injured by the unconstitutional conduct of a Federal employee, from
the perspective of the vast majority of Federal employees who carry out
their duties diligently and in good faith, and from the perspective of the
Federal Government.
Id. (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). The Senator pointed out that because of sovereign
immunity, a plaintiff's only present remedy is to sue the individual federal officers.
The proceedings are long, expensive, and rarely successful since the good faith defense results in few actual recoveries. The employee who has acted in good faith
fares no better under the present system since he or she faces "the spectre of financial ruin, the anxiety, and the damage to reputation which are inherent in any lawsuit which is, in essence, attacking his personal integrity." Id. (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy). The threat of potential liability discourages employees from doing their
jobs "vigorously and courageously." Id. (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Lastly, the
United States Government also loses because it foots the bill for supplying federal
officials sued in their personal capacities with private attorneys-at a cost of
$2,000,000 thus far. Id. (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Private counsel fees cost the
United States $554,306 for fiscal year 1976; $448,520 for 1977; $757,248 for 1978;
and $371,119 for the first part of 1979 (as of March 21, 1979). Amendment of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings on H.R. 2659 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979).
241. H.R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H1107 (daily ed. Mar. 6,
1979). For a discussion of the House Bill see Amendment of the Federal Tort Claims
Act: Hearings on H.R. 2659 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
242. The proposed statute reads as follows:
The employing department or unit of government of [elvery person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
United States or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. The United
States shall be entitled to intervene in any such action on behalf of the
plaintiff or to bring such action on behalf of the party injured. In any suit
brought pursuant to this statute, immunities and defenses available at common law, including the defense of good faith, are abolished. To establish liability, the plaintiff need establish by a preponderance of the evidence only
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the Association of the Bar of the City of NeW York suggested that
federal sovereign immunity be waived and that plairitiffs be allowed to sue both the United States and the individual official,
with recovery against the ermployee alilwable only if the plaintiff
establishes that the employee's acts wete the result of willfulness
or malicious intent.2 43 The gbvei-nment Wdiild ndt be allowed to assert the good faith of its employee as a defense. Thus, if ai bfflial
acted in good faith, iecoveiy wuld be ifll6wed ily d.gaifiA die
United States. That the bifibial e fbtffied a distidiif htniitfitii
would also be irrelevant . 244 Thus an ifijtiked pty *btld be :
kifipidyde
sured of a remedy, 45 while "innovative arid btbkdotd
2 46 idliy
itifilly
ks &dftbiii g
conduct" would be encouraged;
aiid
proteoted.
their functions" would be
The proposal offered by the bdflitiitti *btild fb6t the plaintiff to plead and prove the bad faith 6f the dffiiddltit itti rdf to
recover from him. It would be ior e~litable, giVei tt i fOidtive
availability of information, for the defeiiffit-dfficial to pleAd arid
prove his or her own good faith. Once the good faith of the defendant is established, he or she would not be liable; the United
States would then be strictly liable for the Official's unconstitutional
acts. If the defendant cannot establish his or her own good faith,
then recovery would be allowed only against the official and not
against the United States. This seems to be an adequate solution to
the problem of striking a balance between the rights of the injured
and the rights of federal officials. Prohibiting the United States
from pleading the good faith of its employees as a defense will provide the plaintiff with a more certain remedy. This waiver of sOvereign immunity and approval of respondeat superior actions will
protect the employee who made a bona fide error in judgment by
putting the ultimate responsibility for official wrongdoing on the
entity most able to pay-the government employer.
that the adverse action was taken against the party injured; liability can be
defeated when the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse action taken against the party injured was lawful.
Whenever a verdict is returned in favor of the party injured in a suit under
this statute, the Court shall award, in addition to compensatory damages determined by the trier of fact, a sum of $_ as liquidated damages for the
denial of a federally protected right.
Newman, supra note 7, at 467 n.72. (emphasis omitted).
243. COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION, supra note 23, at 4.
244. Id. at 15.

245. Id.
246. Id. at 24.
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DAMAGES

The law controlling the measurement of damages in Bivens actions is far from settled, with courts allowing divergent awards
based on a myriad of policy considerations. The Supreme Court addressed a related issue in the section 1983 context in Carey v.
Piphus,1 yet directed itself only to damages arising from violations
of procedural due process. 2 Subsequently, the lower courts have
applied Carey, sometimes indiscriminately, to Bivens actions encompassing the violation of substantive rights, without attempting3
to tailor their decisions to the particular infringement at issue.
Thus, the law remains in a state of flux.
This section will examine damage awards in both Bivens and
section 1983 cases with an eye toward the establishment and justification of a clear and concise framework within which the damage
issue can be considered. It has been recognized that "a Bivens-type
cause of action is the federal counterpart to claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 [and] that standards for determining injuries developed in §
1983 litigation are applicable in this context." 4 Section 1983 cases
provide a body of case law easily, though not always profitably,
guiding decisions in the Bivens context. Accordingly, they will be
considered throughout this section.
The measurement of damages in even the most simple tort
cases can prove to be difficult. 5 The presence of complex constitutional questions further confuses the issue in Bivens actions. Accordingly, a framework consisting of four injury categories is offered here to facilitate clear analysis. The first category (type I)
includes damages intended to compensate plaintiffs for actual, tangible injury-for example, the costs attendant to the destruction of
property in the course of an illegal search. Type II covers damages
for intangible but provable injury and includes, for example, psychological pain and suffering. The third category (type III) covers
damages designed to compensate plaintiffs for injuries inherent in
the violation of a constitutional right though not separately subsumed in either the first or second category. The premise for
creating the third category is that feelings of injustice, individual
1.
2.

435 U.S. 247, 264-65 (1978).
Id. at 266-67.

3. See cases cited note 62 infra.
4. Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 871 (3d Cir. 1975); see Green v. Carlson,
581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).

5. One illuminating example is provided by Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938).
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indignity, humiliation, and outrage resulting from constitutional violations are inherently worthy of compensation and that such damages serve to protect the system itself, apart from deterring future
action against individuals. 6 Type-IV damages are punitive in nature, designed to deter future similar conduct. The discussion will
focus primarily on type-III claims as these raise questions unique
to constitutional tort cases which are largely unsettled.
A.

The Inherent Value of ConstitutionalRights:
A ProcessArgument

The 1960's saw a rapid increase in the number of constitutional tort suits7 largely as a result of the Supreme Court's decision

in Monroe v. Pape.8 As the cause of action developed, courts consistently acknowledged the intrinsic importance of constitutional
rights. Yet absent proof of actual injury, the courts frequently undercut that premise by allowing only nominal damages. 9
While arguments for the monetary redress of constitutional violations are easily stated in terms of compensation and deterrence,
the rationale for redressing such violations on a separate ground is
less frequently acknowledged. The temptation to allow type-III
damages on substantive grounds is significant: As the argument develops, the individual indignity consequent to the knowledge that
one was deprived his or her constitutional rights leads to personal
humiliation, or pain and suffering. That reasoning, however, fails
on its own terms. To the extent that type-III damages would exist
solely for compensatory purposes, they are clearly subsumed in the
type-II classification.
The proper rationale lies not in substance, but in process. The
spectre of a government official depriving one of rights secured by
the Constitution is clearly outside the concept of due process. As
the Supreme Court recognized in Goss v. Lopez, 10 the "Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. 'Where a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake be6. These concepts are developed more completely at text accompanying notes
7-20 infra.
7.

[1970] DIR. OF AD. OFFICE OF U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 109; see Friedman, The

Good Faith Defense in Constitutional Litigation, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501, 501-03
(1977).
8. 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1135-37 (1977).
9. E.g., Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1973); Basista v. Weir, 340
F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
10. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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cause of what the government is doing to him' the minimal requirements of the Clause must be satisfied."' Still, though due
process is violated, how can damages be justified absent proof of
injury? It is here that the arguments for process values extend beyond judicial rdcess to legal process in general. Three process
vahies, equality, dignity, and partibipation, 12 are implicated in the
cofistitritibnl tort context.
The eqUality value has generally been recognized as militating
iri
favor of "bqtial access and eqtial opportunity to influence the
deciionmake.' i 3 H'6wevek, the value is most significant to the exteiit it "generates pUblic cofifidence and respect for law." 14 Thus,
just ds the equality value is maligned by insufficient judicial proces§, it is tfialigried by othe- types of inadequate legal process
iriclUdihf, fb- exatihple, the failtire to obtain a valid warrant conseqtienit to a fou-th amienidment search. Moreover, the absence of actual damages is irrelevant: Once an individual is singled out for
treatment riot otherwise accorded all citizens, injury has occurred.
The second value, the dignity value, "accords individuals respect and promotes their grounds for self-respect, thus militating
against alienating and degrading procedures."' 15 The dignity value
is distinguishable from the equality value in that its roots lie primarily in the recognition that, even absent unfair treatment relative to the rest of society, "the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing,"16 is violated by insufficient legal process.
Whether or not one's neighbors' homes are searched illegally cannot logically eliminate the separate standing of the dignity value.
The third process value, the participation value, relates to
one's feelings relative to government control of the particular legal
process at issue. Among the three values discussed here, the participation value is most closely connected to the revolutionary era
idea that "power wielded without accountability to those on whom
it focuses"'17 is the "antithesis"' 8 of good government. Thus, the
11. Id. at 574 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
12. See Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for
"Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1974).

13. Taub, Ex Porte Proceedings in Domestic Violence Situations: Alternative
Frameworksfor ConstitutionalScrutiny, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 95, 121 (1980).
14. Summers, supra note 12, at 10.
15. Taub, supra note 13, at 121.
16. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 503 (1978) (emphasis
in original).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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fourth amendment's requirement that warrants be issued by a neutral magistrate only on a showing of probable cause 19 can be seen
as an effort to provide individuals with an indirect role in the
decisionmaking process. When the government ignores the system,
it violates individual rights of participation, engendering injury
even absent damage to the equality and dignity values.
The process-based justification for monetary redress cannot
properly be viewed as compensatory since it goes beyond any empirical measurement of actual injury. It cannot be categorized as
purely deterrence-based, since it serves some remedial function. It
seems best viewed as organic. Organicism suggests "that life and
living processes are the manifestation of an activity possible only in
virtue of the state of autonomous organization of the system rather
than because of its individual components." 20 Our constitutional
system, befitting a nation of laws and not individuals, requires for
its proper and continuous functioning a built-in method of protection that serves its broader purpose of self-effectuation while at the
same time allowing appropriate regard for its individual parts. Organic damages, then, foster the ideal of perpetual constitutional
government even while meeting the needs of its day-to-day beneficiaries. Type-III damages protect each individual mechanism in the
system, yet also serve to protect the system as a whole even apart
from the particular mechanism at issue.
B.

Cases Prior to Carey v. Piphus

Decisions of the federal courts regarding damages in a constitutional tort context were marked with indecisiveness and contradiction prior to the Carey decision. While the courts frequently acknowledged the inherent importance of constitutional rights, many
belied this basic belief by allowing only nominal compensatory
damages unless the plaintiff proved actual injury.21 Conversely,
other courts have granted substantial monetary awards to plaintiffs
proving only a violation of their constitutional rights and no actual
injury. 22 These awards have been based on the premise that constitutional rights are of such fundamental importance to American so19. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
20. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1590 (1971).
21. E.g., Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1973); Basista v. Weir, 225
F. Supp. 619 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd in relevant part, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
22. E.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 372 F. Supp. 1322 (N.D. Ill.
1972), aff'd, 491
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd,
446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

155

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:943

ciety that their infringement alone, even absent proof of actual injury, merits substantial compensation.
In United States ex rel. Motley v. Rundle, 23 the plaintiff, a
black prisoner at a state correctional institution, had been working
at a 690-a-day prison job when he was temporarily transferred to
another institution pending a habeas corpus hearing. Upon returning to the original institution, he was demoted to a 150-a-day
position. White inmates forced to leave the institution temporarily
had maintained their jobs and salaries upon their return. The
plaintiff brought suit against the prison superintendent under section 1983, claiming an equal protection violation. 24 The trial court,
in finding for the plaintiff, held that "the constitutional rights of a
citizen are so valuable to him that an injury is presumed to flow
from the deprivation itself."2 5 The court believed that hurt feelings, outrage, and humiliation are the natural consequences of
unconstitutional conduct by government officials. 2 6 These type-III
injuries, however, were found to be worthy of only nominal compensatory damages. 27 Similarly, in Basista v. Weir, 2 s also arising
under section 1983, the Third Circuit held that only "nominal damages are proved by proof of deprivation of a right to which the
plaintiff was entitled."29
Conversely, in Sexton v. Gibbs, 30 the plaintiff was granted
substantial damages in a section 1983 suit for the violation of his
constitutional rights, even though he did not claim actual injury in
any specified amount.3 1 The violations alleged arose from an
unconstitutional search by police officers of the plaintiff's automobile.3 2 The court, in granting $750 damages, stated that "there is
23. 340 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
24. Id. at 808-09.
25. Id. at 811.
26. Id.
27. Although the court specified that it was awarding a nominal amount for
type-III injury, it did not make it clear what that amount was. The court only noted
that "nominal damages may be awarded for these natural consequences of lawless
action by state officials," id., in granting a lump sum for actual proven injury. Id. at
810-11. The Supreme Court equated nominal damages with an award "not to exceed
one dollar" in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 267 (1978) (violation of procedural due
process). See text accompanying notes 37-60 infra.
28. 225 F. Supp. 619 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd in relevant part, 340 F.2d 74 (3d
Cir. 1965).
29. 340 F.2d at 87.
30. 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
31. Id. at 136, 142-43.
32. Id. at 137.
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no doubt that the plaintiff suffered humiliation, embarrassment and
discomfort in addition to being deprived of his federally protected
rights . . . . "33
In Tatum v. Morton, 34 a group of individuals was unlawfully
arrested while participating in a peaceful demonstration outside the
White House. The protesters brought suit, based on Bivens,
against the police, federal officials, and the District of Columbia,
alleging, inter alia, the violation of their first amendment rights.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in holding that the trial court
took too limited a view regarding damages, 35 stated:
The vindication of these rights warrants more than token
acknowledgement.... Compensation for denial of First Amendment rights should not be extravagant . . . . Correspondingly
such a compensation award should not be approached in a niggardly spirit. It is in the public interest that there be a reasonably spacious approach to a fair compensatory award for denial or
curtailment of the right to demonstrate. 36
The court thus recognized the inherent value of constitutional
rights in the case of a right the very nature of which might otherwise be said to defy valuation.
Motley, Basista, Sexton, and Tatum provide a representative
view of the state of the law prior to Carey regarding the valuation
of constitutional rights. In juxtaposition, the decisions present an
apparent contradiction: The same rights which are held to be so
precious that injury is presumed to flow from the deprivation itself
often are found to be worthy of only nominal damages.
C. Carey v. Piphus
Carey v.
presented two cases consolidated at the trial
level. 38 In the first case, the plaintiff was suspended from school by
the assistant principal for the alleged use of marijuana.3 9 In the
Piphus37

33. Id. at 143.
34. 386 F. Supp. 1308 & 402 F. Supp. 719 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd in relevant
part, 562 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
35. Plaintiffs had sought $10,000 in compensatory damages per plaintiff, per violation, and were awarded a total of only $100 per plaintiff. 386 F. Supp. at 1311-14.
36. 562 F.2d at 1282.
37. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
38. P.U.S.H. v. Carey, No. 73-C-2522; Piphus v. Carey, No. 74-C-303 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 5, 1975) (mem.), reprintedin Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari app., at A5.
39. Piphus v. Carey, No. 74-C-303 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 1975) (mem.), reprintedin
Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari app., at A6-7.
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spond cse, the l nt, ws spsleded for violating a school rule
prohihing t4 wpar-g of earrings by male students. 40 The plaintiffs ified section 1983 suits against the school officials in federal
district court, arguing that they had been suspended without due
process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 41 The district court upheld plaintiff's claims on the merits but declined to
award damages in light of the lack of evidence of actual injury. The
42
court believed that any award allowed would be speculative.
The Qqurt qf Appeals, for tlp Seventh Circuit reversed and re433ssue.
uandp4 pn the daMage
The court believed that compensatpf O.,age are rcppqyprale for a violation of procedural due
prpes.§, a t4py would bp fqr the deprivation pf voting rights or
qpr ,pnfstpiiqnal r1ghts. 44 Even absent proof that the suspensjpns wpre upjustified pr that pecuniary loss had resulted consequept to t e 1rocecdiral denjal's, the court held that damages
shojld be gr1pted splely "far the injury which is 'inherent in the
'"rqg'.
45 As to valuation, the court instructed the
natrp qf th
Ms.
4 Pt ppqrt tbt the ,apu fixed on remand "should be neither
so small as to triyiqlize the right nor so large as to provide a windfall."4 6 The Seventh Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit in Tatumn v.
Morton,47 was determined to protect the integrity of constitutional
rights by recognizing a special category of damages.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed. 48 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, asserted that section 1983 required proof of actual injury if recovery was to be allowed. 49 He
then suggested courts adopt a flexible position regarding damages
in order to further the purpose of section 1983, and rejected strict
reliance on common law tort models for valuing injury in constitu40. P.U.S.H. v. Carey, No. 73-C-2522 (N.D. III. Nov. 5, 1975) (mem.), reprinted
in Peitiqne rs' Brief for Certiorari app., at A7-8.
41. Nos. 73-C-2522, 74-C-303, reprinted in Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari app.,
at A§79.
42. Id., reprintedin Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari app., at A13-14.
43. Carey v. Piphus, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976).
44. Id. at 31 (citing Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d
569 (7th Cir. 1975) (controlling availability of damages)), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963
(1976).
45. Id. (quoting Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d at
580).
46. Id. at 32 (footnote omitted).
47. 562 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
48. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
49. Id. at 254-57.
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tional tort cases. Thus, "rules governing compensation for injuries
caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored
to the interests protected by the particular right in question
.... "50 In spite of the reference to protected interests, however,
the Court equated compensable injury in the procedural due process context with emotional suffering:
In sum, then, although mental and emotional distress caused by
the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under
§ 1983, we hold that neither the likelihood of such injury nor
the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was
51
caused.
The Court's joint focus on protected interests and provable
emotional injury is inherently contradictory. If, as the Court suggests, there is little likelihood of emotional injury, thus pretermitting the question of compensation, due process interests intended to be protected may be violated with impunity. At the
same time, the Court invites boilerplate proof of emotional distress
by stating that "we foresee no particular difficulty in producing evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was caused by
the denial of procedural due process itself."52 And the Court's belief that "a person may not even know that procedures were deficient until he enlists the aid of counsel to challenge a perceived
substantive deprivation" 5 3 is unavailing. The appropriate question
-even in the Court's analysis-is whether compensable injury occurs, not how the plaintiff becomes aware of its legal consequences.
The distinction of defamation per se in this context 54 is unconvincing. As with constitutional violations, defamation plaintiffs may
not know the legal ramifictions of a libel or slander-or even of
its existence-until apprised by a third party.
Beyond the unsound analytical foundation of the Carey opinion rests a disconcerting valuation of procedural rights. The Court,
having required proof of actual injury, next addressed the availability of nominal damages. 55 In affirming their availability even where
valuation is problematic, the Court recognized that "[b]y making
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 263.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 266-67.
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the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual ipjury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed .... "56
Based on this, and on a recognition that procedural due process
"does not depend on the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions, " 57 the Court held that the claimants were "entitled to recover nominal damages not to exceed one dollar .
"58 Even assuming that plaintiffs will be predisposed to bring suits enforcing
procedural due process guarantees with the prospect of recovering
only one dollar, it is difficult to conceive of government officials tailoring their procedural decisions in light of the threatened liability,
so defined. Given the complexities of procedural due process,5 9 a
stronger admonition from the judiciary seems necessary if "organized society"' 60 is to organize along constitutional lines.
D. Toward a Post-CareyModel
Since the Carey decision, trial courts have granted only nominal damages for the violation of procedural due process absent
proof of actual injury. 61 Some courts also have extended Carey,
holding that violations of substantive constitutional rights are compensable with only nominal damages absent proof of individualized
injury. 62 An automatic extension, however, is unwarranted in light
of the specificity of the Carey Court's reason for granting certio-

56. Id. at 266.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 267 (emphasis added). The Court noted that the recovery of nominal
damages would depend on a finding by the district court on remand that petitioners'
suspensions were justified. Id. Presumably, were the suspensions unjustified, the
question of valuing substantive rights would have arisen. The Court also stated that

"substantial damages should be awarded . . . in the case of exemplary or punitive
damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights." Id. at 266.
59. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Mashaw, Administrative
Due Process As Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. (Summer 1981) (forthcoming); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976).
60. 435 U.S. at 266.
61. E.g., Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1978), Powell v.
Ward, 487 F. Supp. 917, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Parks v. Goff, 483 F. Supp. 502, 509
(E.D. Ark. 1980); Craig v. Franke, 478 F. Supp. 19, 22 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
62. E.g., Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980) (first amendment violation); Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1978) (first
amendment violation).
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rari 63 and its ultimate holding. 64 That decision warned against simplistic consistency in the valuation of constitutional rights:
[T]he elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appro-

priate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one
constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate
injuries caused by the deprivation of another. As we have said
. . . these issues must be considered with reference to the nature
of the interests protected by the particular constitutional right in
question. 65
The Bill of Rights was, of course, intended to protect interests not
necessarily apparent on the face of the amendments. 6 6 Accordingly,
each constitutional violation must be examined separately, with
strict attention paid to its individual nature and the interests
abused before any damage formula can be found applicable.
At least one court has acknowledged the inapplicability of
Carey's procedural due process holding to the violation of other
constitutional rights. In Halperin v. Kissinger,67 a former member
of the National Security Council Staff alleged that his home telephone had been illegally wiretapped. Ten former federal officials,
including Richard Nixon, John Mitchell, Henry Kissinger, and
H.R. Haldeman, 68 were sued, in part on a Bivens theory. 69 The
District Court for the District of Columbia held, as to damages,
"that there is no demonstrable injury here [and] plaintiffs are not
entitled to an award of compensatory damages. . . . It is evident,
therefore, that the only pecuniary relief available to plaintiffs is
70
nominal damages in the amount of One Dollar."
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that "[e]ven
63. "We granted certiorari [430 U.S. 964 (1977)] to consider whether, in an action under § 1983 for the deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must
prove that he actually was injured by the deprivation before he may recover substantial 'nonpunitive' damages." 435 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
64. "[T]he denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal
damages without proof of actual injury." 435 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
65. Id. at 264-65 (emphasis added).
66. See generally Ely, Toward a Representation Reinforcing Model of Judicial
Review, 37 MD. L. REv. 451 (1978); Kaufman, Book Review, 9 HOFSTA L. REv. 1111
(1981) (reviewing J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)).
67. 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976) & 434 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd
in relevant part, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
49 U.S.L.W. 4782 (June 22, 1981) (per curiam).
68. 424 F. Supp. at 840.
69. 434 F. Supp. at 1195.
70. Id.
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if a constitutional violation inflicts only intangible injury, compensation is still appropriate." 7 1 Injury including " 'stigmatization, invasion of privacy, interference with personality development, and
interference with . . . freedom of association'

"72

would merit rea-

sonable compensation. Moreover, the showing might be made
"through direct testimony of the plaintiffs or might be 'Inferred
from the circumstances' .

.

.."7

The Court of Appeals' decision provides a general framework
within which the decision to allow damage awards can be considered. The court carefully distinguished the Supreme Court's Carey
opinion, stating that "[tihe substantive rights asserted by the
Halperins are of a much different character. . .. "74 In focusing on
the interests protected by the constitutional provisions at issue instead of the presence or absence of actual injury, the court was
able to consider, albeit implicitly, the morphogenesis of protection
afforded interests in personal liberty and privacy. 75 Indeed, the
opinion fairly implies that the inadequacy of the common law tort
model necessitated special constitutional protection.76 Thus, the
first step of the court's analysis-an inquiry into protected
interests-allows the second step-an inference that the existence
of special protection presumes the presence of compensable injury.
Given the historical interrelationship of many of the rights incorporated by the first ten amendments 77 and the jurisprudential and
precedential themes supporting the judiciary's power to utilize
traditionally available remedial powers in their protection, 78 the inference of compensability is not surprising.
The final step of the Halperin analysis, which was to be taken
by the district court on remand, requires the determination of the
amount of the damage award. While the circuit court's own guidance on the issue was general, 79 it did note that "Congress in Title
71. 606 F.2d at 1207.
72. Id. (quoting Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 871 (3d Cir. 1975)).
73. Id. at 1208 (emphasis added) (quoting Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d
634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1974)).
74. Id. at 1207 n.100.
75. See id. at 1207-08 & nn. 97-100. The evolution of preconstitutional and constitutional safeguards is discussed at pp. 952-956 supra.
76. See 606 F.2d at 1207-08 & nn. 97-100.
77. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting,
joined by Warren, C.J., and Black and Brennan, JJ.); Ullman v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 445 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.); Butler v. United
States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973).
78. These themes are developed at pp. 948-969 supra.
79. See 606 F.2d at 1208.
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III identified $100 a day as the proper award for victims of unlaw-

ful wiretapping." 80

Because Title III did not apply to the

Halperins' claim, 81 the congressional estimate could be only advisory. 82 The reference to a congressional determination, however,
does suggest a viable solution to the damage issue.

Judicial authority to utilize a traditionally available remedy
does not co-opt legislative power to define the contours of that

83
remedy, absent frustration of a constitutionally compelled result.

Because legislative decisionmaking has the advantages of a deliberative process, Congress is in a better position than is the judiciary

to consider the monetary ramifications of a violation of constitutional rights. 8 4 One federal statute, the wiretapping provision discussed in Halperin,8 5 provides a model for future congressional action regarding damages in Bivens suits. Section 802 of the

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196886 authorizes
the award of liquidated damages to "[a]ny person whose wire or
oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in viola-

tion" 87 of standards set forth in the Act. Subsection (a) provides for
80. Id. at 1208 n.106.
81. Id. at 1202 n.65.
82. Id. at 1208 n.106: "Although not directly controlling for Fourth Amendment
violations .... [o]ne would expect substantial correspondence between that legislatively established figure for compensation and the amount appropriate for Fourth
Amendment violations involving similar harms flowing from similar actions."
83. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 406-07 & n.7 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (setting aside question whether Congress could repudiate Bivens remedy within its constitutional
power).
84. E.g., id. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting): "Legislation is the business of the
Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task-as we do not."
85. 606 F.2d at 1208 n.106.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976):
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed,
or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action
against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other
person to intercept, disclose, or use such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person(a) actual damages but not less that liquidated damages computed
at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violations or $1,000, whichever
is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred.
A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this
chapter or under any other law.
87.

Id.
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"actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at
the rate of $100 a day for each violation or $1000, whichever is
higher."8 8 Significantly, it has been held that plaintiffs can recover
the full liquidated amount even absent a showing of any actual in89
jury.
Because of the restrictions imposed by the common law tort
model, courts are poorly equipped to award damages where evidence of actual injury is difficult to show. 90 Yet, as at least four circuits have recognized, 91 the personal and social injury suffered by
the victim of unconstitutional conduct may have serious, though
difficult-to-prove consequences. The propriety of legislative action
setting damage awards for constitutional violations is supported by
the reemergence of conceptualism as the prevailing foundation for
modem tort law. 92 The rejection of "an atomizing of the subject of
Torts," 93 which could carry with it modification of the actual-injury
doctrine, 94 presupposes that there is "nothing wrong with legisla88. Id. §(a).
89. Campiti v. Walonis, 467 F. Supp. 464, 466 (D. Mass. 1979).
90. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.1, at 403 (2d ed. 1977).

91. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Paton v.
LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 871 (3d Cir. 1975); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634,
636-38 (7th Cir. 1974); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970).
92.

See G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 178 (1980).

93. Id. at 211.
94. There are at least two areas in which the common law actual-injury doctrine has been modified without legislative action. The doctrine of defamation per se
"is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages
without evidence of actual loss." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349
(1974). Justification for the presumption of injury lies in the belief that "statements
that are defamatory per se by their very nature are likely to cause mental and emotional distress, as well as injury to reputation, so there arguably is little reason to require proof of this kind of injury .... Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978).
The Carey Court considered and rejected the argument that the rationale for presumed injury in defamation per se cases should be extended to constitutional tort
cases. Id. at 263-64; see text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
A second area in which the courts have modified the actual-injury doctrine involves the deprivation of voting rights. In Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir.
1919), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated:
In the eyes of the law this right is so valuable that damages are presumed
from the wrongful deprivation of it without evidence of actual loss of money,
property, or any other valuable thing, and the amount of the damages is a
question peculiarly appropriate for the determination of the jury, because
each member of the jury has personal knowledge of the value of the right.
Id. at 66 (citing Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 65 (1900); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S.
58, 89 (1897)). The Wayne court allowed an award of $2,000 to each plaintiff. Id. at
65, 70. The presumption of compensable injury in voting-rights cases is founded on
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tive invasions of common law areas . . . with sweeping doctrinal

change if public sentiment demand[s] it, or with the transformation
of Torts into a subject, like administrative law, that use[s] private
disputes as a basis for making public rules." 95
In the context of comprehensive legislation dealing with damage awards, the various (and not always consonant) considerations
of compensation, deterrence, 96 certainty, and procedural validity97
could be subsumed in solving for the all-encompassing goal of organic stability. 98 Thus the three-centuries-old admonition of Chief
Justice Pratt in Wilkes v. Wood 9 9 can be given full effectuation:
"Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from
any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself."100

"grounds of public policy, the importance of the personal right, and the difficulty of

vindicating it in any other way." Jaffarian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 407, 183 N.E.
110, 112 (1932). In Carey, the Supreme Court acknowledged the voting-rights exception to the actual-injury doctrine, 435 U.S. at 264-65 n.22, but refused to extend the
reasoning to a violation of procedural due process. The Court's recognition of the
voting-rights exception, however, does suggest that violations of substantive rights
are distinct, for Carey's purposes, from violations of procedural rights.
95. G.E. WHITE, supra note 92,at 178.
96. It is well-settled since Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), that Bivens
plaintiffs may be awarded punitive damages. Id. at 21-22. It is also apparent that punitive damages may be awarded even absent a showing of actual injury. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1965); Tracy v.
Robbins, 40 F.R.D. 108, 113 (D.S.C. 1966)). The Third Circuit, in Basista v. Weir,
stated:
There is neither sense nor reason in the proposition that such additional
[punitive] damages may be recovered by a plaintiff who is able to show that
he has lost $10, and may not be recovered by some other plaintiff who has
sustained, it may be, far greater injury, but is unable to prove that he is
poorer in pocket by the wrongdoing of defendant.
340 F.2d 74, 88 (3d Cir. 1965). For a general discussion, see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.3 (1973).
97. Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-27
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), while largely concerned with the validity of the exclusionary rule, also suggested that the use of traditional litigation was an ineffective
method of compensating victims of unconstitutional conduct. He suggested that Congress create a quasi-judicial structure to deal with constitutional tort claims. Id. at
422-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
98. See text accompanying notes 7-20 supra.
99. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
100. Id. at 498-99.
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CONCLUSION

The idea that a separation of powers is of the first principles of
government is commonly traced' to Montesquieu's De l'Esprit des
2
Loix. While Montesquieu's work was not the first on the subject,
the emphasis devoted to the role of the judiciary was unique 3 and
later found acceptance among the framers of the American Constitution. 4 Madison predicted that the federal judiciary would play a
special role in enforcing the Bill of Rights; 5 even Jefferson, one not
likely to express great confidence in a nonmajoritarian body, saw
reason to place faith in an independent judiciary. 6
The judiciary's strength is in its structure: It can fulfill its constitutional role without the burdens of a cumbersome deliberative
process or an everpresent popular influence. 7 Its decisions, however, must be tailored to the litigants and the issues before the
court. Thus the Supreme Court's most far-reaching decisions are
also most often troublesome. Only simple issues can be resolved in
one decision.
In exercising their separate powers, the branches of the federal government were never intended to be "kept totally separate
and distinct." 8 Where judicial decisions recognize new causes of action, there is a special need for legislation to answer the many procedural and substantive questions that will undoubtedly arise in litigation. The lack of popular support for any particular action prior
to the original decision may explain the legislature's initial
nonaction in the same area; however, inaction following that decision can result only in inconsistent judicial decisions, wasted resources, and constitutional rights watered down by the rigorous
burdens of enforcing them.
Ten years after Bivens, the substantive contours of the action, 9
1.

M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 76

(1967).
2. Montesquieu's work in this area was influenced by John Locke and other
English writers. Id.
3. Id.
4. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
5. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (remarks of James
Madison).
6. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), reprinted in
14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659, 659 (J. Boyd ed. 1958).
7. See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS passim (1980).

8. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 331 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
9.

See pp. 970-1018 supra.
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the procedure governing its institution,' ° the immunities available
2
to defendants," and the measure of damages awarded plaintiffs'
all remain unsettled. History teaches that the judiciary shoulders
the unique responsibility of protecting constitutional rights; 13 at the
same time, the limits of the judicial power strongly suggest that
the legislature should provide a clear and complete program to effectuate the judicial decision. The many and varied questions remaining to be faced by courts hearing Bivens claims should be addressed by Congress and should be resolved consistent with the
purpose of the action itself. the provision of meaningful redress to
those whose constitutional fights are violated by government officials.
Sarah Callahan
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